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It is often thought that coordination of national regional
policies in the European Community is very difficult because
of the widely different character of these policies. However,
although the functions and methods of regional policies can
differ, it appears that there is a remarkable similarity between
the regional policies of the Member States. Regional policy and
the desire for more democratic and efficient local and regional
government being the principal basis, it appears that there is
also similarity between the Member States in matters of regio-
nalization. Reforms of existing structures are marked by
amalgamation of municipalities and by the emergence of a two
tier intermediate structure (micro-and macro-regions).
The regional policy of the EC is weakened by the absent of a
coherent set of measures in the treaties but also by the lack
of real coordination of national regional policies. Differences
are not so large that coordination is impossible; it seems more
that the political will has failed. However, if the EC institutions
move further towards a new regional policy, they will probably
meet the same problem which the national governments have come up
against: the need for new political and administrative structures
in particular at the level of intermediate government. When
elaborating regionalization (establishment of micro and macro
regions) they should take account of this European dimension.
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This thesis aims to cast light on the main reasons for
reorganisation of the structure of local and regional
government in the Member States of the European Community,
on the reorganisation itself and on regional implications
for the institutions of the E.C.
I was fortunate enough to receive a scholarship from the
University of Edinburgh, which enabled me to stay from
October 1973 until July 197& at the Centre of European
Governmental Studies. Most of the research has been done
there, although I was able to make some study visits in
the other Member States. I am grateful that I could be
three years a member of so stimulating an academic community.
Because I had to return to my home country to do my military
service, research was completed at the end of A(\ l6.
I owe much debt of gratitude to my supervisors Professor
J.D.B. Mitchell and Mr R. McAllister for their help at
all stages in the preparation of this thesis; in particular
at the end, when the Channel separated us, they have made
great efforts to read and comment my drafts. They are not,
of course, to be implicated either in my arguments or
my conclusions. I want to express my thanks to them for
their intellectual help and also for their patient refining
of my English.
I must also thank Mrs E. Hendry of Fife for the typing and




Since integration (l) of the Vest-European states really
started in 1952, with the establishment of the European
Coal and Steel Community soon followed by the establishment
of the European Economic Community and Euratom 1957, a lot
of studies, books and articles have appeared on this subject.
Some discuss the progress of integration in general, others
deal with specific topics such as the common agricultural
policy, the European Communities* external relations, its
energy problems or its social policy. It is hard to think
of any political, legal, economic or social aspect of any
significance for European integration which has not yet
been subjected to serious examination. Structural problems
too have received considerable attention from politicians,
european activists and researchers. Most of their work
concerns either the establishment of a European equivalent
to the United States of America showing an idealistic but
not too realistic approach to European integration, or ways
of improving the functioning of the present institutions,
i.e. the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament. Certain improvements have been made, for
example the establishment of a single executive for the three
communities in 19^5, but in general the institutional
framework is still the same as set out in the original treaties.
The greatest achievement yet would seem to be the agreement
to hold direct elections for the European Parliament in 1979,
which will probably give a new stimulus to European inte-
sgration.
(l) As opposed to traditional international cooperation
(for example the Council of Europe or the United Nations),
integration implies that an organisation has some powers
of its own, comparable to the powers of central govern¬
ment; that decisions can be taken on the basis of
majority decisions; that persons which do not represent
the member states can participate in the decision making
process; that decisions are directly applicable in the
legal order of the member states; that there is a court
to protect the legal system. See P. Reuter, Organisations
Europeennes , Paris 1970, p. 35-37»
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An aspect of the European Communities' structure which
has received little attention so far is that of the
internal structures of its Member States. It is generally
acknowledged that these structures must be democratic
and it seems to be generally agreed that the present nine
members meet this requirement. True, the emerging European
Union is an integration process of individual states and
local and regional structures are still a purely internal
affair; no one could seriously contemplate setting up a
similar local and regional structure for the Community as
a whole. However, a simple comparison of the internal
structures of two or three member States seems too limited
an approach. There are phenomena today at European and
national state level which may be of some significance to
the further development of European integration, in par¬
ticular the growing concern, both at national and European
level, to reduce regional disequilibria. This is usually
linked with the reforms or reform proposals regarding local
and regional government in all Member States. The link
between regional policy and regionalization (l) is often
exaggerated: regionalization is not, as sometimes seems to
be suggested, necessarily the basis of regional policy.
Governments in the E.E.C. have a variety of specific economic
and financial tools at their disposal to reduce regional
imbalances; modernisation of local and regional government
can be considered as an administrative and political
means of achieving more harmonious development inside the
state. Regionalization is a means of achieving a successful
regional policy not a conditio sine qua non. An analysis
x
of regional policy and regionalization shows how a broaden¬
ing of the concept of regional policy is also accompanied
by the growth of regionalization. If this is so at national
level, then there is good reason to take a close look at the
(l) See p.6 for a further definition of regionalization.
3.
evolution of European regional policy and its possible
repercussions regarding regionalization in the Member
States. If this link is also established on the European
level, the success of the E.E.C.'s regional policy would
then depend partly on the further evolution of internal
structural reforms in the Member States, which would point
to the need for some harmonization in this field.
However, an analysis of regionalization, related to national
and European regional policy, may create an impression that
this process has no other aspects interesting enough to be
taken into account. It is remarkable that regionalization
and local reform are underway at present in all Member States,
as well as in some other European Countries such as Sweden
and Spain. If similar phenomena, exist in the same period
in th^iistory in almost half a continent then there must
be fundamental reasons. So why is this evolution taking
place? Of course, there are specific circumstances in
each state, but we can look for similarities among these
reforms and some common causes may emerge. Given the same
basic reasons, are the Member States1 modernization plans
evolving in the same direction, or are there contradictory
tendencies? From the point of view of further integration,
it would therefore be valuable to compare regionalization
not just in two or three states, but in all nine. Such a
comparison could also have a wider significance in the
context of the integration process as a whole: the sup¬
ranational institutions of a European union with federal
characteristics w«uld have great functional difficulties
with widely diverse internal structures in its Member
States. It is a characteristic of a federal structure to
have a direct relationship with its members. Therefore
too many different and perhaps incompatible internal
structures in the Member States would be a complicating
factor for consultation and cooperation between European
and regional institutions; this concerns regional and
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other policies (transport, social environment to give a
few) .
We shall therefore analyse the overall evolution of regional
policy in the Member States and of their local and regional
reforms. If we can establish the link between regional
policy and regionalization and if we find some common
general reasons of another nature, then it will be interest¬
ing to consider whether there is any "automatic" harmoniz¬
ation between the Member States and if so, what. A study
of regional policy at European level will lead them inev:
itably to conclusions about the further evolution of the
Member States' reforms, and a desirable course for this
evolution to take.
5.
In order to avoid misunderstandings and vrong expectations,
it is necessary to define the method of work and some terms
which are crucial to the content of this thesis and which
are used by different people in different ways, in particular
the terms "regionalism" and "regionalization".
1. Method of Work
Our research starts from two simple facts: all Member
States have elaborated regional policies to reduce regional
an
imbalances, mainly those ofveconomic nature, and all Member
States have carried out significant modifications in thei r
local and regional structures. We are concerned in the
first place with the second fact: the form these modif¬
ications have taken and their causes and a comparison
of them in the context of feuropean integration: regional
policy will be considered only in its relationship to
regionalization. This involves no real economic discussion
beyond a description of the economic evolution since the
reconstruction of the countries concerned after the second
world war. Thus there will be no profound discussion of
national regional imbalances and their origins, nor will
there be a macro-economic analysis of national or European
regional policy. The aim is to give an overall picture as
background to our main topic which is regionalization in
the E.E.C.
We have indicated already that there are other reasons for
local and regional reforms. Here too the same approach
will be taken as with regional policy: specific national
circumstances will not be studied in depth; we are looking
in the first place for reasons common to all Member States
and specific causes will be mentioned only when they are of
fundamental interest. The first two chapters thus give
a general picture of the two main reasons for local and
regional reforms in the Member States. This is followed
by a comparative discussion of these reforms themselves,
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which is hampered by the additional problem of the
dissimilarity of terminology and institutions in the
various states which makes such a comparison a hazardous
enterprise. Therefore a scheme will be put forward into
which we can more or less fit existing local and regional
structures; this also has advantage or clarifying what
we mean by regionalization.
In the second part, regional policy of the E.E.C. will
be analysed, which may reveal some parallel evolution
with the Member States' regional policies. Only at the
end of these chapters will it be possible to make final
comments about the local and regional reforms in the Member
States, placing them in the full perspective of national
and european repercussions. The analysis of European
regional policy will be more profound than that of
national regional policies because its implications for
the final conclusions are more weighty, and because they
have rarely been discussed.
However, first we need to define regionalism and regional-
Ization as these words will be used in the following
chapters.
2. Regional policy, regionalism and regionalization
The word "region" is so often used in many different
significations and combinations that great misunders t Bind¬
ings would be possible if no definition were given. This
is so difficult that publications have appeared on this
topic alone (l). However for the purposes of this thesis
it is not necessary to go into the ramifications of this
word or to discuss all arguments which have been advanced.
This confusion seems to have two reasons; first the
word "region" is used to indicate an incredible variety
(l) F. Masaxt-Pierard, Pour une doctrine de la region,
Leuven, 197^.
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of territorial entities. It is used in constitutional
and administrative law and in politics, economics and
sociology, in history and indeed in practically all
human sciences. It always refers to widely different
territorial divisions. When a political scientist
and a planner speak about the state, they refer certainly
to the same area; when the same people speak of regions
one needs to be careful: they may havd^a\different view
of territorial division. The planner may refer to a minor
town and its surrounding villages, the other perhaps to
areas of around 5 million people. The word region is
even used to indicate economic communities and common
markets; sometimes the E.C. are listed as regional
institutions, for example in U.N. publications. Region
seems to be a useful word every time one wishes to indicate
subdivisions and their institutions: sub-divisions of
the world, of a state. But it would be easier if it meant
the same sort of sub-division in states; this however is
not the case. If one goes out to make comparisons in a
guropean perspective, confusion becomes more serious because
its meaning varies, in different languages probably as a
result of different national experiences and legal and
political traditions. Thus when one studies regionalization
in the Netherlands one discovers it mostly indicates
supramunicipal institutions for cooperation and coordination
at the lowest tier of local government, whereas in France
and Italy it indicates supra-departmental and supra-
provincial levels of government; whatever their form may
be, they are situated immediately under the national state
level government. We are using the word "region" in a
legal-political meaning; a region is an area of government
which is at a higher level than the municipakhjlevel of
government and at a lower level than the central government
of a state But this definition needs more refinement.
The fact that the word "region" can indicate areas of
various sizes has brought us to the introduction of a
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distinction which originates from economic terminology
in France. Economic and town and country planners there
commonly use the words micro- and macro-region. There is
a clear distinction of scale, between both types of regions,
which has led to interminable discussions about the ideal
size of the territory and the population of micro and
macro-regions. This problem has some importance for
economic and town and country planning as well as for the
functioning of government; the advantages of larger scale
government receive much attention nowadays, almost as
much as its disadvantages (l). But so many factors must
be taken into account for the establishment of micro- and
macro-regions that it seems impossible to define ideal
types. Looking for the ideal, generally valid type of
region is like making the same error as the leaders of
revolutionary France in 1789 who aimed at setting up
identical departments. For our purposes it seems more
interesting to look at the tasks which are allotted to
micro- and macro-regions when they are established some-
-- where and to consider their size as a function of their
tasks. Therefore we situate micro-regions at the
second level of government, municipalities (2) being the
first tier, and macro-regions as a tier immediately under
the state level. We will say much more about this later
on (3) but it is useful to point out already that it
would seem to be true that micro- and macro-regions are
not necessarily a form of territorial decentralization;
(1) This will be an aspect of discussion in chapter II
of part one.
(2) Municipalities too can have widely different sizes.
From a legal-political point of view, we consider
municipalities as the first level of government in a
state. See also chapter II.
(3) See Chapter III.
Q
it is conceivable that one of the micro- or the macro-'
regional tier corresponds to the principles of functional
decentralisation. This gives us then the following
framework innwhich to study local and regional structures
in the E.E.C. {b): at local level, there are the munic¬
ipalities (5) in some cases with an institutionalized
form of cooperation and coordination; at regional level,
we find micro-regions (6) first, and above them, macro-
regions (7). All this concerns territorial decentralization,
but functionally decentralized institutions can fit into
this framework too; not of course at municipal level,
where there are no functionally decentralized institutions
except in the form of supra-municipal organs for cooper¬
ation. This scheme does not relate local and regional
government to size in the first place, although we may find
that micro-regions correspond to provinces, counties or
departments whereas macro-regions are on a much larger
scale and have a few million inhabitants in normal situations.
It is likely that their functions will be mainly in the
field of planning, whereas those of micro-regions will be
found in the sphere of sendees. But this is at the
moment only a supposition which an analysis of existing
and future structures will have to prove or disprove.
Regionalization thus, means the evolution towards and the
establishment of micro-and/or macro-regions. It indicates
a trend towards new politico-administrative institutions
(b) A. vein der Jagt, Reorganise tie van het binnenlands
bestuur van N«derland in Europes perspectief, Report to
the Ministry of Interior 1978, p. 6-l4.
(5) "Communes" in Belgium, Luxembourg, France; "Gemeenten"
in the Netherlands; "Communi" in Italy, "Kommune" in
Denmark; "Kreisangehorige Gemeinde", "Kreisfreie Stadte"
in West Germany; metropolitan and non-metropolitan districts
in the U.K.; districts in Ireland.
(6) "Provinces" in Belgium; "Amtskommuner" in Denmark;
"Bezirke" and Verbande" in West Germany; metropolitan and
non—metropolitan counties in the U.K.; counties in Ireland;
"Departments" in France; "Provinces" in the Netherlands,
"Provincia" in Italy; Luxembourg has no other forms of
territorial decentralisation.
(7) "Regions" and "Communautes Culturelles" in Belgium;
"Region" in Italy; "Regierungsbezirke" in the Lander" of
West Germany.
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which are taking over tasks from the old second level of
local government and sometimes also from municipalities
and from the state; it is not relevant in this respect
whether these micro-and macro-regions are established on
the basis of territorial or functional decentralization.
Regionalization is thus quite different from regionalism,
although it can be the result of the latter or influenced
by it (8). Regionalism belongs to the vast category of
-ism words indicating a broad general concept about so¬
ciety and life (e.g. socialism, Catholicism) and a
movement, a tendency towards the realization of the
objectives of such concept. In its original form, in
which the word appeared in the beginning of this century,
regionalism indicates a movement (without giving this word
necessarily and organisational content) towards guarantee¬
ing and reviving the historic and cultural character,
and the linguistic or ethnic difference of a certain area.
This area was often an old feudal duchy or county or
another feudal structure of the territory which had enjoyed
considerable autonomy in the past but was now integrated
in a new state with centralizing tendencies in many
aspects of life, including cultural life. Thus the old
language, for example became suppressed in favour of a
national language. Regionalists worked for the preser¬
vation of the specific characteristics of their region,
using the latin "regio" which is more neutral and makes
identification with the old regime more difficult. Region¬
alists have therefore contributed towards creating the
confusion about the meaning of the word "region". Region-
alist organizations often came into being as a direct
result of regional economic problems from which they
derived their strength and influence; these problems
aggravated resentment against the central government.
Economic and sociological reasons can thus lead to
(8) See in Chapter III the evolution in B, I and GB.
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regionalization, but even without these a state can
still need local and regional reforms. In order to
understand the existing reforms and plans in the Member
States, we shall analyse how the evolution of regional
policy has stimulated regionalization; this
process has been almost equally stimulated by a variety
of other circumstances, thus making nejWm.} of the iiyreknbl
OF THE STST£ fl rl ECE.SSir<} .
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PART I s
REGIONAL POLICY AND REGIONALIZATION IN THE MEMBER STATES
Introduction
Comparison of regional policy and of regionalization in
9 Member States involves some special problems. An approach
which is too theoretical may lose touch with realities
and involve too much wishful thinking. An approach which
goes into all details and aims at a complete analysis of
national regional policies will necessarily repeat a lot
of what has already been said in books and articles about
each state separately; moreover it will be difficult to
discover a path leading to final comparisons among so
much material.
Therefore we discuss in the first chapter the evolution
of regional policy in the present Member States, but our
analysis is restricted to those elements which seem to
have influenced the course of local and regional reforms.
Aspects of regional policy which are of national import¬
ance only and which do not have any significance for European
regional policy will be left out and, as it has been stated
earlier, our discussion is legal-political and not economic.
And of course, most attention is paid to the general
views behind the regional policies themselves, because
these will be relevant for our analysis of regionalization
in chapter III.
In the second chapter we have taken a brief look at other
reasons which influence regionalization, in order to avoid
the impression that regional policy is the only reason
behind different forms of devolution in the E.E.C. This
is in itself such a vast subject that a separate thesis
could be written about it. This chapter, as the second,
prepares the third and central chapter of part one; they
both aim to give a view of the background of regionalization.
In terms of architecture, the first and second chapter
13.




THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL POLICY IN THE MEMBER STATES
Introduction
Although regional policy as such has only been included in
central government policies since the second half of this
century, measures to assist distressed areas were taken
much earlier; this was done mostly on an ad hoc basis,
and its impact was even smaller than today. Nevertheless
we think that it is useful to trace the development of
regional policy fr<m its origins, if not always in all
Member States, at least in some of them in order to
understand present situations better. For the same reason
we give a general account of the origins of regional
problems and their different aspects. Indeed for our
purposes it does not seem necessary to discuss at length
regional economic imbalances and other regional problems
in each Member State separately. Instead we shall present
a European survey; which we hope will show a clearer
picture of regional policy as a common phenomenon in all
of the nine.
Having done so, we shall see how regional policy starts
everywhere as a sort of social assistance to very differently
defined areas, some large, some small; later these are
defined on a more coherent basis and according to certain
specific criteria (l). When government became more
interventionist in economic matters in general, its
concepts about regional policy did not remain unchanged
either. Gradually, the idea of regional development
planning emerges. Together with it, and preceding it
in some respects came the establishment of a variety of
institutions which are set up to deal with the economic
development of certain parts of the state in general or
with certain aspects of it. As other bodies continue to
be involved, such as a growing number of ministries, the
need for coherence and coordination, or in other words
planning on a medium and long term basis, becomes more
(l) In particular high unemployment and welfare below the
average level.
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pressing. Once we have arrived at that stage, we are close
to the need for reforms, which seem to become inevitable
for other reasons too; these are discussed in the second
chapter. In this chapter the origins of regional problems
in Western Europe are discussed in general terms, the first
attempts to do something about them and then the development
of regional policy proper; in the latter we discern two
periods, the pre-planning or assistance period and the
planning period.
1. Origins and aspects of regional problems
The roots of regional problems are often found in the
actions of men though there are regions in the E.E.C.
where natural circumstances are the origin of underdevel¬
opment in the economic sense; this is often accompanied
by other aspects of underdevelopment such as cultural and
social backwardness. Dry climate, poor soil, mountainous
terrain are not favourable factors for economic development,
but one should not overestimate their influence. Thus
underdevelopment of southern Italy for example is often
attributed to natural circumstances, but these regions
have been prosperous at alternate periods in their history,
depending upon who was governing them and how. (l). In
particular poverty of the soil is a false argument for
most regions, because this is often man's fault, as in the
case of soil erosion and deforestation by inhabitants or
military occupiers (e.g. the massive deforestation of
southern Italy by French troops under Napoleon) (2).
Cultural factors are rarely of great influence, but are
often a result of other more direct causes of regional
underdevelopment. Theories have been worked out to
explain the underdevelopment of certain regions by
supposing the inferiority of their inhabitants. Such
(1) S. Barzanti, Underdeveloped areas in the Common
Market, Princeton, 1966, p. 29.
(2) S. Barzanti, op oit.
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theories must be rejected, not only because of their
implicit racism, but because they are contradicted
by many facts. People coming from poor regions have
often shova great skills once they lived in a more
favourable social environment (e.g. the Irish in North
America, Italians from the South who moved to the North
of Italy or other countries). It is true of course that
some qualities necessary for modern development are absent
in backward regions, e.g. entrepreneurship. But this
can not be attributed to one factor alone, as for example
religion.
The social backwardness of some regions is mostly a result
and a by-product of economic and/or political situations.
Indeed, the continuing existence of semi-feudalism in
southern Italy or the absence of a good communications
system in some French regions as well as the centralization
of economic life and administration in the capital result
from a deliberate or silently tolerated policy. The decline
of certain industries can be the result of technological
progress, but the location of the new industries is a
deliberate action. It is thus among the economic and/or
political factors that the main causes of regional
imbalances must be found.
a) The key problem in each case of regional backwardness
is how to adjust out-dated economic structures. These
can be inefficient agricultural tc i" h SS as well as
industries declining because of technological progress
or new competitors.
The most obvious features pointing to out-dated economic
structures are unemployment and under-employment, which in
some regions are above the average figures for the state
a>t
as a whole. However, it is not infallible indication
because unemployment statistics for underdeveloped regions
are not always complete. Young people who never found
work or old people who theoretically live on a pension but
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who in fact must work often do not appear in official
figures. Unemployment figures have long been a
political weapon and governments are tempted to give
the lowest possible figure while the opposition may well
overestimate it. Figures also depend on how regional
boundaries are set; as soon as Corsica and Provence in
France became two separate regions, it appeared that
unemployment in the former was much higher than figures
for the one region had indicated (l) Another example
of manipulation; in Italy, the "Instituto Nazionale di
Statistica" considers as full employed (in the sectors of
industry, transport, communications and services) every¬
one who worked more than 2k hours a week, compared with a
normal working week of k$ hours. (2). Such a criterion
does not provide a fair picture of the situation, to say
the least. Another limitation is that unemployment
figures mostly indicate an average; this does not give
a complete picture either. To give but one example, in
the province of Liraburg in the Netherlands, average
unemployment is higher than the national average, though
the province of South-Holland has far more unemployed
people than Limburg. One should therefore not take
unemployment statistics too iiterally but consider the
economic situation as a whole.
Notwithstanding such limitations, unemployment figures
which are high in one part of the country and low in
another indicate a disequilibrium in the inter-regional
labour market which is a result of inter-regional differ¬
ences in the structure of economic activity and a differing
increase in demand for labour as a result of this. It is
precisely in the regions with a natural high increase in
the labour force that the economic structure is not able
to absorb them. Many of these people migrate to regions
(1) S. Barzanti, op cit., p. 50 et seq.
(2) S. Barzanti, op, cit., p. 53.
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where manufacturing and services are situated and shortage
of labour exists. Thus already backward regions lose some
of their most active(and often young,workers and employees.
The reverse process, that of capital flowing to regions
of labour surplus, is slowed down. However, there are two
more influential reasons for this. Nationally organised
trade unions in most countries have obtained regional
uniformity of wages. This restrains emigration of labour
but also immigration of capital. Indeed, backward regions
do not provide all external economies so that the cost of
new investments, given the same wages, may be higher and
productivity lower than in core regions.
Moreover, most backward regions with a labour surplus
have agriculture as the dominant economic activity (e.g.
the South of Italy, parts of Ireland). Some of Europe's
problem regions have declining industries ( e.g. Lorraine,
Scotland, North-west France, Northern Ireland); some of
these have also agricultural or fishing problems (e.g.
Scotland). Industrially advanced regions usually have
an agricultural sector with very modern equipment and
high productivity. Underemployment is very low because
the labour surplus is easily absorbed by industry and
services.
The reason for backwardness, development or over-devel¬
opment of regions can be found in unequal distribution of
industrial and service employment in the E.E.C. A better
distribution can be achieved by government intervention
(deliberate action) or by new economic factors (accidental
actions) such as transport price evolution. But when
large parts of the active population emigrate shortly
before or at the same time as industry and services move
in the regional income may not 5i6nmcHriruj An
unbalanced population pyramid keeps productivity per head
(l) Commission de la CEE, Rapport sur la capacite concurren-
:tielle de la CEE, Bruxelles, 1971, II, p. 22.
19.
low. State money transfers or money sent by emigrants
remains necessary (l).
Public finance can have another effect. If a direct and
progressive tax is imposed on companies, a regional red¬
istribution of income can result because tax is higher
if productivity is higher; this is, however, only time
if the tax is payable in the region in which the factories
of the company are situated or if head offices are
distributed over the country. If not., it will benefit
only the capital where most head offices are located
(except West-Germ any and the Netherlands, where head-offices
are found in all major cities).
In this context the transport system can also be mentioned
as a cause of regional dtsequilibria. Tariffs which are
not adjusted to the real price favour certain regions and
disfavour others. Certain regions of France for example
became underdeveloped in comparison with the rest only
after the introduction of a railway system centering around
Paris. Most backward regions in the E.E.C. are frontier
regions, thus regions which art peripheral to the national
capital and the centres of economic activity.
Unemployment, agriculture, industrial decline, transport
and state subsidies are words which will turn up often
in the next chapters. Further analysis here would turn
this into an economic thesis, which is not the intention,
these factors are analysed in more detail in the literature
given in the references. However, the political factors
should not be forgotten.
(b) Economic factors do not bear sole responsibility for
the backwardness of many regions in Europe. They have
been accompanied and often accelerated by deliberate
political measures (or the absence of such measures,
which also constitutes a political act).
(l) Commission de la CEE, op. cit. p. 23.
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Most 19th century states considered centralism as a
means of keeping together unitary structures which were
sometimes still weak (e.g. Italy, Belgium). No other
decisionmaking centres of importance were allowed and lower
levels of administration only received an executive or
controlling role. However, the system was tempered by
decentralisation, but usually on the basis of territorial
divisions which were rather artificial. It worked well
because the state was wealc and the role of the govern¬
ment and its administration limited.
However, the more the role of government in public life
increased, the more centralisation increased; new tasks
were often given to the state assuming automatically that
the decentralised authorities would not be able to perform
them. Sometimes indeed they could not, because they were
not designed for such tasks: 19th century local authorities
were never set up with the intention that one day they would
deal with economic planning end town and country planning,
at local levels, or the health services etc. Local
authorities had difficulties in coping with the larger scale
of public life, and the increasing technicality of decision¬
making. However, the more the state took over or intervened,
the more this centralisation was accompanied kj bureaucratic
congestion, inefficiency and loss of democratic control and
citizen's participation.
Reforms therefore appeared to be necessary and a new
evolution started.
2. The Origins of regional policy.
Governments have neglected regional imbalances for a long
time in most states. It would be interesting to make a
serious study of all the reasons for this, but we shall
mention only the most obvious here. One of the reasons is
the view of the role of the public authorities that there
should be oj? li'hHe, inter\/ehti0n m ecoiiojMt'c
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Mrttehs' . Another is incomplete knowledge of whet was
really happening in some parts of the state - which is
partly a result of the same ideology of limiting public
intervention, and partly due to absence of modern stat¬
istical methods. In these early industrial societies,
an optimistic belief existed that the normal functioning
of the economy would automatically bring similar material
welfare for every municipality and province. People
probably had no idea of the disastrous long term effects
of policies such as the centralization of railways on the
capital or the modernization of certain roads but not of
others, which break up the commercial patterns of centuries.
But after a few decades it was clear that certain parts
of the state were beginning to lag behind the general
growth pattern and that people were becoming poorer
instead of better off. Regional policy started thus
as a form of social policy. In order to help the poor,
different forms of welfare were established in Vest
European states, both on private initiative and by the
public authorities during the 19th century. The
primitive social policy worked on an individual basis
until a "new" dimension was added in the form of social
policy on a territorial basis: not only would poor people
be assisted, but nojw also poor areas. Of course, it was
not a real social policy as we understand it today, nor
was it a regional policy in the modern sense; it was a
primitive mixture of both, but nevertheless a real begin-
sning at the end of the 19th or beginning of the 20th
century. There was no coherent set of measures to stimulat
economic development, there were no special institutions
set up for this purpose, there was no planning of regional
economic development. The government was brought to realis
the poorness of certain provinces - the concept of a
region had not yet emerged - and in a paternalistic way
decided to do something about it, to appease the critics,
to stop possible social unrest and to show its benevolence.
This was shown very well in Italy, where the problems of
regional imbalances were recognized earlier than in other
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states; the first proper regional measures were taken
in 1897 (l)» This resulted from the fact that Italian
regional disparities were very serious indeed.
Although history of the southern regions of Italy showed
alternate periods of prosperity and depression (2), it
was at the time of unification poorer than the northern
regions. It hai lower potential for agricultural and
industrial development and was also at a disadvantage
compared with the north as regards communications (3)«
As the general growth of the Italian economy was slow up
to the end of the 19th century, the gap between north and
south did not widen much. Nevertheless, unification was
effected in an irrational way from an economic viewpoint
(k) . The weak southern industries became exposed to the
more competitive northern enterprise5while the tariffs of
the kingdom of the two Sicilies were replaced by the lower
external tariffs of £iemont . The feudal agricultural
structure of the south remained largely intact and the
introduction of protective measures for certain agricul¬
tural products (grain) led to retaliatory tariffs from
other states. The living standards of the population
were very poor compared with the northern regions of
Italy.
These very serious social problems in southern Italy led
to the first state interventions (5)« No control or
restriction was imposed upon the functioning of the free
market in the state, although this would have been the only
way to prevent or heal the damage done by the forced union
of an economically advanced and a backward area. Such
measures were almost unthinkable in the political-economic
climate of the time. Instead the government proposed
(l) It is not the efficiency of these measures but the
intention behind them which classifies them as part of
a regional policy.
2) S. Barzanti, op, cit., p. 28.
3) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, Regional problems and
policies in Italy and France, London, 1970, p. 35
k) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, op, cit, p. 3k.
5) S. Barzanti, op, cit. p. 36.
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measures such as af orestation, works to regulate torrents
and river courses and to supply water. These were all
matters for which private enterprises showed no interest;
they were regarded as collective needs falling under
state responsibility. The state also begem to bring
communications in the south up to northern steindards and to
construct roads and railways. A major part of state
expenditure on roads went to the south, while a large railway
construction program brought these regions up to northern
level by the end of the century.
This policy was followed by special laws concerning under¬
developed regions (l). These laws aimed to create
favourable conditions for southern development and were concerned
mostly with improving agriculture; however, they had little
effect because they were applied to a deficient structure.
Industry was largely forgotten, with the exception of Naples;
it is quite remarkable that the state had already provided
industrial sites and was offering fiscal and customs
concessions for industries locating there.
However, this was not yet a real shift in policy and can
therefore not be considered as a proper regional policy;
they remained within the sphere of aid policy. All these
measures were single, uncoordinated projects, whose
implementation was far from efficient. Their isolated
nature resulted in fact in a deterioration of the situation;
improvement of communications between northern and southern
Italy led to a further weakening of the latter's industry.
A massive fall in industrial employment in the south
between 1881 and 1901 and a rise in the north (2) were the
immediate results of these measures. A concept of regional
policy based entirely on a liberal economic role for the
state proved unable to right the economic imbalances created by
the same system.
(1) For Basilicata, 1904; for Naples 1906; for Calabria,
1905; for Sicily 1906; for Sardinia l897t 1906.
(2) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, op. cit., p. 37.
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The economic crisis of the thirties stimulated the devel¬
opment of this first concept of regional policy. However,
the evolution in Italy was stopped by the fascist government,
which for ideological reasons denied the existence of the
problem (l). Cne has to turn therefore to other states in
order to see how assistance dominated this early beginning
of the development of regional policies. The unemployment
caused by the great economic crisis was higher in some
regions than others. During the 1930's depression in the
United Kingdom, one third of the labour force in Wales
and one fourth in Scotland and Northern Ireland were
unemployed, which was higher then in other parts of the
country (2). As a result of continuing unemployment
and the lower income per head in these underdeveloped
regions (although the income gap was bridged partly by
regional variations in living costs), emigration from
these regions led a continuing decline of the population
there. Higher death rates also account in part for the
slower population growth.
Another state where the depression brought large regional
disparities to the surface was France. Centralization
of economic and political activities in and around Paris
had led to the underdevelopment and underpopulation of
peripheral and central regions. North-south differences
were not so pronounced as in Italy, because of different
historic circumstances and better geographical and
natural conditions. However, centralization dating back
to the 18th century had gradually reinforced the position
of the capital, particular the centralization of transport
systems which orientated business and markets to the
capital which also had the monopoly of intellectual and
cultural life. Centralization of population in Paris led
(1) S. Barzanti, op, cit., p. 37.
(2) J.C. Banks, Federal Britain, London 1971 p. 53.
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to the remarkable fact that about 95# of the territory
of France lost population in both absolute and relative
terms during the 1851-1931 period (l).
Once prosperous regions such as Languedoc and Aquitaine
declined economically, emigration made others such as
the Massif Central and Alpine regions lose more than one
fourth of their population, because of lack of employment
facilities; regression of vinegrowing in Aquitaine was
largely responsible for a population decline of one fifth.
Although these regional dfsequilibria had been growing
since the 19th century, the depression made these imbalances
clear to everyone.
Reaction to the newly-discovered regional problems was
different in the United Kingdom and France and this seemed
to result from the fact that the United Kingdom was a more
advanced industrial society at that time. The British
concept of regional policy was concerned with the problem
of unemployment and its social consequences. Such an
approach to regional disparities, which might have been
brought about under pressure of trade unions and the
Labour party, could right only one of the consequences
of regional imbalances. It did not aim to modify the
unequal distribution of industry and services, which were
concentrated in a few areas of early industrial develop¬
ment .
The British concept of regional policy resulted in the
setting up of an Industrial Transference Board, which
helped selected unemployed adults to fill specific
vacancies in other areas. Those willing to do so could
follow retraining courses in special Instruction Centres
and could also receive help for family removals. However,
as these measures were relatively small, only a fraction
of the labour force profited from it and the economic
effect was limited (2).
(1) R. Lafont, La revolution regionaliste, Paris 19&7•
S. Barzanti op cit. p. 6l.
(2)A.J. Brown, The framework of regional economics in the
U.K. Cambridge 1972 p. 282
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The Industrial Transference Board was in existence from
1928 to 1938, but at the sam^ime the concept of regional
policy was expanding. The government no longer limited
its role to remedying the consequences of regional dis¬
parities, but it made a cautious attempt to go to the
roots of the problem. From 193^ onwards, incentives and
assistance were given in order to promote the growth
of industry in specially indicated development areas.
Though the impact of this measure on backward regions
was not very visible and the unemployment rates of these
regions in 19^+0 were still higher than those of the south¬
east, (l) it nevertheless represented a remarkable en¬
largement of the concept of regional policy in the form of
the state authorities implicit acceptance of responsibility
for a more equitable distribution of industry over its
territory. The incentives and assistance given were
largely inefficient but their introduction can be seen
as an indicator of the changing role of the state in
economic life in general and as regards regional economic
problems in particular.
A similar evolution took place in France during the same
period. Industry had developed in France somewhat later
them in the United Kingdom, because of agricultural
reforms carried out during the 17^9 revolution which
permitted the farmer to stay on his land. Industrial
development from the second half of the 19th century
onwards had been steady, although marked by social up¬
risings and frequent changes of political regime. The
1930 economic crisis upset the French economy as much as
anywhere else, but its effect on the concept of regional
policy was modest (2).
(l) A.J. Brown, op, cit, p. 285
(2) See J. and C. Neme, Economie European, Paris 1970
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In fact, French governments introduced measures to combat
unemployment and undertook what was, for the times, strong
intervention in economic life in general. But almost
none of their intervention aimed at regional development.
The aircraft industry was transferred from the Paris region
to the south-west and Toulouse purely for strategic reasons
Little consideration was given to the problems of moving
a firm to another region (absence of external economies,
recruitment and housing of workers etc.) and therefore
the experiment was not an economic success (l). French
economic policy did not yet introduce special assistance
for underdeveloped regions.
In other states, intervention by the government in economic
life retained its social nature. Though regional dispariti
existed in Germany, these appeared to be less serious than
in the United Kingdom or Italy; in Nazi-ideology there
was also no place for such problems. The Netherlands and
Belgium had a fairly balanced economic development and
because of a wellspread transport system in the latter,
concentration of population was limited (2). In these
states no proper regional policy concept existed.
Up to the Second Vorld War we note thus two positive
points, the gradual recognition that the government could
not just sit back while certain parts of its territory
became poorer in comparison with the rest, and the beg¬
inning of assistance for people in these areas. Although
this was in general a kind of social policy, it was
accompanied (particularly Italy) by some infrastructure
works which aimed to provide a healthy basis for an
economic take-off for these areas. The lack of results
can be explained by the relatively small scale of these
measures, their uncoordinated nature and the economic
fl) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, op cit. p. 1^9
(2) J.F. Gravier, La Revolution Regionale, Paris 19^3»
p. 63.
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crisis of the thirties followed by the war. A concept
of legion had not yet emerged; the word is used a few
times in Italian literature of the time but as yet without
a sufficiently clear meaning (l). In France of course
there was a flourishing body of literature about region¬
alism and proposals for reforms were made to give the
regions a new life (2). But the reference here is
really to historic regions, the former provinces and
states which made up the pre-1789 kingdom, regions with
a modem economic administrative meaning were not present
in French political thought at this period. This sort
of regionalism in France had after all a negative influence;
the regions of the authoritarian Vichy regime had no
democratic political or economic meaning and discredited
the idea of establishing regions for a long time after
the war. Flemish and Wallon nationalists in Belgium also
had no clear concept of region and when they used this
word occasionally, it indicated the Dutch and French-
speaking parts of the state; although decentralization
and political autonomy were requested for Flanders and
Wallenia, the main reasons were linguistic and nothing
more. As they too flirted with the Nazi-regime, the
concept of region, in as far as it ever existed, became
discredited for a long time.
However, after the war, when the first period of the
reconstruction of the economy was over (19^7-^8), regional
problems were again to receive attention as such and the
evolution which started at the beginning of the century
in some states, and during the thirties in others, would
continue and became more and more important for governments
in the present nine Member States.
1) See C. Palazolli, Les regions italiennes, Paris 1966.
2) See T. Fuop.^ , Le mouvement regionaliste franyais,
Paris, 1966.
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3. Development of regional policy
It is almost impossible to put dates behind this title;
the development of regional policy as described in this
paragraph starts a couple of years after the war or even
later, but it leads on gradually and at different tim»s
in the different states to the present situation of
government regional policies. With some hesitation one
could say that the present-day forms of regional policies
emerged in late fifties or early sixties. We shall see
first how in most states a variety of institutions are
set up to deal with regional problems, which now not only
became worse — the gap widens between rich and poor regions,
to put it simply - but also become better known to the
government and the public, thanks to better statistical
methods and the public concern about equal distribution
of welfare. These institutions were accompanied by a
variety of economic-financial measures which aimed not
only to assist these backward areas, but to give them a
chance to catch up with the others and to become prosperous
areas themselves. In the third place this period sees
the emergence of a concept of regions, still embryonic,
but there are signs of a growing awareness that these back¬
ward areas are not just delimitations on the map, of widely
varying size, but that they have a certain internal coherence.
Economic backwardness is not a problem of a few departments
in the south west of France or ofufew counties In the
north of Britain. It is a problem of a whole section of
the state showing similar social and economic characteristics
and a certain coherence which does not stop at provincial
borders. Backward areas become backward regions.
(a) Before the war regional policy was a matter which the
central government would take care of without establishing
special institutions and with little or no involvement
of local authorities. This did not mean that a coordinated
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action by several ministries was elaborated. Regional
policy consisted of aid handed out by one or more ministries
independently of each other. Any further intervention
by the government would have been contrary to the general
view of the role of the state in public life. The first
ministries involved were those of economic affairs and of
public works, whatever the name in different states might
have been (in Italy, from 1904 onwards; in the other
states, since the end of the first world war and in
particular since the 1930 economic crisis,-but the U.K.
has rarely had an economic ministry,. The role of the
latter ministry could easily be defined: providing a
better infrastructure in backward regions. It is not
surprising that this ministry was more or less the first
to be actively involved: private transport companies
became an inefficient affair very soon in many states and
the government had to take over railways and other
transport networks. In Italy particularly great
efforts were made after the unification of the state
to bring the southern infrastructure up to northern
standards (l). This was of course also necessary in
order to integrate the south fully into the new state and
to give a very visible proof of its benefits. Roads end
railways were built but although the measures were impressive
for that period, they were not adequate (2). Moreover,
they left the southern regions more open to competitions
from the more industrialised north and this, together with
the decline of southern agriculture, weakened its economic
position and widened the economic gap in the new state (3).
In other states too the lack of coordination between the
(1) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, op. cit. p. 42
(2) Ki Allen and M.C. MacLennan, op, cit. p. 44
(3) S. Barzanti, op. c.4t. p. 28
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development of nev communications and other economic
measures or the absence of the latter was harmful for many
regions; in France, the centralization of the railway
system on Paris brought economic decline for several
peripheral regions and disrupted century-old trade links
(1). In Belgium, on the contrary, the relatively even
distribution of the infrastructure is considered to be one
of the reasons which prevented the growth of wide regional
imbalances (2).
In some states the Ministry of Economic Affairs had become
involved in these first attempts towards a regional policy.
Special gets were passed in the Italian Parliament in favour
of the most underdeveloped regions (3). These gets
is
envisaged certain development projects, but not an overall
plan, and were consequently a waste of money (*+). Only
Naples profited from it.
Another ministry which became active in regional matters
was the Ministry of Labour. This is not surprising, because
all over western Europe deliberations on regional problems
concentrated primarily on their social consequences. During
the 1930*s economic depression, the Ministry of Labour in
the U.K. was responsible for organizing aid for depressed
regions (5). It showed the close relationship between
unemployment policy and early regional policy. In other
states, no regional diversification in unemployment measures
was introduced by the Ministry of Labour, with the exception
of Denmark where some areas in North Jutland with a partic¬
ularly high unemployment rate received special assistance
too.
See R. Lafont, La revolution regionaliste, Paris 19^7
(2) In particular because it was combined with cheap
workers' tariffs on railways which encourage long distance
commuting. Also in the Netherlands it is a means of keep¬
ing workers in rural areas.
(3) Act of 31.3.190*+ for Basilicata; Act of 25.6.I9O5
for Calabria; Act of 15.6.1906 for Sicily and Sardina.
*+) S. Barzanti, op. cit p. 36
5) See Chapter 1.
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As we have noted, the concept of regional policy became
more developed after the Second World War (l). The increas¬
ing role of the state in economic life in general also
brought more state involvement in solving the regional
problems which by now had assumed huge proportions in
several states. In Italy the devastation by the war
added new reasons to the backwardness of the Mezzogiorno.
Devastation by the war caused serious problems in other
countries too. Another reason for the involvement of more
ministries was the development of economic planning and
town and country planning which necessarily demanded
cooperation and coordination among ministries. Besides the
Ministries of Public Works, the Economy and Labour, which
continued their various involvements in regional development,
other ministries also started to take the matter up,
particularly the Ministries of Transport, Public Health,
the Interior and Agriculture (2). Not all of these
Ministries were involved in regional policy in every
Member State; the Ministry of the Economy has become
mostly the main state administrative body which elaborates,
supervises and coordinates regional policy; in Denmark,
however, the Regional Development Council operates under
the Ministry of Trade and in Italy and Belgium other
Ministries play an important role, the Ministry for the
South in Italy and the two Secretariats of State for
Regional Policy in Belgium. The distribution of regional
responsibilities among various ministries is in itself
an indication of the nature and seriousness of regional
imbalances in the state (3)« It also depends on the powers
fl) P. Randall, Regional Policy for Ever, London 1973 P« 19.
(2) In Denmark, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs is active
in this field too, e#'g. its 1965 study about the problems
of islands habitation. Denmark is probably the only state
where real attention is paid to sociological and cultural
problems in the framework of regional policy.
(3) Except in Belgium, see further p. 33.
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of local and regional authorities and of special institutions
if they exist. The involvement of so many ministries
is in itself already an indication of a change in the concept
of regional policy. Instead of ad-hoc welfare measures,
attempts are made to provide backward regions with a
realistic basis for economic development.-
In several states the Ministry of Finance has gradually come
to be involved in the process of setting up regional policy.
In France and 1he Federal Republic of Germany this took
place automatically through the establishment of a single
Ministry of Finance and the Economy. However, it is also
indicative of the growing costs of regional policies.
Expenditure on regional aid continues to rise and the
Ministry of Finance is becoming more and more a watchdog
of such state expenditure. Its participation cannot be
considered negatively: it may be that in the long run
expensive but not necessarily useful aid to backward
regions will be reduced in favour of more comprehensive
state and regional planning.
Whereas in some states (Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg)
inter-ministrial committees are set up in order to coordinate
activities of the ministries involved in regional economic
development, Belgium has established a central admin¬
istration dealing exclusively with regional economy.
The Secretary of State for Regional Economy in Flanders
and his counterpart in Wallonia do not preside over Regional
Ministries, but fall under the Ministry of Economy (l).
They have ministerial rank, but their powers are defined
by the King and exercised cinder the political authority of
the Ministry of Economy. The establishment of these
Secretaries of State is more a result of cultural antago¬
nism in Belgium than of severe regional imbalances.
Though Wallonia is suffering from economic difficulties,
(l) A. Mast, Overzicht van het Belgisch grondwetterlijk
recht, Gent 1973 p. 276-278.
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due mainly to decline of its steel and coal mining industries,
and though some parts of Flanders still have an unemploy¬
ment figure above average, these problems could be solved
without two Secretaries of State, whose tasks are princip¬
ally to attract new investments and to grant various forms
of state aid. The establishment of a Flemish and a Walloon
Secretary of State for Regional Economy is a typical example
of deconcentration which gives an impression of responding
to regionalist demands.
Italy has a Minister for the South who is also a Member
of the central government. His responsibility is the
control of public agencies working in the Mezzogiorno
and the coordination of the economic development activ¬
ities af other ministries. His position differs from
the two Belgian Secretaries of State because he is not
second in rank in the government.
However, in several states the Ministry of Economy was
considered not to be a suitable instrument for the promotion
of regional economic development. Its priorities were the
national economy, its planning and growth and the strength¬
ening of its international position. Regional development
was often secondary and indeed sometimes obstructive to the
full realization of such national aims. It was felt that
the involvement of several ministries made coordination of
each ministry's regional policy an urgent necessity; even
then, waste of energy and money and contradictory measures
were not always avoided. An inter-ministerial committee
for regional policy can prevent many failures, but the fact
remains that each ministry can and often will continue to
pursue its own policies, be it only for political reasons
(such as prestige, political image of the minister, fav¬
ouritism etc.). Thus several states have set up special
institutions whose major role is to promote the economic
development of underdeveloped regions. The functioning
and the powers of such institutions differ in each state
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according to their specific circumstances and needs, but
they have in common a search for new and more effective
state administration. Their working methods differ from
those of ministries in this sense, that they are in general
more based on the interdisciplinary analysis of a problem
and the elaboration of a more or less coherent plan of
economic recovery, Since they often have considerable
funds at their disposal for financing or assisting regional
projects, these state institutions have become important in
the conception and execution of regional policy. They are
also typical of the technocratic nature of such policies.
They do not replace normal ministerial work, but they deal
with extra-ordinary works which go beyond the scope and
resources of individual ministries. The establishment of
such institutions can be considered as a link between the
aid (l) and the planning concept of regional policy (in
particular in Italy). These institutions all have more or
less considerable sums of money at their disposal, but in
practice the need soon emerges for more harmonization (i.e.
planning) in the allotment of these funds in order to obtain
maximum results. Although these institutions were not set
up as part of a plan to reform the state's local authorities
which in fact are oiten not associated in their work and
certainly not in their decision-making, their functional
character (whether their legal position is deconcentrated
or decentralised) is an indication too of the search to
adapt the state's functioning at central levelto modern
needs; regionalization arises partly for the same reasons,
as will be indicated later.
(l) By aid concept we mean a form of regional policy
somewhere between social assistance and real economic
planning; it indicates that regions receive a lot
of economic and financial aid, which is not yet fully
determined by a comprehensive plan.
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(b) One of the first of such institutions is the Cassa
per il Mezzogiorno (development for the South) in Italy.
After 19^5» political pressures, such as secessionist
movements, and economic necessities resulting from the
devastations of war in the poor south (l), made it clear
that a new and all-round approach was necessary. The
almost feudal agricultural structure had to be reorgan¬
ized thoroughly, the infrastructure improved aniindus-
trialization properly started. Therefore., it seemed
necessary to establish a single organ on an ad hoc
basis, to coordinate the policies of the different
ministries concerned with the economic development of the
South, to plan these policies in detail and to work closely
together with all other public and private institutions
and organizations involved (2). To realise these aims
the Cassa was established on the 10th August, 1950 (3)«
The Cassa is run by a board consisting of experts appointed
by the government, and works under the control of the
Minister for the South and a committee of ministers with
special interests in the South. This committee is
responsible to parliament for the Cassa's activities. It
is remarkable that the Cassa contains no representatives
from the southern regions. This may result partly from the
fact that regional authorities have limited powers in
economic matters, but the Cassa would be a good means of
setting up the sort of cooperation between the state and
the regions which is becoming more and more common in federal
states (4).
(l) In the immediate post-war years, the South received
considerable aid from the U.S.A. and from UNKRA, but
this of course could only relieve short-term problems.
i2) S. Barzanti, op. cit. p. 109-110.3) Act nr. 646 of 1950.4 Coope ative federal sm may be a solution to the
difficult problems of the division of power in federal
and in regional states. See D.J. Elazar et al. Cooper¬
ation and conflict: readings in American federalism;
Illinios 1969; R. Kunze, Kooperativen Foderalismus in
der BRD, Stuttgart 1968; U. Scheuner, Kooperation und
Konflikt, in Die Offentliche Verwaltung, 1972/1977 p.
585 et Seq.
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Regional and national authorities could cooperate on an
equal basis to find solutions to regional development
problems; decision-making and if necessary execution
would be shared. With its present structure and function¬
ing, the Cassa is nothing more than "an interesting ex¬
ample of functional decentralization" (l).
However, the Cassa still meets with lack of cooperation
and unwillingness to coordinate from the different admin¬
istration involved. Even the fact that the final
responsibility for the Cassa's activity lies with the
committee of ministers is not strong enough a factor to
counterbalance this; most ministers continue to regard
their ministry as their own fief for which they are
responsible to parliament alona. The reason why is not
obvious. The most likely explanation is the fact that
Italian politics are dominated by favouritism, which
moves every minister to do as much as possible for his
constituency; this makes them unwilling to coordinate
because it limits their freedom. A second reason
is the influence of southern landowners, who took an
arch-conservative attitude and were not favourable to
modern developments They had considerable influence
in the ruling christism-democratic party. Nevertheless,
it seems that eren with such difficulties, which have
been worse in the initial period, the Cassa plays a
useful role in clearing up the mess and filling the gaps
left by the uncoordinatenactions of individual ministries (2).
That may seem too negative a view. The Cassa has been able
to exercise a positive influence on the economic develop¬
ment of the South, in the first place because of its
substantial funds: over the period 1930-70 it spent nearly
Lire 5.000and secondly, because it made some
(1) M. Watson, Regional development policy and adminis-
ztration in Italy, London 1970 p. 11.
(2) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan op. cit., p. 48.
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chances in the general attitude towards regional problems.
Durinc the first ten year period, most effort went into
agriculture and the infrastructure. About. *J1CP of the
Cassa's funds were spent on improving agriculture and
promoting land reforms, while 20c/~ was spent on infrastructure
works. These percentages reflect the relative importance
which the Cassa initiallvr assigned to each economic sector
in the general development of the South. Agriculture was
the most important economic activity of the Mezzogiorno;
therefore the 1950 measures, it has been argued (l) could
not aim at bringing autonomous economic development.
Others have expressed the opinion that valuable time was
lost in industrializing the South (2). It has also been
stated that political pressures brought about this high
expenditure on agriculture; medium and large scale land¬
owners could receive high grants for land improvement
schemes, whereas the peasants profited from the land reforms
(3). Later these percentages were revised: 55/* and 30c/o
of the Cassa's money was spent on agriculture and infra¬
structure respectively (b). The rest was spent originally
on tourism (3c/°) and later on industrial projects (l25c) and
tourism (3/0
In the agricultural sector, the Cassa aimed at reducing
underemployment and improving agricultural production and
income. It does not cover all agricultural problems,
but only these relevant to the regional development of
the South; the Ministry of Agriculture continued to deal
directly with other general problems (5)» Over three
(1) Russell King, in H.D. Clout, Regional development in
western Europe, London 1975 P« 98.
(2) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennen op. cit. p. 52.
(3) Russell King op. cit. p. 98.
(U) S. Barzanti, op. cit. p. 112-113.
(5) idem, p. 121. However, problems remained, as the
power to intervene was divided between the E.E.C., the
central governments, the regions and the Cassa. The main
losers seem to have been the regions. See further,
Chapter IV.
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quarters of the Cassa's agricultural expenditure went on
04L-
land reforms, soil conservation and irrigation scheme (l).
It also spent considerable amounts of money on training of
young people; during the first 12 years, 21 institutes
for professional agricultural specialization were established,
which coordinate the more than 100 agricultural schools
already existing or newly established (2). Another
activity for the Cassa concerned housing improvement; much
was done also to improve social and health conditions (e.g.
ldrin<y^ drinking water to every village).
In matters of infrastructure, the Cassa elaborated a
general plan to establish what the South needed in the
way of aquaducts and sewers and then, as far as funds
were available, carried out the most urgent projects (3).
Another important step towards providing the South with
a basic infrastructure for its econcmic development was
the improvement of existing roads and the construction of
new ones. In cooperation with FFSS, the Italian State
Railroads, the Cassa planned extension and improvement of
many lines. The Cassa also made improvements on seaports
since these were essential for the economic revival of the
Mezzogiorno (4).
From the beginning, it was accepted that tourism could be
a very stimulating factor for southern development, The
Cassa therefore directed some of its funds into this
sector, improving the infrastincture in and towards places
of touristic interest, building hotels and restaurants
and restoring much of the architectural heritage of the
South. As was the case in the field of agriculture,
the Cassa's funds were also spent in selected areas in
the tourist sector (5). It vas considered that this
fl) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, op. cit. p. 84
(2) S. Barzanti, op. cit. p. 123
(3) idem, p. 124
(4) idem, p. 125-126
(5) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, op. cit. p. 93
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would be more efficient than spreading the Cassa's funds
out over so vast a territory as the Mezzogiorno. The
system, however, inevitably increased internal dfsequilibria
in the South. The Cassa was criticised for this geo¬
graphical dispersion of its efforts. This resulted
mainly from the dilemma between economic benefits and
efficiency and socil and geographical equality (l).
It thus appears that social considerations also continue
to exercise an important influence on the development of
regional development planning.
In this initial period, the Cassa paid little attention
to industry. It was not until 1957 that the industrial¬
ization of the South became a major aim of the Cassa.
Though some industry was already located in the South, there
was no real industrial take-off. If the Cassa had started
earlier with its industrialization policy in the immediate
post-war period the problems of southern development might
have been less difficult to solve. By 1957» industry in
northern Italy had recovered from the war and thus a chance
to relocate some enterprises was missed.
The Industrial Areas Act (2), which, for political reasons,
did not come into operation until 1959» introduced a wide
range of measures to promote industrial development. The
Cassa now aimed to attract small and medium-sized enter¬
prises, and started to pursue an industrial growth pole
policy. It was assisted very much by the I.H.I., which is
a state holding for industrial reconstruction, and the E.N.I.,
which is a state hydrocarbons agency, who together account¬
ed for over 90°/® of the annual investments by state
controlled firms in Italy. Though they were already
required (3) to locate 60% of their new industrial
investments in the South, the impact of this provision
had been relatively small up to 1957» because most of
their investments concerned modernization of existing
enterprises (4). Confirmation of this earlier provision
fl) Russell King, op. cit. p. 98
(2) Act nr 634 of 1957^
(3/ By Act nr 646 of 1950» art. 4.
(4) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan op. cit p. 62
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given by Act nr 63^ came to be of great importance for
southern industrial development. The involvement of
I.R.I, and E.N.I, and Italsider (iron and steel holding)
helped to bring basic industries to the Mezzogiorno.
The Cassa's industrial policy, based on the growth pole
concept, aimed to establish and to manage selected indust¬
rial zones in the southern regions. The entry of
socialists into the government in i960 made this growth-
centre policy politically possible. Two types were
envisaged: industrialization areas and industrial
nuclei; the former are areas with a population of at
least 200,000 and the beginnings of industrial develop¬
ment, the latter are smaller and envisaged for small
and medium-sized enterprises. It is interesting that
both types of poles were not imposed but left to local
initiative although all plans had to be submitted to the
Cassa for approval. By 1970, k2 areas and nuclei were
selected, representing 29?o of the Mezzogiorno and
of its population. Some nuclei were approved for
political reasons and their economic viability may be
doubted. In practice the difference between the aid
available to both types of growth centres has largely
disappeared (l). Lack of integration in a comprehensive
regional plan and lack of coordination between areas and
nuclei and between town and country planning and indus¬
trialization policy are the other reasons which made this
policy less successful than might have been expected (2).
It is worth noting that the Cassa's industrial policy
was elaborated largely without the cooperation of or
reference to the regions (3)^ Though very regrettable
and a cause of much criticism and inefficiency, it could
hardly have happened otherwise: regional authorities
had not yet been established in the early sixties (special
fl) Russell King, op. cit. p. 100
(2) Russell King, op. cit p. 100
(3) Martin Clark, Italy, Regionalism and Bureaucratic
Reform, in J. Coraford (Ed) The Failure of the Jtate,
London 1975 66.
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regions excepted) and the attribution of overall powers
to the regions, as written in the 19^7 Constitution,
reflected the economic situation of that period. However,
the regions were responsible for agriculture and even in
these matters they were by-passed by the Cassa, which was
an almost inevitable result of its structure as a function¬
ally decentralized state agency.
Although from 1959 onwards the Cassa became thus involved
in all sectors of economic development in the South, the
fact remains that these regions are still poor compared
with the North. In many respects the Mezzogiorno has
done well, but the disparity of income per head between
the North and the South of Italy was only slightly less in
1967 than it was in 1951 (l)* However, one cannot expect
so great a disparity to be removed or reduced substantially
in a period of less than 20 years. For a long time to
come, southern regions will be dependent on outside help.
Of course even without intervention, some economic
development would have taken place in the South. The
Cassa has spent 5.000lire in the South during
1950-1970 period, an amount which in the first place
helped to prevent the gap from increasing. But the
Cassa's funds are still insufficient; there is an increase
in the funds available since its existence was extended in
1965 until I98O, but current allocations are lower in
relation to the State's income as compared with the early
'50's (2). It appears thus that the Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno has h.cuL 5oy\t. poslri/fe imfloemcs on Southern
economic development; its results are not more substantial
because lack of funds and power to act on structural aspects
have led to continuing backwardness.
This wide discussion of the Cassa seems useful because it
shows the most important instrument for regional develop¬
ment in the country with the most serious regional imbalances.
1) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, op. cit. p.Ill
2) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, op. cit. p. 115
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It is typical of the evolution of regional policy in
this period; it* lack of'success is also caused by the
absence of general economic snd regional planning at
the time, but at the same time it influenced the emergence
of more comprehensive planning. The latter remark is
probably the most important; the establishment of an
institution with considerable funds at its disposal
made the need for its efficient use very urgent, and
this seemed only possible by coordinated action, in other
words through planning the region's economic development.
Planning in its turn is not possible on the basis of
undefined areas. One cannot seriously elaborate a macro-
economic development plan for a few villages here, a couple
of provinces there, which change as easily as the govern¬
ments which make these delimitations. A general and
coherent structure is needed in the state to make general
economic planning possible. Thus the establishment of
institutions like the Cassa contributed to the development
of the idea of regionalization. Nov Italy already had a
regional structure (l), while in other states no instit-
ution the Cassa was established, but instead less power¬
ful and less comprehensive institutions; these are the
reasons why the relationship between the establishment of
regional policy institutions, regional economic planning
and administrative reforms is less than clear. In the
one state where this relationship could have been clear
(Italy), regions existed already, in other states the
variety of institutions and their less powerful positions
make it difficult to distinguish how much they influenced
the emergence of regionalization. We will come back to
this; let us first examine the evolution in other states.
The significance of the Cassa is also in the fact that the
(l) For other reasons, see further Chapter III.
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Italian government seemed to have asked for a "European
Cassa" during the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome.
Other states (Germany, the Netherlands) did not like this
system and it was the European Investment Bank which
emerged as a compromise.
In other states, functionally decentralised institutions
have been established, but at present no institution
is devoted so exclusively to regional development in
particular of the state as the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno
in Italy. Comparison with institutions in other states
is often limited to a general characterization as function¬
ally decentralised bodies (l). The political, economic
and financial role of comparable institutions in other
states is less pronounced than that of the Cassa. One
type of public institutions involved, among other things,
in regional development, are state holdings (2); other
examples are the various funds and planning agencies.
Mention has been made already of IRI and ENI in Italy.
The former was created in 1933 (3)» originally in order
to help private enterprises suffering under the economic
crisis. A few years later, in 1937» its role was extended
to allow it to manage its shares permanently (4). The
IRI's existence was confirmed after the fall of the fascist
regime (5); it became a corporate body under public law
(1) Other instifeu tions, such as the Development Funds of
various ministries which are not more than a matter of
accountancy^11 the state budget cannot be considered as
special institutions responsible for regional development.
They lack the necessary legal, political and financial
autonomy. As they are also an integral part of one or
another ministry involved in regional policy, it would be
irrelevant to consider them here, because they can never
act autonomously in a European context.
(2) They are mentioned only if and in so far as they have
been assigned concrete regional objectives.
(3) Act nr 5 of 23.1.1933
(4j Act nr 905 of 24.6.1937.
(5) Act nr 51 of 12.2.1948.
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("personne morale de droit public") directed by a board
and a president which are appointed by the government.
Its aim is to manage the state's participations in
industry; as such the IRI can be considered as a state
holding modelled on the organisation and working of private
holdings (l).
The ENI, whas^origin dates back to a mixed economy
enterprise from 1926, was established as a corporate
body under public law in 1953 (2). It enjoys a
monopoly of hydrocarbons and has also taken the form of
a holding. As is the case for IRI, enterprises in
which ENI participates remain private law
companies; they cannot be considered as nationalized
enterprises. A third similar holding is Italsider, which
is active in the iron and steel industry.
These holdings and in particular the IRI play an important
role in Italian regional policy, because they are obliged
by law to direct a large part of their investment to the
South. Supervisory power over both holdings is in the
hands of the Ministry of State Participations established
in 1956 (3) though it appears that in practice the powers
of this Ministry in fact do not stand up to the power of
the actual captains of industry (h).
In France two public companies have a comparable role:
the "Societe Siderurgique de Participation et de Develop¬
ment Economique" (Sideco), which aims to provide new
jobs in areas relying heavily on steel industries, and the
"Society Financi&re pour Favoriser 1 * Industrialisation des
Regions Miniferes" (Sofirem) which pursues the same objective
in coalmining areas. Investment schemes which create new jot>5
can be financed in other states too by specially established
(l)j. De Lanversin, Le ministere des participations de
l'Etat en Italie, in Revue de Broit Public et de Science
Politique, 1962 p. 632.
52) Act nr 136 of 10.2.1953.3) Act nr 1389 of 22.12.19564 J. de Lanversin, op cit p. 6*11-6^2
k6.
public companies; the Netherlands and Belgium for example
have a "Nationale Investeringsmaatschappij" (NIM) but in
Belgium it was transformed in 1975 into a public holding.
Both NIM, however, are rather indiscriminate with their
investment aid from a regional viewpoint.
Some governments have made more use of nationalization
practices in order to become directly involved in the
economic process. This is the case of France (banks,
Renault and Great Britain (coal and steel industries)
(l). From a regional viewpoint, nationalization cannot
bring more benefits than a state holding operating within
the economic system according to market rules but on
conditions laid down by the governmemt. However, even if
a state holding or a nationalized enterprise are obliged
of
to take account regional disparities and to invest more
heavily in depressed areas, they are bound by economic
rationality, though the latter can rely easily on state
subsidies. They have to take account of the overall
economic situation and to adapt to the state's economic
policy in general. Therefore, states have established
institutions more directly and more fully committed to
promotion of regional economic development. These
institutions enjoy a different degree of autonomy, have
different supervisory powers, different functional powers
and financial means at their disposal, all according to
the statete own circumstances and needs, but they are both
central state instruments to aid backward regions and to
promote more harmonious economic development (in theory
at least). In a certain sense, they are the smaller
brothers of the Cassa, smaller in this sense that they have
less power and financial means; but the problems they
deal with are also rarely as complex and large as those
of the Mezzogiorno.
(l) See further p. ^9 et seq.
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However, Italy takes the lead again. As was mentioned, the
Cassa did not pay much attention to industrial development
before 1959* In order to stimulate this, the state
therefore established three credit institutions in 1953
(l): ISVEIMER (2), IRFIS and CIS operating respectively
on the southern mainland, on Sicily and Sardinia. Their
objective is to give industrial incentives by providing
medium term loans for southern industry, in particular for
the acquisition of plants and for modernization or
installation of factories. Though such credits were much
needed in the South, which had not sufficient capital of
its own, the amount of credit given up to 1957 and the
relatively high interest rates on these loans reduced the
importance of these institutions significantly (3). In
particular they were not able to counterbalance the negative
effects of the original absence of the Cassa in the industrial
sector. Later, their financial means were increased and
consequently their impact on southern industrial development.
These credit institutions are linked to the Cassa, which
provides almost half of their endowment; the rest of it is
shared by the Banco di Napoli and various other banks.
The Cassa, which receives loans from the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and from the
European Investment Bank, makes part of these loans avail¬
able to these credit institutions. The financial
operations of these institutions are further made possible
through income from various banking operations of Medio-
credito (credit bank for the Mezzogiorno), income from a
special fund created by act nr 298, from long-term loans
from the Treasury and from the issue of bonds.
An important factor which hindered southern development was
1) Act nr 298 of 11.4.1953.
2) ISVEIMER was originally a creation by the Banco di
Napoli, dating back to 1938, but it was reorganised by
act nr 298.
(3) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan op. cit. p. 50-51.
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the absence of a proper entrepreneurial class. There¬
fore, ISAM (institute for Assistance to Development
in the Mezzogiorno) was established by law in 1961; it
is composed of the Cassa and the three credit institutions.
Its role is to provide small and medium sized firms with
technical assistance (market analysis, fiscal and admin¬
istrative advice) and advice on location and expansion.
ISAM further has an important role in attracting industry
to the South. It helps local authorities to develop
tourist projects as well as those responsible for areas
and nuclei with the legal, fiscal and administrative
problems which they meet. ISRM also does a lot of
applied research.
In order to take shares in southern companies, a public
shareholding company was set up in 1963> IN-SUD; it receives
its capital from the Cassa and usually takes a majority
participation. It is typical of Italian regional policy
that these state institutions are all assigned limited
working areas. Though there are smaller underdeveloped
areas in northern Italy too, neither the Cassa nor any
of these credit institutions can intervene there. Regional
authorities are not officially integrated in the function¬
ing of these institutions. The reasons are the same as
those behind their absence in the Cassa's decision making
bodies, but even at present after the establishment of
regional government everywhere, no attempts are made to
change the bureaucratic and centralized nature of regional
policy in Italy. This undoubted, accounts partly for its
lack of real success (l).
Comparable institutions in other states usually extend their
field of action to every backward area or region in the
state. Such is the case of the "Fonds de Development
(l) See concluJ--^ remarks to this chapter
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Economique et Social", established in France in 1955,
(l) which replaced several other institutions, whose
activities in national and regional economic develop¬
ment had been somewhat dispersed. The FDES thus
replaced the "Fonds de modernisation et d1 equipment",
which had financed investments under the first plan
(19^6-52) and the Investment Committee, an intenninis-
terial body supervising spending of public investments
voted by parliament. Several other institutions more
specifically concerned with regional development were
integrated in the FDES as well, among the "Fonds de
reclassement de la main d'oeuvre" established in 195^ and
the "Fonds d'adaption et de development", established in
1953.
The FDES aims to finance modernization projects and
equipment plans and action programmes such as construction
works, rural equipment and economic expansion, schemes for
increased productivity, industrial and agricultural con¬
version, retraining of manpower and decentralization of
industry. Its interventions thus are not limited to
regional development policies, and its field of action
covers all France.
The FDES is administered by a board ("conseil de direction")
in which each ministry concerned with •conomic policy is
represented together with the Bank of France, the National
Planning Commission and special financial institutions
(e.g. Caisse des Depots et Consignations). Among its
subcommissions, two deal with regional problems: the
committee concerned with agricultural and industrial
conversion and industrial decentralization and another
dealing with investments in agricultural, industrial and
tourist promotion schemes as approved by national or
regional plans. The FDES has thus in France many tasks
(l) Decree nr 55-875 of 30.6.1955.
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which in Italy are carried out by the Cassa; its economic
role is nevertheless more limited.
French regional policy makers have another fund from which
to finance their projects, the FNAT ("Fonds National d1
Amenagement du Territoire"), established in 1950 (l).
This fund provides grants and guarantees for loans to
create industrial estates and to finance infrastructure.
Its aid goes directly to such projects or is used as
assistance for projects carried out by local authorities;
it was the first step in France towards associating local
government in regional policy. Its original resources
were limited, and it did not have the power to expropriate
land, a serious restriction on the choice of suitable
land for industrial location. Even in 1953 when the
government obtained powers to expropriate land for indus¬
trial purposes, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing,
the supervising power of FNAT, could not promote the
decentralization of industry sufficiently (2). The costs
of moving to the provinces were often higher than those of
modernizing existing premises, even those destroyed by war
in the Paris region. Nevertheless, FNAT was the first
step towards the development of town and country planning
in France.
A noticeable contrast appears here between France and Italy.
In the latter, regional policy comprises town and country
policies in the sense of providing a necessary infrastruct¬
ure to promote regional development in its widest sense
(social, economic, educational). In the South, the el¬
aboration of this policy is largely in the hands of the
Cassa and associated institutions; in other regions,
ministries are alone responsible. In France the elabor¬
ation of this policy is much more centralized and the role
(1) Act nr 50-967 of 8.8.1950.
(2) K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, op. cit. p. 151*
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of functionally decentralized institutions can be dis¬
regarded almost. Power struggles between two deconcen-
trated administrations, the "Commissariat General du Plan"
(CGP) and the "Direction de l'Amlnagement du Territoire"
(DAT) during the fifties and confusion between town and
country policies and urbanization policy (l) have made
French regional policy more dependent on town and country
Policies This situation probably also results from the
fact that French regional imbalances are often caused by an
inadequate or non-existent infrastructure (in a narrow sense);
this argument hides other causes such as centralization
of economic, social and political life in Paris.
The principal body now responsible for town and country
po|icie-5 , including special aspects of regional policy such
as relocating manufacturing and tertiary industries outside
Paris and reorganizing rural areas, is the DATAR ("Dele¬
gation a 1'Amenagement du Territoire et 6 1'Action
R^gionale") established in 1963 (3). It is an inter¬
disciplinary and technocratic, functionally deconcentrated
administration attached to the Prime Minister^ Office;
this makes the DATAR a politically important body, because
it can normally rely on the authority and arbitration of
the Prime Minister in the Permanent Interministerial
Committee for Town and Country Planning. Its objective is
to coordinate annual aid programmes for industrial expansion
and for the provision of infrastructure; the latter
implies the elaboration of a policy of location of industries
to decentralize congested areas and to assist industrial
conversion, the former integrates the DATAR in the region-
alization of the budget, which is linked with the region¬
al "tranches" of the plan. The DATAR has its own
financial means as its disposal through its participation
(l) B. Pouyet, La d6l6gation A 1'am^nagement du territoire
et h 1*action r^gionale, Grenoble 19^7 P« 26-29.
(g) The DAT has become the BAFU ('Direction de l'Am^nag-
sement Foncier et de 1'Urbanisation').
(V) Ln Pf\pnce fcVits moaviS in The piH.iT ?t-Rce ? iWti>i H6 i H PRO v/ n £
irt p^pst'R.octo ke •
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in public financial bodies (l) and its use of the FIAT
("Fonds d'Intervention pom 1'Am^nagement du Territoire")
(2).
The establishment of DATAR has strengthened the role of
the CGP which integrates (long term) town and country
planning policy into economic and social development
plans (medium term policy); it is assisted in this by
the CNAT (Commission National de 11Am^nagement du
Territoire"). Other main partners of DATAR are of course
the Ministry of the Economy and Finance and the technical
ministries and also the regional administrative bodies
(CODER).
The DATAR has considerable influence on French regional
policy. The idea of economic growth poles has led to
establishment of 8 "m^tropoles d'^quilibre" which are
to counter balance Paris in some respect (economic, social
cultural). When this was criticized because it did not
respect the hierarchy of towns in the regions, a change
of policy was introduced and since 19^7 more attention has
been paid to regional capitals and other medium sized
towns. The DATAR also elaborated the "Plan d'Am^nagement
et d'Organisation G6n£rale" for Paris (3) and is involved
in programmes for the modernization and equipment of towns
and the elaboration of schemes for metropolitan areas.
In other states too regional policy institutions are not
conceived strictly as such but have, more general
objectives; the reduction of regional imbalances is
integrated in a larger policy package.
Such appears to be the position of the IDA in Ireland. It
was established in 19^+9 as an agency of the Ministry of
Economy and Commerce. In April 1970» IDA became an
autonomous institution under state guarantee. As is the
ill Envisaged by decree of l4.2.1963> art 5-62) Established by decree of l4.2.1963> art 3-3) See Hugh D. Clout, op. cit. p. 122-123.
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case for the FDES in France, the IDA is not specifically
a regional policy instrument. Its general aim is to
strengthen and promote the expansion of Irish industry;
it has to fulfill this task in cooperation with other
autonomous institutions such as the Irish Export Board
and the Industrial Training Authority. However, the future
prospects, a high export potential, growth and stability c ^
for the economy (l). Considering the regional dispar¬
ities in Ireland, there can be no doubt that such aims
imply action to improve the regional situation, particularly
as regards employment. IDA has thus accepted as one of
its concrete objectives, together with full employment and
higher standards of living, a substantial reduction in
regional imbalances which is to be achieved by a greater
dispersal of economic activity throughout the country (2).
It assumes that actions taken to this end should respect
the country's present population distribution, which implies
less economic, social and cultural centralization around
the Dublin area and the creation of an efficient urban
structure in order to counter balance Dublin. Although
the terminology is different, the aim is similar to that
of the "m^tropoles d'equilibre" in France, though on a
more modest scale. IDA wants to preserve the existing
pattern of community settlements by providing employment
within reasonable distance (3). States such as Belgium
and the Netherlands which have achieved good results in
this respect, hav.e shown that a coherent infrastructureconditio
network is a yfeine qua non. The Irish objectives are
interesting, because all too often regional policy results
in the destruction of traditional population patterns and
the creation of regional centralization around one or two
growth centres, leaving large, depopulated and desolate
areas behind. Though economic development appears to
be impossible without upsetting traditional rural character
(l) IDA, Regional industrial plans 1973-77» Dublin 1972
p. 4.
2) idem, p. 3.
3) ibid.
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of a region, IDA seems more determined to rule out the
negative side effects than other similar institutions.
Small and medium sized enterprises are most suitable for
location in the rural regions of Ireland, according to
IDA reports (l).
In this context the activities of the Gaeltarra Eireann
may be mentioned. This is a deconcentrated government
body responsible for the development of areas where the
old Gaelic language is still spoken md which can all be
considered as underdeveloped rural areas. In order to
preserve the cultural integrity of these areas, special
measures are taken which sometimes differ from regional
policy elsewhere (e.g. the absence of tourist projects).
It is a second example of the more human approach which
Irish regional policy tries to take.
For each of the eight regions, IDA has elaborated regional
industrial plans which envisage possible industrial devel-
sopment; in the 9th region, this task is carried out by
the Shannon Free Airport Development Company, as an
agent for IDA. IDA is further involved, in cooperation
with local authorities and the relevant ministries in
helping to build up the infrastructure for regional
development (2). It plays also a major role in attract¬
ing new industries to the industrial estates which have
been set up; as such IDA advertises Ireland overseas as
a profitable locationfor industrial expansion, aiming
often at specific enterprises suitable to the Irish
environment (3)«
In 196ht the An Foras Forbatha (National Institute for
Physical Planning and Construction Research) was established
to advise on regional policy in a stricter sense. But its
suggestions for a kind of growth centre policy suffered
from the absence of overall government planning of invest-
ibid.
IDA, op. cit. p.
idem, p. h.
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sment in the country (l). It nevertheless influenced
the later policies of IDA.
Finally, in the United Kingdom there is the Board of Trade
which after 19^5 (2) a functionally
deconcentrated institution one of whose responsibilities
is the economic development of areas. Though it has a
considerable amount of money at its disposal and it can
make loans (with Treasury approval), build factories and
provide other necessary services, it cannot really be
compared with the other institutions analysed because it
does not have the same autonomy.
In other Member States, no such agencies have been created
and regional policy is conceived and elaborated by the
relevant ministries. This absence may be explained by
internal political reasons, though it is worth nothing
that Ireland, France and Italy are the states with the
most serious regional problems; only the U.K. seems to
have equally grave regional disparities. However, the
institutions described so far are all central state bodies.
In some states, attempts have been made to associate
decentralised authorities in regional development by the
establishment of regional institutions with similar
objectives.
In the economic field, this has often resulted in the
establishment by regional or local authorities of
institutions aiming to promote the development of their
region. These regional development bodies are often
more restricted with regard to funds at their disposal,
but that does not mean that they are not useful. It is
not possible to make a clear cut distinction between devel¬
opment resulting from state intervention and development
brought about by a region's own efforts, but the part
played by the latter may well be considerable. Not only
(1) James H. Johnson, in Hugh D. Clout, op. cit. p. 226.
(2) Distribution of Industry Act 19^+5.
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do the regions stimulate regional development by the
projects which they carry out, but they may also have
a positive influence on the sociological environment of
the region by making people more aware that it is possible
to improve the region by their own efforts thereby stim¬
ulating local entrepreneurship. Some of these regional
bodies are established on the initiative of the govern¬
ment, others result from local or regional initiatives.
An outstanding example of such a regional institution for
economic development ifi the Shannon Free Airport Devel¬
opment Company. Though it also acts as one of the
regional offices of the IDA, it is responsible for the
planning and management of the airport of Shannon and the
industrial estate around it. Since its establishment in
1959» its success has influenced Irish regional policy
more towards the growth centre concept, which became fully
accepted in 1965 (in theory, that is: the practice came
much later).
In Belgium, regional development agencies ("Soci6tbs de
development regional") were established in 1970 (l). In
each province, or ±n two or more provinces together, an
SDR may be established. Their board is composed of
provincial authorities and representatives of trade unions
and employers' organisations. Their aim is to study,
plan and promote economic development of their region.
In Flanders, each province has established its own SDR;
this results less from a dominance of the micro-region
concept as from fear that one SDR would further strengthen
economic centralization around Antwerp. In Wallonia, one
SDR has been established (macro-region concept) - the SDR's
make up an inventory of the region's needs and of works
already in execution according to previous acts for
economic expansion or arranged by other authorities concerned
(l) Act of 15.7.1970 art. 15
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with regional policy. The SDR can make proposals and
encourage public and private authorities to promote
productive activities , town and country planning, and the
provision of social amenities and regional infrastructure.
They have the power to expropriate any premises or land
and to purchase them from their own resources and to start
any action which stimulates private or public investment
envisaged in the plan. They can also expropriate and carry
out works by delegation and at the expense of the state.
The SDR can even carry out industrial projects itself,
if private enterprises should not be interested.
The regional development companies in France (SDR) which
were established in 1955 have the same name but not the
same powers as their Belgian counterparts. In order to
overcome the obstacles of an inflexible capital market
and the centralization of credit institutions in Paris,
the SDR may acquire shares in firms which set up in
regions with a high level of unemployment or inadequate
economic structures. The capital of the SDR is sub¬
scribed by private and state banks, and to a much lesser
extent by some large firms and by local authorities. The
SDR were later given power to grant 5-year loans to the
firms in which they had shares; they could also under¬
write long term loans by such firms (l). The projects
in which the SDR invest need approval by the FDES as
being useful for regional development. It is typical
again of the centralized nature of French regional policy;
the government seems to be really afraid that something
may be done without its direct knowledge and approval.
Such an attitude can kill all regional initiative.
In order to improve and to rationalize existing agricul¬
tural structures "Soci^tes d'am^nagement foncier et d*
6tablissement rural" (SAFER) were created in i960 (2).
(1) Decree nr 55-876 of 30.6.1955
(2) Act of 3.8.I96O.
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The SAFER were intended in particular to try to re¬
-establish farms of an efficient size and to counteract
the division of agricultural land into smaller units as
a result of the law of succession (l). At national
level SAFER's policies are coordinated by a central body.
In Italy all funds and credit institutions are established
by the central government, except of course those of private
origin such as ISAP, which subscribes capital in enter¬
prises setting up in the South. However, there is one
regional institution, namely in Sardinia, Finsarda, which
operates under the control of the regional government. Its
objectives are similar of these of IN-SUD on the southern
mainland (2).
There is therefore a great variety of state and regional
institutions active in the field of regional development.
Their legal position, political autonomy and powers differ
and make comparison difficult, and their eventual integra¬
tion into some kind of European regional policy scheme
will be even more difficult. It is remarkable that despite
such diversity in the institutional framework in the var¬
ious Member States incentives for regional development
show a marked similarity. This fact alone is not suff¬
icient basis for any major conclusion, but it seems an
indication that concepts of regional policy are more or
less shared by the Member States (as will be shown even
more clearly in the following pages). The diversity in
institutions results from each state's legal-political
circumstances. But in matters of regionalization, the
economic evolution plays an important role too; perhaps
some common basic concepts or tendencies can be found
among the Member States in this context? It is too early
to give an answer; first a closer look at regional policy
measures is neejiecLto establish whether or not there are some
1) S. Barzanti, op. cit. p. 98.
2) On the centralized nature of Italian regional
policy, see previous remarks.
common factojs.
(C) Although it would seem to be an exaggeration to say
that the role of the financial mechanism is of prime
importance for regional economic development (l), its
influence cannot be denied. No region which is backward
in comparison with more industrially and technologically
advanced regions can bridge the gap by its own efforts
alone. Assistance needs to come from the central govern¬
ment in order to achieve a more harmonious distribution
of wealth in the state. Financial resources are needed
to improve infrastructure and to make investments in
backward regions more attractive. The absence or inad¬
equacy of external trade plus the psychological reasons
often make private investors hesitate to expand into less
developed regions. The state, interfering more and more
in economic life, has taken over these former tasks of the
private investor by providing different sorts of aid.
The amount spent on regional aid is not the only factor
determining its success, the origin of this aid can be
of equal importance. If the region relies heavily on
private resources, then a certain lack of coordination
may occur if central or regional authorities (if the latter
exist) do not intervene. Even though such assistance has
a philanthropic element, it is still an economic necessity
to ensure a normal return on investments; therefore a risk
exists that a regional economy may rely too much on one
industrial sector which provides short or medium term
benefits, or that developments take place in one or a few
isolated areas, which will then merely transfer all the
problems of centralization to the regional level. One can
see indeed in many states, in particular in Italy, France,
that inter regional disequilibria appear or even increase;
they are as harmful in society as intra regional imbalances.
If on the other hand the region relies heavily on state
assistance; then it might happen that its development
(l) Documentation Fran^aise nr *+088-4090, 197^» p. 8.
is not as autonomous as could be wished; the state will
be tempted to set itself priorities and determine the
nature of the region's economic development. If decisions
are taken over the heads of regional authorities, if no
official expression of regional requests is possible, if
planning is carried out without the advice of the respon¬
sible regional bodies, in all these cases the central
government will by nature of its responsibilities be
tempted to place national interests above regional ones;
this is all the more likely if these underdeveloped areas
are only a few peripheral regions or isolated areas which
are politically not interesting (or indeed vote the wrong
way). The greater the diversity of aid available, the
better, on condition that all measures are integrated in a
global and coordinated plan.
Another factor likely to influence the effectiveness of
financial aid to backward regions is the nature of this
aid. During the past decennia states have elaborated
a great variety of measures; some envisage direct grant¬
ing of financial aid for regional development, others con¬
sist of manipulating fiscal policy or special reforms.
While the latter are usually open to governments alone,
except where regions have been granted fiscal power, the
former can more easily be applied by state and regional
authorities alike.
In the industrial sector, financial inducements are a major
form of aid used by governments to stimulate the economy
of backward regions. Special provisions are made, by
law or regulations, to stimulate public and private
investments in designated areas. Such measures can have
a positive influence but in practice they need to be
complemented by other types of assistance.
A first form of financial inducement is the state guarantee
for loans. If a private enterprise envisages establishing
itself in an area or region in which the state does want
to stimulate economic development more than in other
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areas or regions, then the state can offer its guarantee
for such a loan. Though a state guarantee does usually
not require any expenditure from the state, because such
a guarantee will normally be given only to economically
healthy enterprises, its influence should not be under¬
estimated. Investments in a backward region may
involve, or may seem to involve, more risks than in econom¬
ically advanced regions; therefore, firms may find it
more difficult to obtain loans at a normal interest rate.
A state guarantee given to such a firm is likely to
remove such obstacles and to allow it to obtain a loan
and at favourable interest rate.
State guarantees are used as a means of helping regional
development in Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and France.
In 1958 Denmark introduced state guarantees for loans
granted by normal lending institutions (l). Loans
granted for the construction 0/ new industrial enter¬
prises or to extend or modernize existing firms can
receive a state guarantee for up to 90^e of the total costs
(Act nr 211 art 4). Loans to finance the purchase of new
machines can receive a guarantee for up to hyj: of the
total price (^5). These loans may not exceed 15 years
for the former or 10 years for the latter ^r6). Although
these measures were aimed in particular to assist certain
areas in northern Jutland suffering from high unemploy¬
ment, no clear geographical definition is given. These
guarantees were recently extended (2) to industrial,
commerical and service enterprises whose expanding activit¬
ies would contribute to regional development; state
guarantees given by the Ministry of Commerce may not
exceed a total of 100 million DKr (Act nr 172ai"5).
A new extension of state guarantees came in 19^7 (3)
1) Act nr. 211, 16.6.58.
2) Act nr. 172, 16.5.62.
(3) Act nr 228, 3.6.67.
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1969 (l) and 1972 (2). These laws modify previous
provisions with respect to some details. In 1967» an
outline was also given of the areas where these guarant¬
ees could be given. These areas remain the same today,
except for some small technical alterations due to the
modification of municipal boundaries.
At about the same time as in Denmark, state guarantees
were introduced as one of the tools of regional policy
in Belgium. The Act of 1959 offered state guarantees
for loans granted to finance the establishment or expan¬
sion of industrial and artisanal enterprises in areas
with economic and social difficulties (3). These
areas, though they are called development regions, are
in fact groups of communes suffering from high unemployment,
emigration and the decline of important economic activities.
Some areas were composed only of three communes; 15 such
areas have been designated, comprising 325 communes (**).
They were considered to suffer from the same problems of
economic growth such as employment or industrial conver¬
sion, i.e. structural problems rather thangeneral
problems arising from the economic climate. These communes
are also considered to contain growth poles whose economic
development would be beneficial for the entire area (5)*
Although there was already some anxiety in 1959 about
the threat of a coal crisis, only two mining areas were
included in the royal decree designating the areas to
benefit from this law. In 1966, however, the aid measures
provided for by the 1959 Act were extended (6) and in
(1) Act nr 56, 23.2.69
(2) Act nr 219, 7.6.72
(3) Act of 18.7.1959
(kS Royal Decree of 26.11.59
(5) J. Beaufays, La politique £conomique rdgionale de
la Belgique, in Centre Interuniversitaire de Droit
Public (Ed), Etudes sur le rdgionalisme, Bruxelles 1973»
p. 269.
(6) Act of 1*4.7.66.
678 communes, representing together 35*3^ of "the tota]
Belgian population (l), loans taken out by industrial,
artisanal and certain distribution enterprises can now
receive a state guarantee if they are in the interests of
economic expansion. All coal mining areas are now included
together with other areas affected by high unemployment
and declining industries.
As was the case under the 1955 lav, the application of
this Act is limited in time, originally up to 31.12.68;
later it was extended to 31.12.JO. It would appear,
however, that the effectiveness of these state guarantees
at least as far as regional development is concerned,
has been reduced by another Act of 1959 (2), whose aim
is to stimulate economic expansion and the creation of
new enterprises. A new element in this law is that the
application of the aid measures envisaged by this law is
not limited to certain areas. Therefore, enterprises
which cannot benefit from the regional economic Act of
18.7.59 are able to claim a state guarantee under the
Act of 17.7.59> provided that the loans in question
contribute directly to the establishment, extension,
conversion or modernization of industrial or artisanal
enterprises, that these operations are carried out by the
enterprises themselves or by other persons or corporations
under public or private lav and that they serve the
general economic interest (Act of 17*7.59» art. 1, a).
Almost inevitably, by providing the possibility of
state guarantees outside the areas designated as develop¬
ment regions, the stimulating effect of this measure
becomes reduced, because enterprises can in fact benefit
from state guarantees in every part of the state
(lj Act of 17.7.59
(2) Royal Decree S 17.2.67.
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of the state.
A new law providing state guarantees was passed when the
temporary aid measures expired (l). Its application
was also limited to development, but now enterprises
of the tertiary sector can benefit from it as well.
Luxembourg, introducing in 1962 (2) a comprehensive act
to improve the general economic structure and the
regional equilibrium and to stimulate economic expansion
(art. 1, act of 2.6.62) also turned to state guarantees
as one possible form of aid.
As in Belgium, state guarantees in Luxembourg can be
obtained for investments in the whole country, thus
significantly reducing the effect of this measure on
regional development. This and other aid measures, which
were originally introduced for a period of five years, were
extended in 1967 (3) and 1973 (b). The latter act in¬
troduced a further category for which state guarantees
can be given: investments aiming to prevent or to solve
environmental and pollution problems (art. 3* 1> Act of
1973)* However, this extension of the field of app¬
lication of state guarantees is likely to further reduce
the impact of this measure on the economic development of
the northern part of Luxembourg, as pollution problems
seem more acute in the mining and steel area in the south
of the country.
The state guarantees given in France differ from those
in other states both as regards their nature and their
application. These guarantees are not granted directly
by the ministry responsible for economic policy and
regional development, but granted by a public fund, the
FNAT ("Fonds National d'Am^nagement du Territoire"). This
can provide guarantees for the establishment of industrial
(1) Act of 31.12.70
(2) Act of 2.6.62
(3) Act of 5.8.67
(b) Act of 28.7.73
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estates by local authorities or cooperatives; these
guarantees are merely for the purchase of land and for
the financing of infrastructure (l).
Without assessing the role of the FNAT in French regional
policy it appears that this kind of guarantee does not
have the same importance and stimulating effect which
can result from the direct state guarantee available in
other states. The reason for this seems to be not so
much the fact that the guarantee is given by a public
fund, but that its field of application is more limited.
On the other hand, enterprises may be more attracted by a
well equipped industrial estate than by a state guarantee
for a loan.
A further financial involvement in regional aid is the
granting of interest rebates and interest subsidies
practised in some states (Belgium, Luxembourg,the
Netherlands and France). Investments in economically
less developed regions may appear likely to give a slower
return than a similar investment in another region and thus
to make payment of the interest on loans more difficult.
Interest rebates by the state can help enterprises to
overcome their hesitations to invest in backward regions
under such circumstances. Different systems of according
such interest are practised.
In Belgium, interest rebates have been introduced by the
Act of 18.7.59 and their application extended by the Acts
of 14.7.66 and 31.12.70. Loans are made available at a
reduced rate of interest in order to stimulate the creation,
extension, converstion or modernization of enterprises
(art. 6, Act of 59); the rebate is kfo, but exceptions
are possible and no time limit is set. Interest rebates
are also possible under Act of 17«7«59» but they are
normally 2°/> in order to give an advantage to regional aid.
(l) Barzanti op. cit. p. 97.
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This ensures that the advantages for the regions from
a regional aid measure are not cancelled out by offer¬
ing the same aid under the same conditions for the benefit
of overall economic expansion, everywhere, as is the case
with the Belgian state guarantees. In 1966, the interest
rebate was raised to 59»» but its duration is now limited
to 5 years. The 1970 Act has not modified this provision.
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg introduced interest rebates
in I962 and subsequently prolonged their application in
1967 and 1973- Subsidies can be given by the relevant
ministries to certain credit and public financial
institutions which have been granted permission to give
loans at a reducedinterest rate; these loans must serve
to finance investments in building or equipment, to
finance investments such as market studies, research,
elaboration of new products and their commercialization,
to finance retraining of workers and to cover the cost of
specific investments made by existing enterprises in order
to prevent or to solve environmental or pollution problems
(Act 1973» art. 31•)• The level of these subsidies is
calculated according to the normal interest rate for such
operations and to reduce interest rate actually paid
by the enterprise (art. 3*2), but in no case may the
interest rate be reduced more than 3 units, (art. 3«3)»
The French measures are related to the policy of indus¬
trial decentralization away from the Paris region.
Enterprises setting up or moving to areas considered as
priority areas nr firms expanding in such areas are
eligible for various forms of aid, according to legis¬
lation passed in 1955 (l)« These measures are
administered by the FDES. However, the interest subsidies
are also available to firms which do not move into a
priority area; although this reduces the effect of this
measure. The reason for this appears to be the importance
(l) Decrees of 30«6.1955«
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given to economic decentralization,the achievement of which
was thought for a long time to be sufficient in itself
to create a more harmonious economic structure.
In the Netherlands interest subsidies for the establish¬
ment of new industrial enterprises are available only
for projects of exceptional importance for the strengthen¬
ing of the industrial structure in the provinces Groningen,
Drente, Friesland and in parts of Limburg and Overijssel.
The maximum subsidy is yjc a year over a period of a maximum
of 15 years. The decision to grant such a subsidy to
capital loans must be taken by the Ministry of Economic
Affairs.
Interest rebates or subsidies are certainly more effective
than state guarantees in bringing more and better economic
development to backward regions, but success depends on its
method of application. If they are available in the whole
country, as is the case in Belgium, Luxembourg and France
the regional effect is reduced, though a difference in
rebate can enhance again the efficiency of this measure.
However, it is clear that interest rebates or subsidies
can only be applied if a firm has been able to obtain a
loan, and for investments in backward regions loans are
not easily available. Other aid measures are therefore
needed.
Loans for the purpose of regional economic development are
available in most E.E.C. states though in different forms
and under different conditions. Sometimes they are
combined with other forms of aid, such as interest rebates
or tax reduction.
In Belgium loans are made available at a reduced interest
rate by the Act of 18.7.59» art. 6. It stipulates that
such loans must be used for the creation, extension,
conversion or modernization of enterprises in the so called
development regions. The application of this provision has
been extended by the Acts of 1*4.7-66 and 31.12.70.
Long term loans can be obtained in the Netherlands from
the NIB; both principal and interest ar^ guaranteed
by the state. This possibility is open for investments
outside the Randstad Holland. A further distinction
is made between areas to be stimulated (Northeast,
Northern Holland, Zeeland, part of Noord-Brabant) and
areas to be restructured;in the latter aid is more
extensive to stimulate conversion and attract new industries
after the closure of coal mines (Limburg) and the
difficulties of the textile industry in the Tilburg area.
These restructuring and stimulation areas are included
in the overall town and country planning, which in the
Netherlands has been developed earlier and more funda¬
mentally than in any other Member State; this of course
results not least from the high population density and the
limited space available. In a certain sense, regional
policy in the Netherlands is dependent on town and country
planning, which is elaborated largely at municipal and
provincial level, though coordination of these plans as
well as the need to tackle new problems at higher levels
ha£ led to various administrative innovations (l).
Loans constitute the most important part of Italian incen¬
tives to regional economic development. Most loans are
medium term (max. duration 15 years) with an interest rate
below market rates; there is also the possibility of
exemption from paying interest over the first two years.
These loans are issued by special credit institutions
(CIS, IRFIS, ISVEIMER) which benefit from subsidies from
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in order to be able to offer
a low interest rate. These loans are available to small
and medium sized enterprises, setting up, modernizing or
expanding in the South. Besides these loans, so called
special loans with an even lower interest rate have been
made available since 1959» but the difference between the
(l) See chapter IV.
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two types of loans seems to be nebulous.
Act ni) 73-7 of 1965, which prolonged the existence of the
Cassa and allocated new funds, also introduced a change
in its policy, putting more emphasis on general develop¬
ment. Loans are available at reduced rates for the impl¬
ementation of farm improvement plans, for construction
of plants for the conservation, improvement and distrib¬
ution of agricultural products and for new or expanding
enterprises. Loans are also available for construction,
modernization and expansion of hotels, hostels and tourist
villages. The Italian system is in this respect probably
the most comprehensive.
Loans available in France have more restricted aims namely
relocate industries into the provinces, and are granted
in particular for factory construction, transport and othe:
costs of dismantling machinery from Paris factories,
training or retraining of workers.
In Ireland credit facilities have improved since 1958
(l) but this was done to stimulate economic expansion
in general and the regional consequences are thus
negligable. Indeed, if no difference is made between
loans available in Irelandideveloped areas (e.g. Dublin)
and thos available in backward areas, for example
by different interest rates, then enterprises will of
course set up preferably in those areas where the external
economies are best.
As we have noted before, the idea of regional policy
developed early in the United Kingdom. As early as 193^
the Special Areas Act made loans available in particular
to assist migration. They continued after the war (2)
but with more specific economic purposes; loans could be
made by the Board of Trade to industrial enterprises in
development areas (a redefinition and extension of the
1) First programme of economic expansion 1958-63.
2) Distribution of Industry Act 19zi5.
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pre-war special areas). It is important that the same
Board of Trade has also the authority to issue industrial
development certificates which were needed for the extension
of setting up of factories. In combination with loans,
this could be a strong stimulus to economic development
in backward regions and indeed for a time it did. This
policy slackened during the early fifties but was reinforced
in 1958 (l)» Again the number of areas qualifying for
loans was extended (2).
Of all the various forms of state aid to regional devel¬
opment, grants are the form which imply the highest
degree of financial involvement by the state. Such grants
are available in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, France
Ireland, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. They
are an important instrument for regional development
because their influence on the profitability of an invest¬
ment is likely to be higher than other aid measures intended
to attract investments to a certain region. However, their
direct impact on the state's budget limits their application.
Grants can be provided in several forms; in cash, or by
providing industrial estates free or at reduced prices,
or by preferential tariffs for public industrial and
commercial services. It happens more frequently that
such grants are not made by the state alone but in cooper¬
ation with local authorities, European or international
financial institutions.
In the Netherlands investment premiums of 25°/° of the
capital expenditure on fixed assets, including cost of
land and acquisition of buildings and machinery, can be
granted since January, 1967 to firms setting up in new
buildings, up to a maximum of D. F1 3 Million. Enterprises
whose investments are to be eligible for this premium must
set up outside the western part of the state (Randstad
Holland) in the stimulation areas of south-Limburg and
1) Distribution of Industry Act 1938.
2) They form now more homogenous areas. Unless regional
imbalances are weak, it is important to create large
enough areas in order to be able to provide all the
necessary external economies. See also page 76 et seq.
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the provinces Fries land, Groningen, Drenthe and part of
Overgssel. Within these areas, certain centres are
indicated where financial incentives are applicable in
order to obtain maximum results.
To obtain a premium, industries must fulfill certain
conditions. This premium is available not only for
industrial enterprises but also for establishments in
the private service sector, provided that they fulfill
the conditions and are of more than regional importance.
Different regulations apply to investments in Leystad,
the center of the new Zuiderzee polders. A Company
investing there can receive a subsidy of 10.000 fl. per
male employee brought in, but the total may not exceed
25% of the capital expenditure on fixed assets or D. fl.
3 Million.
In 1969 the application of this system of premiums was
extended. Industrial enterprises located in the above
mentioned areas and expanding there are *ligible for a
premium of 15% of their new capital expenditure on fixed
assets; there is a maximum of D.fl.10 million, but the
Minister of Economy can decide to exceed it. The conditions
under which this premium is granted are in general the
same as under the 19&7 regulations. An interesting
supplement to the loans and grants provided by the govern¬
ment is the fact that Dutch multinational companies have
made considerable efforts to conform to the objectives of
regional policy and to invest in areas where otherwise high
unemployment would have existed.
Whereas in the Netherlands the grant is given by the
Ministry of the Economy, in Italy the authority to make
grants has been conferred upon the Cassa per il Mezzo-
gionio (l). It does so to small and medium sized enter¬
prises which are located or expanding in the South. These
(l) Act nr 637 or 1957.
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grants can range from of building costs such as a
factory and supply road and up to 40^ for water storage
and supply systems. The Cassa decides autonomously on
these grants in cooperation with the special credit
institutions associated with it.
Several factors are decisive for the size of the grant.
The first one is the size of enterprise and the industrial
sector in which it is active. Modern industry, involving
new technology, receives a higher grai.t than traditional
industries. Other factors are investment per employee and
location. The last criterion is closely linked to the
Italian growth policy, on which the grant system is largely
based. Industries locating or expanding in growth areas
and nuclei receive preferential treatment: even within
these growth poles, grants are higher for industries
located in industrial zonas. Grovrth areas and nuclei
are classified in 3 categories, according to their level
of industrialization; the least developed are the most fav¬
oured (l). Later, large firms were also given grants,
though to a maximum of 6000 million lire.
As interesting and unique variation on the grant system
is the provision of risk capital. Enterpreneurship was
quite absent in the South, and to develop it, specially
created bodies subscribe capital in southern firms.
Financial and technical assistance is given. If these
firms do well, they are expected to pay back the capital
subscribed. Institutions using this sort of assistance
are ISAP (instituto per lo Sviluppo delle Attivita
Produttive) which is a private body, and IN-SUD (Nuove
Iniziative per il Sud). In Sicily, SOFIS and in
Sardinia Finsarda carry out similar operations (2).
In France, FDES is responsible for giving grants. They
have been available since 1955 in the first place to
(1) It must be said that there are also some smaller
development areas which outside the Mezzogiorno, in the
central regions of Italy.
(2) In fact this system tries to offer the benefits of
a grant at the same time as those of a loan.
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decentralize industry away from the Paris region. Although
this is not the case with other incentives, a firm receiv¬
ing a grant is obliged to move into an underdeveloped area
(and not just anywhere). Firms establishing or expanding
in one of the priority areas are eligible for an invest¬
ment grant of a maximum of 20°/c of the capital costs
involved. These priority areas are small groups of communes
with a high unemployment rate, similar to those selected
later in 1959 in Belgium and not really growth centres as
in Italy or the Netherlands. Since 1959 > grants have
been given in large zones too "(zones sp^ciales de conversion")
and in 19^0 the policy of financial incentives was enlarged
again to include any person with bad employment prospects.
But to link the level of the grant to the level of unemjioy-
ment make^ entrepreneurs uncertain of what they can expect.
Therefore, the government introduced in 196k two categories
of grants; adaptation grants, available in old industrial
areas, and development grants at three possible rates,
available in rural areas. Since 1972 these grants have
been replaced by regional development grants, also with
three different possible levels of assistance.
Irish regional policy started with the introduc¬
tion in 1952 of grants for buildings and equipment for
small industries setting up in the Western part of the
Republic (l). This policy was later modified and its
measures extended to include tourist activities; grants
to manufacturing enterprises in these backward areas were
increased too. However, these grants were available through¬
out the country, so that the regional effect was negligable.
In the Gaelic speaking areas, supplementary aid from the
Gaeltarra Eireann has been available since 1957; these
measures were inspired by cultural motives and the economic
results were consequently not as had been hoped (2).
1) Underdeveloped areas act 1952.
2) James H. Johnson op. cit. p. 218.
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The system of grant's to industry was again improved in
1958 (l); whereas at national level this policy stim¬
ulated the annual growth of the GNP, it did not prevent
relatively high unemployment and a population decline in
the economically backward western countries (2).
In Denmark grants have been granted since 1958 (3) for
the establishment of factories in development areas; if
a new factory experiences a temporary loss of efficiency
in such an area, a grant is also available for up to 3
years. in other states, state grants are normally
terminated once an enterprise is set up in a backward
region though other forms of aid e.g. tax concessions
often continue. The government grants to local authorities
which establish industrial buildings for lease or for sale
instead of making such grants directly to the entrepreneur
are typical of Denmark's approach.
In the Federal Republic of West Germany where economic
policy is less interventionist than in other Member States
and where the concept of "Sozialraarktwirtschaft" (k) has
brought great economic and social success in a relatively
short period, regional policy has not played a role of
any great importance. Though a federal regional devel¬
opment programme existed since 1951 (5)> Us influence
is limited because municipalities and have the
principal authority in these matters. Since 1963» invest¬
ment subsidies have been granted in development areas;
they can reach 25c/° in the "Zonenrandgebiete" (frontier
zones) which suffer from the disruption of their trad¬
itional hinterlands (now occuped by communist regimes).
(l) Industrial Grants act 1958.
<21 James H. Johnson op cit. p. 219-223.
(3) Act nr 211 or 16.6.58 extended and modified by Act
nr 172 of 16.5.62, Act nr 228 of 3.6.67, Act nr 56 or
25.2.69 and Act nr 219 of 7«6.72.
(k). Can be translated as socially responsible market
economy.
(5) This programme was linked to the problems resulting
from war devastations and refugees from East Germany.
Thus in 1951 emergency areas were scheduled and in 1953
renewal areas.
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This policy was changed in 19&9 when a constitutional
amendment (l) made joint regional actions by federal
and Lander governments possible. Growth poles have
been introduced where investment subsidies can be obtain¬
ed varying between 10°/c and 25?»; outside these centres
it is almost impossible to obtain any government assistance
for setting up new industrial enterprises.
Although we shall return to it later, it seems important
to the general theme to say a few words about this change
of policy here. The amendments to the Federal Constitution
art 91 a, 1, 2 and 3 aim "to provide a constitutional
basis for cooperation between the Lander and the Federation.
In other states, the central government is vested with the
legal and financial authority to elaborate regional
measures; only in Italy could the regions have been in¬
volved in this, but when the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno
was established and the regional development plans drawn
up, the regions were still non-functional (2). In West
Germany regional economic policy, improvement of agricul¬
tural structures and coastal protection fall under the
authority of the Lander, though they lack sufficient money
to elaborate these policies and are thus dependent on
federal subsidies. This has given birth to "Mischverwaltung"
which is an administrative practice whereby the central
government gives subsidies and wants a say in how this
money is to be used (3)« Strictly speaking, this changed
the division of powers between the Lander and the Feder¬
ation, which was unconstitutional. The amendment put it
(1) S. Schepers, Regionale politiek en constitutionele
problemen in de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland, in Tijdschrift
voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht, 1975 nr 1.
(2) See Chapter III.
(3) Quite normal, but in many a centralized system of
government, local authorities have very little influence
on the government's regional measures.
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right again. It is an interesting example illustrating
the fact that the development of regional policy does
touch the existing political administrative structures
in a state, even in a Federation set up in 19*+9» and
therefore probably to greater extent in much older state
structures.
The German aid is probably the smallest package of reg¬
ional aid made available by the government of any Member
State of the E.E.C. and yet it appears to be the most
successful: most developed areas are catching up (l).
This proves that the quality and not the quantity of
regional aid is decisive but it cannot be doubted that it
is also the decentralized nature of West German regional
policy that accounts for its success (2).
ilOJV .
Grants exist«tin the United Kingdom since 193*+ (3); the
strong social impact of regional policy at that time was
shown by the fact that they were merely used by commission¬
ers appointed for the depressed regions to assist migra¬
tions. The increase in regional problems during the
fifties prompted the government to enlarge the system of
subsidies. Thus in i960 (4) the old development areas
were replaced by development districts, which were based
in the first place on high unemployment figures. Large
parts of Scotland, Wales and England became included so
that it was felt necessary to be more selective and to
concentrate efforts in growth centres. In 1966 (5)
development areas were reinstituted and special devel¬
opment areas added; in the latter, government assist¬
ance was more extensive. However, the system of grants
and loans was not really integrated into the physical
planning, which was the main reason for its lack of
(1) Mark Blacksell, in Hugh D. Clout, op. cit. p. I87.
(2) idem, p. 17*+. See also R. Dahrendorf, Society and
Democracy in Germany, London 1968.
(3) Special Areas Act of 193*+ and 1937.
Local Employment Act i960, renewed and completed 1963.
(3) Industrial Development Act, 1966.
i
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success (l). The Highlands and Islands Development Board
aimed to combine both functions. This gives of course
more possibilities and the fact that it was done in this
case indicates that the central government was not unaware
of it. So why was this integration not effected for other
regions too? Perhaps because of opposition from various
ministries (as has happened in other countries)? Regional
policy also remained the responsibility of central govern¬
ment (with all the negative consequences of this).
However, attenpts to give regions a say in their economic
development tried to remedy this shortcoming (2).
(e) A further form of aid which is less important than
loans and grants are the various forms of tax concessions.
Though it can be doubted whether it will attract much
industry to underdeveloped regions, the system can have an
indirect regional benefit if it is applied on a suffic¬
iently large scale Indeed, there are equalising effects of public
expenditure and taxation : they reduce regional disequilibria in per
capita income (by, on average, about 40 cjo, more in Prance, less in West
Germany). (3) The redistribution through public finance between regions
tends to be reflected to a large extent in corresponding deficits in the
balances of payments on current account of the poorer regions, with
corresponding surpluses in the riches? regions. These deficits and surpluses
are of a continuing nature. (4)
Until now tax concessions have been used only on a limited
scale. Luxembourg managed to attract some important
industries by its favourable fiscal legislation of 1962;
they located in areas in need of new employment. But the
Luxembourg fiscal laws also strengthened the tertiary
sector, which is entirely located in the capital and so
(1) David Thomas, in Hugh D. Clout, op. cit. p. 207.
(2) See Chapter XV.
(3) Commission of the E.C., Report of the study group on the role of public
finance in European integration (MacDougall report), Brussels 197 7 j P 12.
(4) However, overdeveloped areas are often in need of enormous state
subsidies too. See P. Uri, L'Europe se gaspille, Paris 1973, P 141 et seQ.*
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much of the effect of the measure regarding the redistrib¬
ution of economic activities and population was lost.
To e lesser extent, the Irish government gave tax concess¬
ions to tourist and manufacturing enterprises locating in
the western and north western counties. A reduction of
certain taxes could be grated by the commission set up
under the Special Areas Act to enterprises setting up there.
In France exemption from taxation for a certain period was
possible in the western region and in some eastern regions
in addition to other financial inducements. Belgium too,
introduced tax; exemption in 1959 for enterprises in
development areas (ar. 11 aid 12 of the regional expansion
act of 1959)•
(f) The incentives mentioned so far all concern industrial
aspects of regional development. In some E.E.C. States
# T
attention is also paid to services i.e. the tertiary
sector; its increasing economic importance requires its
inclusion in any regional policy which aims to be global
and long term in its approach. Closely related to this
problem is the growth of state administrations; they are
usually located in the capital and reinforce its economic
domination over the rest of the country (l)« France and the
United Kingdom have given considerable attention to de¬
centralization of tertiary employment. In the former an
effort has been made to reduce the almost total educational
and cultural domination of Paris by the establishment of
new Universities in the provinces and by building "Maisons
de Culture" in the equilibrium towns® Research centres
have been set up near major production cities (e.g. Toulouse
for Aerospace). Some branches of the civil service have
been relocated, but much remains to be done. Since 1971>
the tertiary sector has been receiving more positive
attention; control on office development in Paris has been
(l) Possibly by the only exception is Bonn (d), though the
city is linked to the Koln-Du®seldorf area,1
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increased; a special tax is levied on new offices and 3
categories of rates are applied for the center, eastern
parts of the city and suburban areas respectively. At
the same time, incentives for industrial developments in
the equilibrium towns are extended to the tertiary sector.
However, French policy in these matters remains ambivalent.
Although the need to give other cities a share in the
terbiary sector is officially recognized. Paris is also
a symbol of French grandeur and the government will
miss no opportunity to increase its international status.
Hence the recent construction of enormous office buildings
2
and the rise of planning permissions granted 17000 m
floorspace in 19^9 to 636.000 m granted in 1971.
The United Kingdom has attempted to solve these problems
more strictly with town and country planning policies.
New towns were established (l) to decentralize in partic¬
ular London and Glasgow but also to stop these and other
major cities from absorbing more and more of the rural land
around them. Together with more than 30 new towns, which
now total more than 2 million inhabitants together, expan¬
sion schemes are worked out for other medium sized cities.
However, whereas the growth of London has been reduced, that
as
of the London region has not, just the Paris region, where
modern transport facilities permit people to live on the
outskirts, thus creating a huge megalopolis, comparable to
the Randstad Holland (but worse). Attempts have also
been made to decentralize the Midlands and the North, but
again with only limited success. However, Great Britain
has been more successful than for example France or Italy.
To conserve and improve the international status of major
cities in the Benelux, nothing has been done there to
discourage the private tertiary sector; on the contrary,
(l) New Town Act 19^6.
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Brussels has a deliberate policy of attracting office
jobs, at the cost of congestion, destruction of the
urban and social environment and increasing the imbalance
between income per head in the capital and the rest of the
state. Only in the Netherlands a start has been made on
the decentralization of the public tertiary sector; between
6000 and 7000 jobs in the civil service will be transferred
from the Hague to Limburg and to northern cities. Though
it concerns relatively small number of mainly lower rank
jobs, the cumulative effects of this sector can contribute
considerably to regional development. But as yet (1977)
not so much has happened. There have been transfers to
Maastricht, Eindhoven and Groningen, but on a smalkrscale
than planned, mainly because of strong civil service union
opposition. The financial terms were as generous as those
offered in private industries to moving employees, but an
important reason for this opposition was the fear that an
employee's promotion chances will be less once he is in¬
stalled far away from the decision center. In other words,
moving personnel is not easy if it is not accompanied by
decentralization of powers too.
The state least affected by these problems is doubtless
West Germany, where the federal structure of the state and
the existence of several large cities minimize the need
for decentralization in the public and private sector.
Although the importance of the agricultural sector is
diminishing in the economies of many states, reforms in
this field are a valuable and necessary part of reginnal
policy. Indeed, with the exception of old industrial
regions , h-io^b others had a dominant but deficient agricul¬
tural system: heavy underemployment persisted as do
small farms, little mechanization, low productivity and
a low income per head, (l)
(l) See J. Bourrinet, Le probleme agricole dans 1'inte¬
gration europ^enne, Montpellier 196k.
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Worst off in this respect was again the Mezzogiosmo in
Italy, where an almost feudal agricultural structure had
continued to exist until after World War II. A widespread
land reform was therefore elaborated, which also included
regions in the north of Italy. Besides expropriation
above a certain ceiling (varying around 200 to 300 ha)
and redistribution of this land, the reforms were completed
with land improvement schemes, irrigation, setting up of
cooperatives and provisions for the marketing of products.
The reform was an economic success in some areas of the
South, a failure in others, in Sicily in particular.
Despite all the money invested through the Cassa (l),
it did not fundamentally change the socio-economic struc¬
ture of the Mezzogiomo (2). The main reason was political:
the ruling Christian - democratic party did not want to
destroy the basis of its power among the peasants and
landowners of the South. The land reforms was a one-
dimensional operation; some farmers and areas profited
from it, many did not. The unforeseen economic boom
of the North and the lack of parallel industrialization
in this period reduced the positive effects.
French measures to renovate agricultural structures are
not basically different; they too envisage modernizing
farm equipment and improving infrastructure and social
facilities. Major land reforms were not necessary as in
Italy but mixed economy planning cooperatives (3) did a
lot of land clearance, in particular in north eastern
areas and in the Landes forest. In 1967 zones for rural
renovation were defined, covering over a quarter of France;
special financing is available there to modernize agriculture
and to increase output. Unlike the Italian policy makers
in early days French planners paid more attention from
1)See 36 et seq
2)Russel King, op. cit. p. 96-97.
3)state and private capital are participating in it.
the start to the establishment of small and medium sized
enterprises in rural areas in order to reduce under¬
employment and unemploymwntj migration continued to a
lesser extent than in Northern Italy.
In Ireland too industrialization attempted( particular
in those rural areas where the nature of the climate and
soil mean that the possibilities of improving the
agricultural output are limited. In some places tourism
can become an important economic activity and investments
are made in this sector, except in the Gaeltacht areas in
order not to endanger the linguistic purity.
Other E.E.C. states do not have agricultural problems of
such gravity, not even in backward regions. States like
the Netherlands and Denmark have long had a highly productive
agricultural sector and policies there are very much
concerned with the protection of rural areas and the
conservation of green belts around the cities. It must
be noted that in France too nature conservation (national
and regional parks) is included in the elaboration of
regional policies, also as part of tourist developments.
The situation in West Germany provides a remarkable
contrast: agriculture is inefficient in its use of land,
capital and labour (l) consequently underemployment persists
in this sector, in particular in Bayern and Niedersachsen.
Federal and state governments are making efforts to modify
this situation. Annually the federation spends over
1.2 million DM to raise agricultural incomes by subsidising
machinery and other necessary goods (e.g. fuel oil), by
improving marketing and by giving cheap loans and grants
for retraining and retirement. A similar amount of money
is used for land reforms (2), to form larger units. The
Lander have contributed by attracting small and medium
sized enterprises.
(l) Mark Blacksell, op. cit. p. 179? A. Mayhew, Structural
reform and future of West German agriculture, in Regional
Studies, 1970 nr 3 P»




This survey of the development of regional policy in
the Member States seems to reveal a few interesting
points with respect to our general theme.
1. Institutions for regional economic development are
set up by the central government and controlled by
it; the exceptions are all institutions of lesser
importance.
2. Regional aid is granted mostly by the central govern¬
ment or by bodies which it controls.
3. Regional economic development is thus promoted from
"above". The only country' where lower authorities
are really associated in the elaboration of regional
policy is Vest Germany, which managed to obtain
better results thanks to its federal structure and
the concerted actions of the Lander and the
Federation (l).
k. In every state attempts are made from the beginning
of the emergence of regional policy to concentrate
aid on areas most in need. Thus areas are defined
all over the country, which can range from a few
municipalities (Belgium) to several departments or
counties (France, Great Britain). Only Italy applied
its aid from the beginning to a large area, the whole
South, but here underdevelopment was very apparent J
in the rest of the country, the Italians were orig¬
inally no better than the others in that they also
dealt with widely different areas.
5. Gradually it becomes clear that regional economic
development entails coordination between all min¬
istries and other institutions involved and co¬
ordinated policy. Coordination leads to planning;
(l) M. Blacksell, op. cit. p. l6j
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but this needs coherent areas, and coherence
means larger areas. Regional economic develop¬
ment planning leads to regionalization and in
the third chapter we shall see how this developed
in the Member States; this development was not
really parallel but influenced clearly by the
need for planning.
6. This survey makes it evident that regional policy is thus not a
phenomenon which takes place in one or two Member States, but in
all Wine. What is even more important, there seem; to be no wide or
fundamental differences between the objectives and the means of these
nine regional policies. This "parallelism" may be a good argument
against those who argue that coordination of national regional policies
is extremely difficult because of "fundamental differences"; it appears
that one must look for other reasons to explain the weakness of European
regional policy coordination, (l) Another important conclusion concerns
the relation between regional policy and regionalization. Although it
is certainly not the only reason for regionalization, it is one of
the most important, and in some Member States, the most important
reason for reform of local and regional government. (2) As soon as
the development of regional policy has come to the need for regional
economic planning, one must also define coherent planning areas. Even
if it is not stated as such, it is clear that this is one of the main
reasons for reform of sub-national government in the Member States.
However, it would be an exagerration to say that the development of
regional policy leads automatically or unavoidably to regionalization,
as there are clearly other reasons too. But it will appear (3) that
these other reasons are only in one Member State of fundamental
importance (Belgium); and even in that case, economic disequilibria
play a more important role that one normally recognises.(in other words,
the absence of a succesful regional policy can also be an influential
factor).
(1) See part II, in particular chapter I and II.
(2) This will appear most clearly in the case of Prance. See chapter III.
(3) It is of course impossible to define precisely which reasons are most
influential (regional policy or those described in chapter II). There is
always inter-action.
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CHAPTER II. WHAT ELSE IS BEHIND STATE REFORMS?
Introduction
In this second chapter our intention is to indicate some
Tacts which have also influenced the emergence and develop¬
ment of regionalization. Because it is so vast a subject
and because it is more sociological than legal-political,
we will aim to complete the picture given in the first
chapter. Without the remarks following here, the reader
could be left with the impression that the emergence
of regional policy and its contemporary development are
alone responsible for regionalization. This is not the
case, as we will try to clarify in this chapter.
The Member States of the E.E.C. are characterized by an
enlargement of the scale of social life, in particular
since the second World War. The development of science
and technological progress, the growth of population,
urbanization, industrialization, professional special¬
ization, greater mobility of the population and better
communications: all these elements are inter-related
and have contributed to create this enlargement of the
scale of social life. In the past, the life of most
people did not extend beyond the narrow boundaries of
the village where they were born; they had less contact
with the rest of the nation and expected nothing from it.
This situation has changed profoundly. Because new
means of communication bring people into contact with
new developments, they expect the same infrastructure
wherever they live. These higher expectations as regards
living conditions, and the social environment have enlarged
and intensified the tasks of public authorities. Whereas
people had a low degree of involvement in public life
in the past, people nowadays expect a whole range of
specialized services from their local, regional or
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national authorities. These bodies were thus confronted
with new problems of how to meet these popular expectations;
in general local and regional authorities did not have a
sufficiently large area under their charge, nor the organ¬
izational capacity to elaborate efficient policies in
all fields. Administrative organization dated from the
last century and had not been adapted fundamentally to
new times. Xn most countries (the Benelux, France,
Italy, Denmark) territorial boundaries and the functions
of local government were still the same as in the 19th
century, but the scale of social life and the tasks of
public authorities have changed fundamentally. Consequen¬
tly, the administrative tasks of local government, its
powers and its financial means are no longer in accordance
with present needs (l). Having thus indicated the major
problems, a closer look is needed now before we start
a full comparison in Chapter III.
1. General comparison of local and regional government
As we have indicated already, it is easy to describe
regionalization in each Member State separately, but it
is difficult to make a comparison which is useful for
the European perspective of this thesis. Therefore a
scheme has been worked out (2) which will now be devel¬
oped further. In order to clarify the other causes of
regionalization apart from those connected with regional
policy, four aspects of local government seem to be rele¬
vant: territory, organization, tasks and powers, finances.
The territorial aspect can be divided into the local, micro-
regional and macro-regional levels of government. A
government body can be considered as a tier or level of local
government if it has its own legislative and executive
body, its own fiscal powers and a separate budget; if
(1) "Memorie van Toelichting" (Explanation Memorandum)
to the Dutch proposals on the reorganization of local
government, 19^7-77» nr 1^.332 p. 36.
(2) See introduction.
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it is obliged to cooperate with a higher level of
government and can in its turn oblige a lower level
to cooperate as well; if it is subject to supervision
from a higher power and is itself vested with supervisory
powers over local levels (l). There is thus a distinc¬
tion between these bodies and those which may also have
a territory over which they exercise some powers, but
which do not fit the description of a tier of govern¬
ment in other respects. This concerns in other words
the difference between territorial decentralization and
functional decentralization.
Territorial decentralization implies the delegation of
powers to autonomous public authorities in a certain part
of the state territory (2). These powers usually cover
local and regional interests which can be better dealt
with by local and regional authorities, although under
the supervision of the central authority. The latter
decides which matters are of local and regional interest
and which are not, but decentralized authorities can deal
with matters falling under their responsibility as they
consider appropriate and they can set up all services
necessary to the execution of their tasks. Clearly
territorial decentralization has political significance,
in particular if decentralized authorities are elected
by the people of their electoral area (municipality, prov¬
inces etc.) (3). However, there can be territorial
decentralization, according to some scholars (^), even
if local or regional authorities are not elected or if
(1) G. Burdeau, Traits de Science Politique, Paris
1969> P» 393 et se95 A. Mast, Overzicht van het
Belgisch administratief Recht, Gent, 1973 nr 77«
(2) A. Buttgenbach, Droit Administratif, Bruxelles 1966
p. 132; J. Dembour, Droit Administratif, Bruxelles,
1970, p. 113; J. de Meyer, Staatsrecht, Leuven, p. 20;
A. Sandulli, Mannale di Diritto Amministrativo, Napoli,
1969 p. 25^ et seq.
(3) A. Mast, op. cit nr 68; J. Prelot, Institutions
politic^o^s et droit constitutionel, Paris 1969 p. 235-
237; G. Vedel, Droit administratif, Paris 1962 p. ^60.
(4) G. Burdeau, op. cit. p. 399-^01; J. Dabin, Doctrine
g^n^rale de l'Etat, 1939 P* 308.
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they are nominated by the central authority. It appears
that in such a case, autonomy is more legal than real.
Although it is not necessarily so, the principle of
territorial decentralization is usually entered in the
constitution.
Functional decentralization on the contrary is usually
introduced by law. It implies the delegation of specific
powers to a public body whose institutions have organic
autonomy from the authority by which it was established
(l); in most cases such public bodies have legal person¬
ality. Functional decentralization differs from decon-
centration in that the former implies a degree of autonomy,
and from territorial decentralization in that it is spec¬
ialized. However, there is a school of thought which
suggests that functional decentralization may only be the
outward and visible form of decentralization; it is
related to material power, whereas centralization and
territorial decentralization concern personal power (2).
The difference is that territorial decentralization
establishes a relation with other levels of authority in
the state whereas functional decentralization concerns
an internal structure with no correlative relation between
the functionally decentralized organs and other levels of
authority in the state. In the first case, the organs
have the same material but different personal powers;
this establishes the relation with other levels of authority
in the state. In the latter case, they have different
material but the same personal powers, which concerns the
internal structure. (3) According to others, the
difference between territorial and functional decentral¬
ization concerns merely the number of the functions, the
former implies, general powers and autonomy, the latter a
(1) A. Buttgenbach, op. cit. p. l4l-l42; G. Burdeau,
op cit. p. 396.
(2) C. Eisemann, La centralisation et la decentralis¬
ation, in: Revue de droit public et de science politique,
19*+7 p. ^8-50.
(3) idem, p. 51 e"t seq.
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specific public interest which can be national or municipal
or departmental, provincial etc. (l)
Both forms oj? decentralization can exist in practice with¬
out any relation. When they cfc> exist, it implies the
recognition of local public services and institutions
under public law; within the regional or local adminis¬
tration, another decentralization can be created by the
establishment of local or regional public institutions.
Such decentralized services can be established on the
decision of one competent authority or by more than one
authority in association (e.g. inter-communal associations).
In several states services with a mixed administration have
also been introduced in practice (2).
They are created by a public authority to deal with a
particular public service, but in cooperation with private
individuals or legal corporations which provide part of the
capital or know-how and which sit on the board (3).
Territorial decentralization is considered to have many
advantages of a social administrative and political
nature. It permits better arrangements for specific local
or regional interests as well as better contacts between
citizens and public authorities. It facilitates the
functioning of the state administration, to an even larger
extent than deconcentration, and is a means of providing
political training for citizens and politicians. In
general, it reconciles authority and freedom but maintains
at the same time the unity of the state because of the
hierarchy of legal rules. The disadvantages are held to
be for example the lack of technical knowledge of locally
or regionally elected people and the politic»Sa-bu>h of their
administration; however, this also happens at state level.
1) A. Buttgenbach, op. cit. nr 1^+0.
2) For example, air transport in Belgium (Sabena),
West Germany (Lufthansa) the Netherlands (K.L.M.radio
and television in Luxembourg.
(3) A. Mast, op. cit. p. 71-75*
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Sometimes decentralization is considered to be more
expensive than deconcentration, though it can reduce
central state expenditure too; it is difficult to
assess whether this argument is really valid. The most
important advantage probably lies in the guarantee it
offers for democracy and liberty. Recent developments
in decentralized states show a tendency towards "co-
management" between lower and higher decentralized
authorities whereby the former cooperate in the execution
of laws and regulations of the higher authority (l).Detailed
instructions are often given by the higher authority which
in practice make decentralization res emble deconcentration
(2).
Functional decentralization also has advantages. It
provides each public service with a statute in accordance
with its aims; it can limit interventions by public
authorities and allows a decentralization of power and
financial means. On the other hand, the variety and large
number of functionally decentralized services sometimes
ma^ei democratic control difficult. Its regional reper-
'cussions can show some aspects of deconcentration.
At the local government level, municipalities exist in
all Member States. A special situation must be mentioned
in the United Kingdom which has two sorts of government
at local level: non-metropolitan and metropolitan dis¬
tricts; the matter can be compared with non-metropolitan
counties, existing at the micro regional level of government
in the United Kingdom, because they have some powers in
common (in the field of public services for example).
Capital cities, Brussels, Copenhagen, London and Paris
have special regimes, as do some other large cities
(1) For example, town and country planning in Belgium and
the Netherlands, regional policy in Vest Germany, municipal
schools in Belgium and France.
(2) C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Decentralisatie en aanweijzingen,
uitnodigingen en bevelen, in: Tijdschrift voor Overheid-
:sadministratie, 197^j P» 1-9.
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(Milan, Rotterdam). Between the local and micro regional
level, there is a special, intermediate form we might
call cooperative local government. By this we mean those
bodies which are established by municipalities on their
own initiative or under the instructions of a higher
authority, and which come close to territorial or func¬
tional decentralization. Among the first category, i.e.
those concerned with territorial decentralization there
are the federations and agglomerations of municipalities
(l) in Belgium, the "Verwaltungsgemeinschaften" in Vest
Germany, which in some Lander have almost taken the place
of municipalities, the "communautes urbaines et rurales"
in France; examples of the second category i.e. of
functional decentralization are the "Nachbarschaftsverbande"
in Vest Germany, the "syndicate a vocation multiple" in
France, the "societ^s inter-communales" in Belgium, the
"gemeenschappelijke regelingen" in the Netherlands. The
difference is that in the first category these bodies are
supra-municipal (very clearly so in Vest Germany) while
in the second category they are inter-municipal In both
cases they aim to provide specific services as a joint
effort or to work out together more general policies
(such as, town and country planning) which the individual
municipalities cannot handle effectively alone because
of technical, financial or organizational problems or
because problems have gone beyond the municipal borders and
become interrelated. As we are concerned only with reg-
ionalization, the local level is mentioned here only to
complete the picture and will not be studied more deeply.
At micro-regional level, there are forms of territorial
and functional decentralization as well. Micro-regions
cannot be considered as local government, because their
area and population are usually larger than those of
municipalities and because their tasks and powers are
different (2). As a form of territorial decentralization
(1) The first are in rural areas, the second in urban
areas, but they are really identical.
(2) See below.
at micro-regional level, one can consider the provinces
in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, the counties in
Britain, Denmark and Ireland and the departments in France.
In West Germany the "Bezirke" and "Verbande" are also put
into this category. It must be noted that West Germany
has a very complicated structure of local and regional
government. The powers concerning administrative
organisation belong to the "Lander" and organisation and
powers of local and regional government vary considerably.
However, one can say that at local level there are in
ever)' "Land" "Kreisfreie Stadte" and "Einheitsgemeinden"
which cooperate within "Kreise", These "Kreise" belong
to the level of local government as a special, more
developed form of cooperative local government. Therefore,
we consider as micro-regional government in West Germany
the "Regierungsbezirke", which exist in every "Land"
except in Saarland and Schleswig-Holetein) as a form of
deconcentration and the "Verbande". The latter are a
complicated institution which have a different position
and different powers in every "Land". However, in the
context of a European comparison, it seems enough to agree
that there is a proper micro-regional government in West
Germany too. Functional decentralization at micro-regional
level seems to be absent exceptisome examples which are
less relevant to this analysis (l).
Macro-regional government is at a level immediately under
the level of central government and above micro-regional
government. In Belgium, economic regions can be considered
as a form of territorial decentralization, and cultural
councils as a form of functional decentralization. However,
distinction is somewhat arbitrary in this case (2). The
"Lander" in West Germany and the regions in Italy are
macro-regional forms of government. The regions in Britain
(1) For example the "vaterschappen" (bodies concerned
with water protection) in the Netherlands, the districts
for (town and country) planning in Belgium and the
"Plannings regionen" in the Lander" of West Germany.
(2) See Chapter III.
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and France belong to the category of functional decen¬
tralization on a macro-regional scale.
These three levels of local and regional government also
have different tasks and powers. Municipalities have
small scale planning tasks, although these are often
delegated to the level of cooperative municipal govern¬
ment. They are autonomous in these matters in all
Member States, but micro-regional authorities usually
exercise supervisory powers. Municipalities are also
responsible for a variety of public services. At the
level of cooperative municipal government, one finds
tasks of municipal origin, but which are beyond the scope
of a single municipality; these tasks can concern matters
of local planning as well as public services.
The micro-regional level also mainly involves a variety
of public service tasks which are beyond ~he scope of
local government. They also execute planning tasks,
although it happens in more than one country that these
tasks are actually performed within macro-regional bodies
(functional decentralization). It seems indeed that in
all countries where macro-regions are established,
planning occupies a considerable part of their responsib¬
ilities. However, if they are territorally decen¬
tralized units, other powers are added often concerning
social, cultural and economic matters (l).
The size of the State can have some influence on' its
internal structure, but this is not necessary. If one
compares France and Vest Germany, the former has a very
simple scheme, the latter has a very complicated scheme
of local and regional government. If one compares Belgium
and the Netherlands, the former has introduced some form
of macro-regions, the latter does not consider it. State
size is only one factor (among many others) which can
influence the system of local, micro-and macro-regional
(l) All this concerns regionalization proper and will
be discussed at length in the following chapter.
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structures. In larger states, however, opposition against
four levels of government (including the national one)
may not be so strong as in smaller states, (except Belgium).
2. Main problems
A problem present in every Member State concerns the scale
of local and (micro) regional government. Both levels
of government were established in the 19th century and,
although some modifications have been worked out since,
these were of such a minor nature that these bodies have
remained ill-adapted to contemporary social and economic
situations. Existing municipalities and micro-regions Q*)
were designed for the needs and concepts of the 19th
century society, but the developments of social, cultural
and economic life, of communications, technology, and the
concept of the role of public authorities made fund¬
amental renovation necessary. But this ("''ts beca very difficult
to achieve.
One means used to modernize local government has been
the introduction of legal provisions to enable municipal¬
ities to create bodies for inter municipal cooperation on
specific matters (municipal transport, fire protection,
ambulance services, provision of water and electricity);
in some countries this form of solution has grown to
such proportion that a supra municipal level of local
government has been built up ("gemeenschappelijke
regelingen" and "gewesten" in the Netherlands, "Nachbar-
schaftsverbande" in West Germany, federations and
agglomerations of municipalities in Belgium). However,
this brings no fundamental solution to the problems of
local government: their technical administrative and
financial means remain weak and they cannot handle effect¬
ively new demands by the population (for example for
social, cultural, educational infrastructure) or new tasks
given to them by the central government as a result of
growing intervention of public authorities in public life




(for example increasingly strict rules on town and country
planning, increasing controls in social and economic
matters). Therefore, in all Member States we see the
central administration taking care of these matters or
being obliged to give considerable subsidies to local
government. In both cases there is undoubtedly a loss
of local autonomy and of significance of local government.
Even if micro-regional government has been brought in,
local government has been weakened. In all Member States
there seems to be a tendency towards centralization which
has not yet been stopped. The establishment in West Germany of the
"Gemeinschaftsaufgaben" there has introduced a form of
co-participation between the Lander and the central govern¬
ment, which is also practised between "Regierungsbezirke"
and Lander. There seem to be two reasons behind these
reforms: the powerful CSU wing of the CDIJ has always
been very much in favour of the rights of the Lander and
opposed to strong central government; what was given to
Bavaria could not be refused to other Lander. Secondly,
the West German State structure is relatively new and
therefore more flexible than older, undisturbed systems
where different levels of government and administration
seem to be entrenched. But of course, this is not in
itself an adequate explanation, although one should not
under estimate this factor of immobility and opposition
to fundamental changes on the part of local and (micro-)
regional government. This becomes very clear every time
reform proposals are tabled (in the Netherlands, France
Belgium). However, as the Belgian reforms of 1975 or
the Danish reforms of 197^ show, if the government is
determined to bring about much needed reforms, local
opposition quickly disappears once the "inevitable" has
happened. Another, less open form of opposition comes
from those political and other forces which are organised
and firmly involved in policy making at national level
(political parties, but also trade unions and organizations
of industry and commerce). It is not unlikely that these
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forces are not very enthusiastic about municipal autono-
:my or new transfers of powers to local and regional
government, because this would weaken their influence.
As long as political forces are not regionally organized
and have not established firm control over municipal and
regional party organizations, decentralization may be
hard to achieve. In Belgium it was quite remarkable to
see all major parties re-establish their organizations
for municipal and regional council representatives soon
after the amalgamation of municipalities (1975) this is
clearly intended to establish control by the central party
apparatus before a new constitutional reform transfers
more powers and financial means. On the contrary, one
sees the central government delaying regionalization and/
or municipal reforms when it is feared that this would
provide a power base for opposition parties (France,
Italy) or when parties are locally not very well organized
(the Netherlands) or not sufficiently controlled. This is
probably one of the main reasons why municipal and (micro-)
regional reforms in Britain, Denmark and Ireland have
not le d to real decentralization (l). In Germany, where
political forces have organized themselves very well at
all levels of government at the time of the establishment
of the federal state structure, opposition against reforms
is very moderate (2).
A clear example of th^jroblems of scale at local level
is found in the relations between urban centres and
surrounding rural areas. Many towns have developed
a central function for industry and commerce, shopping
facilities, schools, health services; rural areas tend
to become dormitory areas, with some recreationaffunctions ,
(1) The other reason is that nobody seems to have clear
ideas about a new division of tasks and powers between
the different levels of government: a problem which
also exists in other states.
(2) But a remodelling of Lander, proposed in the early
170's by the federal government, could not take place,
probably for the same reason that it would upset the
established power basis and channels too much.
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although these are found in the towns too. Administrative
divisions between these social units an obstacle to
effective government (l). This is even more so if a
pluriform local government structure exists, with a
distinction between the tasks and powers and supervisory
powers of urban and rural areas (Britain, Denmark, West
Germany).
The problems mentioned here existeiin all Member States,
as is proved by amalgamations of municipalities or by
the establishment of inter-municipal cooperation. This
can take the form of territorial or functional decen¬
tralization; in the former there is more or less all-
round government taking care of several tasks; in the
latter there is cooperation on a specific matter. However,
inter or supra-municipal bodies for cooperation receive
quite a lot of criticism.
First of all, whatever the possibilities for municipal
cooperation, their practical realization always depends
on the willingness of municipal authorities to cooperate.
Personal reasons or politically different council major¬
ities often prevent inter-or supramunicipal bodies from
working effectively and sometimes they can be a reason
not to cooperate at all. But even if it works, not
always the right scale can be found; some municipalities
may not wish to participate in one group because only part
of their territory is concerned and therefore they may
choose to participate in a group of other municipalities.
This often happens in municipalities consisting of several
parishes, spread over a large territory; one of the
a
parishes can be orientated to different neighbouring
municipality from the others. Xt also seems that all-
round policy becomes jeopardized by this splitting of
responsibilities at one government level, and that prior¬
ities cannot easily be defined. In many countries
(l) See H. Rottier, Steddijke Structuren, Muiderberg 1978.
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complaints about lack of coordination are to be heard.
Criticism comes from the point of view of democracy too.
Control over the activities of specialized inter municipal
bodies or over a supra municipal institution becomes
difficult, both for elected councillors and for the
citizens; it often becomes unclear who decides what.
Xt should be noted that this sort of criticism is not
heard very loudly everywhere, but it is common with respect
to local government in the Nine. There seems to be a
widespread uneasiness about the ineffectiveness, the
weakness and the loss of autonomy of local government.
Regional government (micro and macro) seems to be
considered differently in this respect (l). In the
Netherlands much attention is paid to democrac^-y in local,
regional and national government and reform proposals
seem to be as much dominated by this concern as by
problems related to the scale of government (resulting
in amalgamations) and its effectiveness. In other
countries, a more balanced approach exists and these three
aspects mentioned are considered on a more equal basis.
Another related problem is that of the powers of each
level of government; it is thought that existing
structures can no longer fulfill their tasks. This results
then in inter-municipal cooperation, which has been
mentioned already, but also in open or more often concealed
centralization. There is not so much a change in the
division of powers among the different, levels of govern¬
ment, but a change in their financial scope. The more
local and regional authorities depend on centrally provided
financing, the more their autonomy weakens; very often
they depend so much on subsidies from the central govern¬
ment that they cannot have much influence even in matters
within their legal powers (France has probably the worst
situation in this respect). However, this is not a
(1) See below.
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general rule. It happens too that legal guarantees and
a strong feeling of autonomy can make local autonomy
real, even if one depends on government grants. It depends
also on the system of receiving subsidies: if a general
subsidy is given to a local authority, which can decide
'
L
freely how to spend, autonomy is larger than if subsidies
are given for each specific aspect of local policies.
Access of local authorities to other sources of finance
(e.g. existence of municipal banks, access to the capital
market) also influences their autonomy. The division of
tasks and powers is outdated in most countries too. The
existence of too many levels of government (as in West
Germany) and of different authorities at each level can
make it difficult to aee where responsibility | Jes ;
powers can be exceeded both in the horizontal and the
vertical direction (l). Tasks closely related may be
treated in an uncoordinated way (2). The distinction
between rural and urban areas only aggravates this
problem and makes coordination between an urban centre
and its "hinterland" difficult (3).
In the discussions about local and regional reforms,
decentralization has become a key word in almost every
country; it is related to three other aspects. First
of all, centralization is thought to be at least partly,
responsible, for the economic difficulties of several
regions (in France, Italy, Britain, Belgium); it prevents
(macro or micro) regional public and private authorities
from playing an effective role in the economic develop-
:ment of their area (4). We have said in the previous
(1) Interference by the central government in West
Germany in matters of regional policy before the 19&9
constitutional amendment.
(2) The establishment of industrial estates by
municipal, provincial and national authorities in Belgium.
(3) One advantage is, however, the protection of rural
areas from easy absorbtion by a town.
(4) J. Co*hford (Ed), the failure of the State, London
1975 P. 9-11.
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chapter that planning activities need new structures;
the request for participation in decentralization inevitably
leads to demands for new structures as well. The central
government or its agencies become aware of the need for
local and regional reforms because effective social,
economic and town and country planning demand it; at the
lower levels, the desire for more effectiveness in order
to achieve more equal welfare in all parts of the state, or
in other words the desire for more planning, is linked to
the wish to participate in it; decentralization is request¬
ed to achieve more democracy and more effectiveness.
To achieve this a new distribution of tasks and powers and
financial means is thought to be necessary: but this new
distribution is not possible with the existing structures
which have proved to be no longer adequate for contemporary
needs. Structures inherited from the 19th century cannot
maintain the type of modern administrative and technical
apparatus which could handle with efficiency all tasks
entrusted to it. What general solutions are offered for
all these problems?
3. Solutions at local and regional level
One of the first problems which needs to he solved in most
countries is that of the scale of government. In every
country one sees a tendency to respond to a larger scale
of social life by establishing a larger scale of govern¬
ment, in particular at local level. At micro-regional
level this tendency is less pronounced, although there have
been amalgamations at this level too (Britain, Ireland,
Denmark). However, let us look now at the municipal
level where fusion of municipalities seems to have
become almost a rule; some countries have already drast¬
ically reduced the number of municipalities (Britain,
Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, West Germany), others have
plans to do so. A territorial regrouping of municipalities
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is considered to be a sine qua non for a possible red¬
istribution of tasks and powers; the latter seems
even more difficult to realize than the amalgamation
of municipalities. ^ K political philosophy ia
about the role of local government and ^ no clear
view about its functions either; too little serious
research has been done on this matter until now. How¬
ever, bu>o aaajoma, ^>fccc(x,cL about local
government: it is a provider of services to a local
community and an instrument of self government, not
just an agent of the state and the central government
(l). All government reports on local government include
similar statements. They are easy to agree with in a
democratic tradition.
Together with amalgamations there is an effort to eliminate
or reduce the differences (in tasks, powers, supervisory
power) between urban OniLrural areas. The evolution in
this respect^s not clear: sometimes rural and urban
areas are brought together to form a single territorial
unit (Denmark Britain but with exceptions), sometimes
inter-municipal bodies for cooperation are set up (Belgium,
Italy, France, Netherlands). A pluriform structure at
municipal level seems to be disappearing but the evolution
is not finished yet. Intei^and supra—municipal cooperat¬
ion seems to continue even after fusions, except in the
Netherlands where amalgamations ere carried out in order
to eliminate this much criticised practice of function¬
al government.
It must be mentioned that metropolitan areas often receive
a special status (London, Brussels, Copenhagen) because
of the social, political, cultural economic and demo¬
graphic significance of these urban area. Theittasks^
(l) Lord Redcliffe - Maud and Bruce Wood, English
Local Government reformed, London 1973> P« 10«
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powers and financial position become more like those of
a micro region; Paris even approaches the status of
-wdb
macro region. Although this is relevant for our thesis,
it does sliow the problem involved in reforming structures
overtaken by the social and economic evolution.
However, it is not at municipal level that all social
and economic problems can be solved and that planning
can be elaborated. Municipal reforms are merely a first
step or an aspect of wider reforms which also include the
micro-and macro-regional level (or the introduction of the
Jatter) for those specific tasks which cannot be dealt
with as municipal tasks. It is here that regionalization
comes into the picture.
As has been mentioned already, the desire for more
democratic government is one of the reasons for reforms,
but it is not a major reason in any country and
certainly less important than the demand for effective
government. Even in the Netherlands, where an impression
is created that democracy is the main reason for reform
proposals, this seems more camouflage than anything else;
if one con_sid-e-t»s the proposals, they deal with new structures
which are not more democratic than in other countries (l).
Democracy is a word which is used with a different meaning
in each country to "sell" reform proposals easily. However,
the execution of tasks at an unnecessarily high level of
government is not only undemocratic but often inefficient
too; the execution at too low a level of government is
always inefficient. The first problem can be solved by
decentralization, the second by centralization. People
want effective government in the first place; political
involvement is always possible in a democratic system at
any level of government (local, micro, macro, regional,
(l) For example, they do not propose to change the
system of centrally appointed mayors; in other
countries mayors are elected by the members of the
municipal council.
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national). The proportion of people who wish to be
involved actively in government is probably not higher at
municipal than at national level. The idea that
municipalities and regions must be a counterbalancing
power is illusQrtj in the present situation, because
of party structures and party politics and because of
the weak financial position of the lower levels of
government.
This will be discussed further in the context of the
relations between Lander and federal government in West
Germany (l). And we have mentioned before that party
controls over local sections are tightened before a
redistribution of powers, for example, by the establish¬
ment or renovation of party organisations for local
and regional councillors. Even in a. country like the
Netherlands, with its old tradition of mayors appointed
by the Crown, one sees a rapid decrease of neutral
appointments and an increase of party appointments
particularly in the more important municipalities.
Functional bodies become more at both local and
regional level in most Member States. Indeed, they can be
a way to more effective government, but from a democratic
viewpoint "government integral" must be preferred to
"government partiel". Because all problems are so
closely linked, it is in the long run probably more
effective too. Functional solutions (inter or supra
municipal cooperation, inter-micro—regional cooperation,
functionally decentralized (macro-regions etc.) are short-
term solutions for a central government which is unwilling
or too weak to create a sufficiently large scale for local
and regional government by amalgamations.
Laments about the weakening of democracy are nonsense
(l) See Chapter III.
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because the present situation brings more centralization
and/or functional government, neither of which is very
democratic, and because internal decentralization and
deconcentration of services can bring more democracy at
municipal level. The crucial problem is not one of
democratic government, but one of effective government;
the crucial problem is therefore: which tasks and powers
can be given to each level of government,and on what
scale. To redistribute tasks and powers between
different levels of government is one thing, to give each
level an appropriate scale is another. Fusion of
municipalities seems to be the step taken first in most
countries, in order to create a proper scale for a
later redistribution of powers; if the latter is done
at the same time, it comprises mostly tasks and powers
of supra-municipal and to lesser extent of micro—regional
origin which are given to the new municipalities. Reduc¬
tion of the number of micro-regions seems already a more
difficult operation, perhaps because tasks and powers of
central origin could go to micro—regions with a more
suitable scale? There is also the problem of whether
these should be functional or integral forms of govern¬
ment. The latter would mean the creation of five levels
of government (local, micro-regional, macro—regional,
national, European) if a macro—regional level is introduced.
There is much opposition to this idea in the smaller
states (Belgium, the Netherlands) in particular. According
to this view, only one of the regional levels should
become integral government, the other functional. So one
sees the Netherlands in favour of functional macro—regions
(if any are set up), Belgium in favour of functional
micro—regions (according to the latest ideas for a new
revision of the constitution). Other countries maintain
micro_regional integral government for the moment, and
seem to favour functional macro-regions (France); the
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latter are not so strong (no directly elected regional
council, no regional image) and more easily controlled
(because of the lack of democratic justification: and
so the vicious circle arises, in France for example.)
These tendencies of regionalization, the proposals and
structures made in each Member State, the new structures
and their powers will all be examined in the next chapter.
Such an examination is necessary now that we have seen
thob regionalization is brought about by the development
of regional policies but also for other reasons mentioned
(in a more general way) in this chapter. The background
is similar in each Member State, although of course the
emph^is is different according to national circumstances
and traditions. The detailed discussion in the next
chapter will enable us to see whether or not, and if so,
to what extent, similar structures have been established
or similar proposals made.
io6.
CHAPTER III: REGIONALIZATION IN THE MEMBER STATES
Introduction
In the two preceding chapters we have studied the back¬
ground of the reforms of the local and regional levels
of government in the Member States. We have seen thus
that the evolution of regional policy from aid to under¬
developed regions to planning of their social and economic
development has led to the need for new local and region¬
al government structures. Besides this major reason,
there are other reasons mentioned in the second chapter
which have more to do with effective and democratic
government at these levels and with adaptations of its
scale to fit contemporary circumstances. In the preface
it has been mentioned that cultural reasons (renaissance
of nationalism, or linguistic differences) can also be
a stimulus to state reforms. Local government reform
has already been mentioned in the second chapter; we
shall return to it here although our thesis concerns
in fact only regionalization: i.e. the intermediate and
not the local (municipal) level of government. However,
in some countries reforms were carried out at both levels
simultaneously which we have to discuss in order to
avoid an incomplete picture of these reforms. Another
reason is that the problems of these levels of govern¬
ment are often linked and are frequently, if not
invariably^dealt with by the government together (I;-
In this chapter an analysis will be made in particular
of the micro and macro regional levels of government,
regardless of whether they comprise territorial or
(l) In Belgium for example, amalgamation of municipal¬
ities is considered without any reference to regional¬
ization; Italy too has introduced a regional level of
government without touching existing municipalities or
provinces.'
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functional decentralization, because we think that both
forms at both levels can be relevant in the European
perspective ( which is discussed in the second part of
the thesis). At municipal level we discuss briefly
only those forms which are relevant to an understanding
of the reforms at regional level. After the discussion
of the Member States' reforms we will make general,
concluding comments about the major characteristics
of regionalization in the Nine.
First we consider those countries where reforms have
taken place at local and micro-regional level, then the
countries where reforms have occurred more at micro-and
macro-regional level; but this is not a strict division,
because in the first group there are countries which also
planned reforms at macro-regional level (for example
Bi"itain) and in the second group there are countries
which have reformed the municipal level too (for example
Belgium} which has also not touched the provinces.
1. Local and micro-regional reforms.
A) Reform of existing local government has been carried
out very consistently in Denmark. Since the reorgan¬
ization of local government in 1867-68, no basic changes
had occurred and the state was left with too many and
inefficient administrative units (l). Not only the
geographical structure but also the financial resources
and the distribution of powers among state, counties and
municipalities necessitated adaptation to new economic and
social circumstances. Regional considerations appeared
only at the end of the preparatory work, which lasted from
1958, when a local Government Act Commission was appointed
as a commission of inquiry, until 4.967 » when a local
Government Reforms Commission started work on the elabor¬
ation of reforms; at this point it was argued that the
(l) E. Harder, Local Government in Denmark, Copenhagen,
1973, P. 122
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counties too were not large enough to carry out present
and future tasks efficiently. These reforms ca.wa uaLo
on 1st April, 1970-
a) The aim of these reforms is to modernize the state
structure and in particular local government. As Denmark
enjoys a more harmonious distribution of wealth among
its regions than other states, regional pressures
are very weak (l). The relative absence of this economic
factor is the reason why demands for more participation
are not put in regionalist terms. The work of the reform
commission aroused a lot of interest, not only from local
authorities but also from the population, which was not
always the case in other states (2). Main topics were
the redistribution of powers among the three levels of
government and the equalization of the fiscal burden of
local government (3). It is surprising, though, that
the establishment of macro-regions was not raised partic¬
ularly because the geographic situation of Denmark as well
as its aim of redistributing powers in general could lead
in that direction {k) .
Together with a considerable reduction of municipalities
(from 1197 to 276), the number of counties was reduced
from 25 to Ik; the metropolitan area of Copenhagen
and Eederiksborg is given a special status. A classic
problem with amalgamations is to find objective criteria
for determining new boundaries; in Denmark the amal¬
gamation and partition of county boundaries was done on
the basis of the responsibilities which the new counties
(l) All three major regions of Denmark are above the E.E.C.
average GNP. Our analysis does not include the Faroe
Islands, which have an autonomous status and are attached
to Danish Crown and Greenland, whc® internal structure is
organised by Act nr 4Ll of 22.12.1966.
2) E. Harder, op. cit. p. 126-130.
3) S. Mohring-Andersen, Local Government Reform in Denmark,
in Comparative Local Government 1973» vol. 7> nr. 2, p. k8.
(k) At one moment there was discussion about 8 regions,
but the idea was dropped mainly because of resistance
from local authorities.
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vould be given. Even such a functionalist approach
made it necessary to envisage additional but minor
alterations in order to take account of popular request
or to facilitate the functioning of the new communities
(1).
The 1970 reform did not apply to the metropolitan area,
comprising the county o£ Copenhagen and the central
corporations of Copenhagen and Frederiksborg. The
population in this area is so high that only minor boun¬
dary adjustments were required (2). However, the problem
is to organize decision-making and administration of
matters common to the whole area. Urbanization and
economic development in this metropolitan area have
spread over the boundaries fixed in the beginning of this
century and necessitate an overall administration. The
Copenhagen Local Government Reform Commission, appointed
in May 1970> offered two alternatives to the government
in its conclusions, agreed upon in April, 1971 (3)- One
would be the establishment of an ordinary county authority
embracing all local authorities in the metropolitan area,
the other the installation of a metropolitan council. The
adoption of the first solution would require a change in
the legal positions of the corporations of Copenhagen
and Frederiksborg, whose powers are comparable to those
of county councils; but the new Copenhagen authority
would then be in line with the newly established counties.
The adoption of the second solution would create problems
concerning the determination of its powers though it was
agreed that the metropolitan council would have to be
responsible for economic and infrastructure planning.
Political disturbances held up a final decision until 1973*
In fact the Copenhagen problem poses the question of
(1) Act nr 13k of 2U.5.1972.
(2) E. Harder, op. cit., p. l^U.
(3) Hovestads omradet, Betaenking, Kobehhavn, 1971*
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whether a state must give itself a uniform structure
or whether certain areas can have an organization distinct
t&v tfi
from the rest. With exception of West Germany, other
Member States' capital is also the largest city of the
State, where income per head is highest and where all or
the most important political, economic, social and
cultural functions are centralized. This creates partic¬
ular problems connected with planning, service provisions
and the financial income of the capital. Even Jacobin
thinking agreed that uniformity had to be abandoned, as
the case of France will illustrate * In Denmark too the
capital was given a special status; though pragmatic
reasons often lead to the abandonment of uniformity, it
may enforce the dominating position of a metropolitan
area over the rest of the state. But not enough time has
passed to give a final judgement.
Together with new boundaries, the 1970 reforms introduced
direct election of the county councils. The councils
elect their own chairman, who becomes county president:
under the previous system, the council head was appointed
by the government. This innovation marks a desire to
make the county more democratic and more attractive (for
citizen and politician alike).
b) The powers of the county councils are defined in
relation to the traditional powers of local authorities
in Denmark. These powers can be statutory, such as
social and health services, primary and secondary
education, adult education and spare time activities,
roads and maintenance of water, protection against
pollution and sewerage (l). Other activities result from
the definition which local authorities have given concern¬
ing local interests. This led them to provide for local
transport, cultural and sports activities, housing schemes
and for supply of water, gas and electricity (2).
(1) E. Harder, op. cit., p. I56-I69.
(2) idem, p. 170-175-
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Recently, they have also become active in economic
development, particularly by carrying out public works in
periods of high unemployment; V they may not engage in
specific activities for attracting industry and commerce,
for example by providing grants or other economic benefits.
Only in areas scheduled as backward may local authorities
intervene together with the state in order to help indus¬
trial development by construction of industrial sites.
Most of these powers are shared now between the municipal¬
ities and the counties; there has thus been no strict
redistribution of powers, but rather a tendency towards
cooperation among different levels of government. Amal¬
gamation of communes has indeed left communes too small
to handle efficiently all the tasks mentioned above.
Supervision of municipal activities, which was exercised
by the state, has been transferred to the counties under
the 1970 reform, but the counties remain under supervision
of the Ministry of the Interior; in both cases supervision
is of course limited to legality of acts. Some powers
have been transferred from municipalities to counties
e.g. in the health sector (hospitals). Though in
principle deconcentration was rejected in favour of dec¬
entralization, it should again be emphasized that the
redistribution of powers is not yet complete (l). No
powers of significance have been transferred from the
state to the counties, though in future they may receive
more powers in matters of coordination and planning.
Reforms concern also municipal and county income. The
old system, much criticised because it restricted local
expenditure autonomy and led to fiscal inequalities among
local communities, has been replaced by equalization
schemes on a local tax basis or on necessary local
expenditure which is determined by criteria such an inhab¬
itants, areas, etc.
For the Copenhagen areas a solution has been worked out
(l) S. Mohring-Andersen, op. cit. p. 50.
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which differs from anything in the rest of the state (l).
The idea of one county was rejected because it would be
too big (2) and too distant from the citizens. A Metro¬
politan Council has thus been established, composed of
members of the municipal and county councils of the metrop¬
olitan area. The Metropolitan Council has received bind¬
ing powers in matters of town and country planning,
environmental protection and certain health services (e.g.
hospital planning) . Supervision is nor uniform and |*5
exercised by the Ministers of Housing, the Interior and
Environmental Protection. The metropolitan council has
no direct powers in matters of public transport. The
Metropolitan Transport Act of 1973 has set up a function¬
ally deconcentrated body, the Metropolitan Transport
Council; members are appointed by the Minister of Public
Works and by the Metropolitan Council. It is an example
of insufficient coordination (and unwillingness?) among
ministries, a phenomenon which we have also observed
in regional policy issueS; clearly some ministers are
not enth usiastic about decentralization.
It is significant that Danish regionalization, in contrast
with other E.E.C. states, was not initiated as a result
of strong regional pressures or as a complement of reg¬
ional economic development. It started as a local govern¬
ment reform to improve efficiency and it remained within
this sphere. Consequently Danish regions are typical
micro.regions, to which some of the powers of lower author¬
ities (communes) have been transferred but none or very
few from the higher authority (state). This tendency
may result from the fact that the communal reform still
leaves a large number of small municipalities: out of 267,
167 have less than 10.000 inhabitants (l). From a point
of view of participation and democracy, this can be wished
for, but it brings almost inevitably a tendency of central¬
ization, even though the state remains basically decen-
(l) E. Harder, op. cit. P. 135.
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tralized. Power moves away from the population, towards
a second level of government. The powers of those micro
regions regardless of whether they exercise them exclusively
or share them with municipalities, are clearly in the
sphere of public service. They have little general
economic planning functions and are restricted too in
matters of regional development; absence of any signif¬
icant regional pressures could be one reason, but the
size of the new counties does not seem suitable for
proper planning functions either.
Another characteristic which is also found in other
states is the search for a special status for metropolitan
areas. The Copenhagen area has grown so much in pop¬
ulation and economic domination that it is considered
possible
no longer/to give it the same legal status as other
cities in the country. However, special status for the
metropolitan area carries a serious risk of reinforcing
its position and its growth, though of course, a solution
must be found for its problems. If this solution must be
a special status^ it should be accompanied by provisions
to limit its growth. This is not the case in Denmark
perhaps because development of the Copenhagen area as
a whole is slowing down compared with other areas. Never¬
theless its economic importance continues to increase,
in particular in the tertiary sector.
Finally, regionalization in Denmark has not yet been
accomplished. Micro-regions may learn that they are
not a satisfying answer to demands for participation
(to be performed at municipal level) nor for decentral¬
ization in economic and political matters (to be performed
at macro-regional level). But in the near future macro"
regions will be excluded in Denmark. It can be argued
that this is a good thing, because a division of a country
of less than 5 million people in two or three macro—r gions
would create too heavy an administrative structure. Even
nit.
in larger countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands,
there is considerable opposition against the establishment
of three levels of local government (municipalities, micro-
regions, macro-regions). Thus macro-regional functions
(in particular planning) may veil continue to be performed
at national level (l). In Denmark, there is also no
socio-cultural stimulus towards the establishment of
macro—regions (as there is in Belgium)
B) Regionalization in the Netherlands is still in a
preparatory phase and therefore no concrete structures
can be analysed. Nevertheless, traditionally decen¬
tralized structures of the state, province and municipal¬
ities are questioned. Reasons for this search for modern¬
ization and for the different proposals tabled are
instructive both as regards the possible final outcome
of Dutch regionalization and for the discovery of differ¬
ent trends in matters of regionalization in the E.E.C.
a) As in Denmark, regionalization in the Netherlands does
not find its major stimulus in regional economic imbal¬
ances. This does not imply that population and economic
activities are distributed harmoniously throughout the
country; on the contrary. Both are very much concen¬
trated in the Randstad Holland and adjacent areas; the
provinces North and South Holland and Utrecht, together cooij3ft>t
21^o of the territory, have 40.1 D/o of the total population
and produce 5^.3°l° of the GNP. This concentration has not
led to serious economic underdevelopment in other parts
of the state, even though certain agricultural areas in
the north suffer from emigration and indvetry declines
in a few other places. Southern, eastern and northern
provinces have a GNP which is under the average E.E.C.
GNP = 100, whereas the three western provinces are above
(l)The same applies to Ireland, See further D.
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it (l). However, these differences do not seem to be
large enough to give rise to proper regionaljdemands.
The idea that regionalization is a structural complement
of regional policy does not really enter into the debates
in the Netherlands either.
The starting point in the Netherlands is similar to that
in Denmark: the inadequate functioning of decentralized
authorities, in particular municipalities (2). Though
the number of communes has decreased considerably since
I85O, there are still many which cannot fulfil all the
tasks which have been entrusted to them (3). Prevailing
attitudes towards the communes, which are considered to
be the basis of democracy and participation in public life,
and resistance from local authorities have held off a
drastic program of amalgamations until now. Instead a
solution has been sought in inter municipal cooperation
in order to deal with specific common interests (4).
This 1950 get allowed communes to establish joint public
corporation which have been given the name of regions
("gewesten"). Though their tasks are only municipal (5)»
their acts have the validity of communal regulations (6)
and their institutions and working methods are similar
to those of municip cc lities (7). These "gewest en" are
in fact not fundamentally different from the "syndicat s
de communes" in France or the agglomerations and feder-
(1) P. Romus, Economie regionale europeene, Bruxelles,
1975 p. 96.
(2) S. Schepers , Loopt de Nederlandse gewestvorming uit
de europese pas?, in: Tijdschrift voor openbaar Bestuur,
1976, nr 15, P. 338-339.
(3) D. Simons, Het probleem van de gewestvorrning in.
Nederland, Tijdschrift voor Bestuur swetenschappen en
Publiekrecht, 1970, nr 3 P« 150.
h) Wet van 1 April 1950.
5) J.J.M. Festen, Gewestvormingin Nederland, een weg
van lange adem, Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen
en Publiekrecht, nr. 1, 1975 P* 5*
(6) G.W. van der Pot, Handboek van Nederlands Staatsrecht,
Zwolle 1972, p. 520.
(7) J. de Bres, Het gewest in werkelijkheid, in: Instituut
voor Bestuurswetenschappen (Ed.) Onderzoek naar de best-
:uurlijke organisatie, I, Rijswijk $.972, p. 209.
116,
ations of municipalities in Belgium.
This Bet and its application are the subject of much
criticism nowadays. This form of cooperation among
municipalities makes it difficult to see who is respon¬
sible for what, thus it is harmful to the public (6)
character and harmony in administration, ft! the same
time it has not improved efficiency in planning and co¬
ordination as was hoped at the time (l). Indeed,
municipal cooperation, even municipal reforms, though a
necessary complement, cannot be a substitute for region-
alization. Modifications made in 1966 in the 1950 Bet,
allowing the "regions" to care for several common mun¬
icipal interests together, could not basically improve
the situation.
b) Nevertheless, further developments towards the establish¬
ment of regions are based on these experiences. The Dutch
regions, in a Government paper on administrative re-organ¬
isation (2) remain "municipal regions"; they are
considered to be an alternative for amalgamations of
communes by establishing a structure which does not replace
them but takes over certain common tasks (3)» These
regions are thus placed above the communes but under the
provinces, which will play a similar administrative role
for the regions as for the municipalities (4), This
concept was worked out in a Bill put forward in 1971
(5), which did not however reach the statuta^ook. When¬
ever a proposal pleased the powerful Dutch association
of municipalities, the Government thought it to be un¬
suitable; when a proposal was to the Government's
taste, it aroused opposition from local authorities.
(l) E.H.A, Kocken, Het gewest als wenselijkheid, in:
Instituut voor Bestuurswetenschappen (Ed.) op. cit. p. 253~25^»
Nota Bestuurlijke Organisatie 1969.
D. Simons, op. cit. p. 152.
Nota Bestuurlijke Organisatie 1969 p. 53-
Memorie van toelichting bij het wetsontwerp p. 3«
(KccAjiA oP t&C ovA\AAMM/*b/"«*"bM>AA< Etkfc tfu.
b>x>0 AAAmam- oP cfcy ^ titot .
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In this Bill the organization of regions remained closely-
associated with the administrative structure of municipal¬
ities and provinces (l). Their establishment is put in
the hands of municipal authorities, though in certain
circumstances, the government can help them (2). The
region's role is to coordinate, stimulate and direct the
activities of member communes and it can therefore lay
down binding rules (3). The region would also be
allowed to levy taxes as the communes do, on the basis
of the Set, art. 273^-277 (*0« The powers of
these regions would concern town and country planning
(5) and different aspects of public responsibilities which
are better dealt with cooperatively than in the municipal¬
ities separately (6). The regions would take the decisions,
but the execution of these matters would be left to the
communes. Though Dutch municipalities have always dealt
with physical planning, general rules need to be estab¬
lished at higher levels of government (as the proposal
implicity admits).
In later proposals one sees a tendency to enlarge the
powers of the "regions" and to strengthen their instit¬
utions. HoweVer, regions as seen by the Dutch author¬
ities are not real micro-or macro-regions; they are
suprajnunicipal bodies, improperly' labelled as regions.
This creates a lot of misunderstanding if one attempts
a comparison with the evolution of regions in other
Member States (7). The major reason for the failure of
the 1971 proposals and of later ones ±s the strong
opposition to introduction of a fourth level of admin¬
istrative decentralization which, it is assumed, will
serve neither democracy nor efficiency. Similar opp¬
osition to a fourth tier of local government existed in
(1) idem, p. 8
(2) idem, p. 6
(3) idem, p. 19
(k) idem, p. 15
(5) J. De Bres, op. cit. p. 21^.
(6) Memorie van Toelichting, op. cit. p. 9
(7) J.J.M. Festen, op. cit. p. 6
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Denmark too. It reflects clearly that citizens
everywhere in Europe are in favour of efficient and open
government, technocratic it necessary but not bureau¬
cratic. In the larger states, however, the question of
a fourth tier of local government is a different matter,
because of the size of the country. In the larger
states, central government is further remoted from the
citizens than in smaller ones. Rome, Paris and London
are felt to be far away, more so than Brussels, the
Hague or Copenhagen. Although it is difficult to
prove it, it seems likely that this is an important
general reason for (popular) opposition against a fourth
level of government in smaller states. It is certainly
used as an argument in the Netherlands.
It may be suggested that this objection to 'municipal
regions" has been an important factor in keeping the
debate going on other forms of regionalization which
are more worthy of the name. Thus the establishment
of 22 or 28 provinces has been suggested (instead of 11
as at present)(l). However, the idea of proper macro—
regions is not absent totally; a preliminary Bill of
18.11.197^ suggests establishing 5 regions and bb macro^
regions but, according to the same document, the provinces
would continue to exist. Opposition to such a compl¬
icated administrative structure led then to another
suggestion, i.e. replacing the provinces by b or 5 macro —
regions and the municipalities by micro-regions (2).
None of these proposals has become law; it s most likely
that the present government Will not push any reform
before the elections in 1977- The new government
continued discussions for a while and then decided to
start with amalgamation of municipalities before reforming
the provinces. In marked contrast with Belgium, amal-
(1) J.M. Polak, Gewesten en provinces, in Nederlauds
Juristenblad, 1975 P« 822 et. seq.
(2) Eindrapport van het Institut voor Bestuursweten-
sschappen, 1975-
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gamations in the Netherlands are not worked out by the
Ministry of Interior, but by municipal and provincial
authorities. However, not much concrete has happened
yet.
In any case, the Dutch attempts at regionalization do
provide another illustration of our contention that the
absence of serious regional economic inbalances gives a
different dimension to regionalization. No reference is
made in any of the proposals to regional policy or har¬
monious regional economic development; the relation-
Jhip of the latter with regionalization is not brought
forward in the debate. Instead, regionalization is
considered solely in relation to the problems of re¬
structuring the state, primarily at municipal level.
The Netherlands and Denmark do not differ fundamentally
regarding regionalization; in broad terms the same
reasons are at the basis of reform proposals and reforms,
namely in the first place a better provision of public
services. But the Danish reforms have led rather easily
to the establishment of micro regions, whereas the Dutch
experiences with municipal cooperation, improperly called
regions, make such a process more difficult. However, it
is still possible that the outcome may be the establish¬
ment of micro—regions, probably by creating more provinces;
but amalgamation of communes is therefore not excluded
because a micro-region also needs viable municipal
structures.
C) The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg can be considered to
be similar in size and population to a micro-region; there
is thus no question of regionalization in the sense in
which it is generally understood. Though administrative
reforms will appear as necessary, they will have to be
on different levels than the decentralization reforms in
other states.
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However, on this small scale, serious desequilibria in
economic development and distribution of population
exist. In order to build up a more harmonious structure,
successive governments have used regional policy measures
as well as town and country policies . The latter in
particular seems to have brought into the open the
deficiences of Luxembourg's administrative structure.
The municipalities, which are the sole level of territ¬
orial decentralization in the state (l), are mostly
unable to deal efficiently with the new tasks (2);
moreover, a majority of them cannot even fulfil their
normal responsibilities. Indeed, more than 60 communes
have less than 1000 inhabitants; most of these are
situated in the less developed northern part of the
state. It may be assumed that the inevitable failure of
these municipalities to provide adequate services for
their population is one of the reasons behind the slow
developmen^of that area and in particular the departure
of a large part of its younger population (3).
In order to remedy these problems, Luxembourg too has
established inter-municipal institutions ("syndicate de
communes" )j they can help to solve a single, specific
problem, but are inefficient if more general local
matters have to be dealt with. Amalgamations of communes
come up again as an appropriate means of preventing the
lowest tier of decentralization from losing its political
significance and its effectiveness. Though the need to
reform the existing administrative structure has been
recognized, no fundamental reform has yet worked out.
There is an agreement on the principle, but still some
dissent as to the number of new communes(4).
D) The three states studied so far have in common, among
other things the absence of functional regions. This is
(1) P. Majerus, l'Etat Luxembourgeois, Luxembourg 1970»
p. 282.
(2) Ministere d'Etat, Programme directeur de 1 *amenag-
ement du territoire, Luxembourg 1971. P« 55*
(3) S. Schepers, Examen des probl&mes rdgionaux au
Grand Duch£ de Luxembourg, in Revue d'Economie Politique,
1978 nrfp. 673-674.
(4) S. Klein, Regionale Einheiten Statt Gemeinden, in:
Luxemburger Wort, 1970 nr 325-326.
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a remarkable contrast with another small E.E.C. Member
Ireland, where local government reform was carried
through without reference to existing forms of function¬
al regions.
a) The basic unit of local government are the districts,
which include mostly an urban area or municipal town with
its hinterland. Below these territorial units there
are community councils, which are of a purely voluntary
nature; their goal is to represent the interests of the
people of a small community, say the size of a parish.
Although they differ in size in rural areas as compared
with urban areas, community councils can be useful to
increase participation. It has therefore been suggested
that the state and its agencies as well as local authorities
should be obliged to consult them in matters affecting
the area (l). They should also be allowed to nominate
or to elect a few members in the district councils.
The das trict is suggested as the municipal or local level
of government which can provide certain public services,
and create a harmonious structure instead of the present
borough and urban district councils. In fact, a number
of services are already organised on a sub-county or
district basis, including roads, housing, health and
cultural services, agricultural advisory services and
education (2). However, the district boundaries used
by these various administrations as well as by some
state agencies such as the Post Office or electricity
supply are not always the same which leads to confusion
for the citizen, ineffective democratic control and lack
of coordination.
Therefore, the establishment of districts, each having
an elected council, is suggested as one part of the
local government reforms. These district councils will
be responsible for the running of services and admin-
(1) Institute of Public Administration, More local
government; Dublin 1975 P* ^ •
(2) idem p. 20-21
istration of local affairs , but district personnel
remains county personnel assigned to the district.
This considerably reduces the district's influence, as
its staff will of course respond first of all to county
council's orders and wishes. The Gaeltacht areas become
districts where all matters are conducted in the old Irish
language (l).
The counties can be considered as a micro-regional level;
their functions and legal status remain essentially the
same. County councils are responsible for the planning
and execution of all major local government tasks,
including housing, transport, social and cultural services
and economic development plans; this range of public
services can be extended. At present Iff counties exist,
each with a council whose membership varies according to
the number of inhabitants and whose members are directly
elected.
Quite clearly Irish counties are no easy case. We
consider them as a micro-regional level of government
because we think that the districts can best be compared
with municipalities elsewhere; their institutions and
functions have really a municipal or local character. But
the counties have not so evidently the legal and political
character of micro—regions, be it only because they are
far too small compared with micro-regions in other
countries. But they cannot be considered as supra—mun¬
icipal institutions either; they have some character¬
istics of both (supra""municipal and micro— regional ) .
Like the Netherlands, Ireland is somewhat out of the
European mainstream of local and regional government
reforms. Ireland seems too small a country to be
divided into macro-regions.
Much importance is given to the counties from a point of
view of democracy, but it cannot be doubted that they are
(l) Final Report of the Commission on the Restoration
of the Irish language, Dublin 1965.
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too small to be adapted to modem local government
requirements. Already in 1963, the Second ProgramMt
for Economic Expansion (l) envisaged larger areas and
established regional development organizations for 9
regions formed by grouping of counties. These instit¬
utions brought some functional deconcentration; other
ministries also introduced in a dispersed way, regional
boundaries for some services (2). Lack of coordination
is obvious, as is lack of democratic control and part¬
icipation. In the framework of local government reforms,
however,harmonization of regional boundaries is now
envisaged (3). It will be necessary to modify them
in order to make them identical with the nine planning
regions.
b) These planning regions have a board composed of
elected members and officers of the member countries;
their representativity is thus of a second degree. The
board exercised control over the regional executive
officer and its personnel. Under the new proposals, the
board will have limited statutory powers, in order to
stimulate economic planning and development in the region,
coordination of public services and provisions of certain
services (4). Such a reform could also bring a solution
to the Dublin area, which is now in a special position,
and give it the same regional powers as other regions.
In Ireland the aim is thus to establish an identical
structure for the whole state (which is not the case in
some other E.E.C. Members). These nine regions are
established clearly because the counties are not suited
for economic planning (5)» but local government reform
does not take account of this at present. The nine regions
approach the concept of functional regions, but (in
comparison with France or Britain), they are functional
(1) In fact, the 19^3 Bet made no precise provisions for
regional planning, but the concept emerged as necessary
during its execution.
(2) Eg. the Irish Tourist Board, regional health boards,
each with different boundaries.
3) Institute, op. cit. p. 28.
k) idem, p.
(5) James H. Johnson, op. cit. p. 22b.
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micro regions.
E) The United Kingdom is a special case. As in other
states analysed so far, there has been a move towards
modernization of local government which has resulted in
replacing a complicated and inefficient structure by a
new set of counties and districts. This reform is
interesting because it comprises a thorough reform of the
two tiers of local government (as in Denmark and as
proposed in the Netherlands), while functional regions
also exist (as in Ireland) of the macro type (as in
France). The latter have not been developed as a proper
tier of local government. At the same time, a search
started for devolution, a rather vague term whose outcome
couUlbe a form of political regionalization in favour of
Wales and Scotland (and maybe Northern Ireland). ^4^
a) Several factors made a review of existing local
government structures necessary. In England and Wales
it was established mainly by two flcts of 1888 and 189*4,
which laid down two principles for local government: its
democratic nature and the distinction between urban and
rural areas. Whereas the former became gradually eroded
through lack of interest from the electorate, the latter
came to be seen as a major weakness of local government
which was responsible for a great deal of ineffectiveness
and the consequently apathy of the people concerned (2)
(2) Lord Redcliffe-Maud & Bruce Wood, English Local
Government reformed, London, 197*+ P« 3»
(l) The problems of Northern Ireland are not discussed in this thesis,
because they are rather unique and therefore less relevant in a thesis
which is first of all a comparative study. However, it seems useful to
mention some basic facts in order to complete the picture of what is
happening in the E.C. Northern Ireland ranks among the poorer regions of
the E.G., but it is better off than the Republic of Ireland or the
Mezzogiorno in Italy. See Commission doc. (73), 550 final, 3«5»I973 (the
Thomson report). In the 1930s, unemployment had risen sharply in
Northern Ireland, but the region was not included in the Special Areas
Act of 1934? but this Act was not very efficient. See Hugh D. Clout, op.
cit., p.196. When new Development Areas were defined (Distribution of
Industry Act, 1945)? Northern Ireland was included too. Government action
led to a substantial degree of industrial diversification within the
economy of Northern Ireland, but it was not sufficient to solve all
economic problems: the shipbuilding and steel industry for example
continued to have problems. When economic regions were established,
Northern Ireland became one economic region. As Wales, Scotland and the
eight regions established in England, it received a council and a board.
The economic planning council is composed of individuals selected by
the Government for their knowledge and experience of the region, the
board is composed of senio civil servants, who have the technical expertis
Together they draw up regional development plans and make recommendations
for their implementation. See Hugh D. Clout, op.cit., p.205-208; and
further p.134 (thesis). In matters of regionalization, Northern Ireland
is a special case. In 1920 the region received Home lule, which meant
extensive autonomy in internal affairs and included a parliament (with
two Houses) and a government for Northern Ireland. The Crown was represen¬
ted by a Governor. Northern Ireland received also a representation in the
House of Commons (in London), and its own Supreme Court. See T. Wilston
(Ed.), Ulster under Home Rule, 1955* However, terrorism made this system
unviable and in the early 1970s the British Government introduced Direct
Rule by Westminster. Eor these reasons, it does not appear appropriate
to study Northern Ireland, which is a special case outside the European
mainstream.
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Indeed, together with greater London, another 79 cities
and towns were withdrawn from the ordinary county
structure and given the status of county boroughs. They
combined thus the powers of counties and districts. Much
more than the uniform system practised on the continent,
which
Jhis distinction/cut off cities from their natural
hinterland resulted in many difficulties concerning the
provision of adequate services (e.g. housing). Districts
were divided into three categories: municipal boroughs
and urban districts, both small towns but the former with
charters, and rural districts, which in turn ha^L parish
councils or parish meetings for each village composing
the districts. All these authorities were elected
(with the exception of the parish meetings in very small
villages). Obviously such a strueture results in small-
ness and consequently loss of effectiveness; it was
very complex too, as services were often provided by
different authorities; in some cases a particular
service was provided by two or more neighbouring author¬
ities together, in other cases the counties had decon-
centrated services or part of them at district level.
For the citizen it was difficult to see who was responsible
for what. A regrouping of the powers of local authorities
was thus as necessary as a reduction of their number.
Another result of this situation was that authorities
had become too dependent on the central government (l)
which, as usual had to provide subsidies but which also
provided instructions as to their use.
It became increasingly clear that, in order to preserve
the functional and democratic characteristics of local
government, adaptation of the 19th century structure to
present day realities was needed. A first step in that
direction was taken with the appointment in 195§ of the
Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London
(l) Even to such an extent as to create doubts about
the validity of local government's constitutional position.
See J.D.B. Mitchell, Constitutional Law, Edinburgh 19^8,
p. 207-208.
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(the Herbert-Commission). It is another striking example
of the special status which capital cities receive when¬
ever local government reforms are undertaken now. Its
aim was to study reform of local government in reater
London, but the old idea of a distinction between urban
and rural areas still influenced the government; thus the
Commission could only conclude on the main built-up area
of London (l). The commission itself found that the
cit^ ' s influences extended far beyond the review area
(2). The Herbert-Commission was followed in 1959 by
the Local Government Commission for England, set up in
order to examine boundary changes, which was very difficult
to achieve because of acts from 1926 and 1929• The
Commission too worked on established principles of separate
authorities for town and country (3)«
The appointment of the Royal Commission on Local Government
in England and Vales on 31«5«66 (the Redcliffe-Maud
Commission) aimed to review the structure and areas of
local government and to recommend a new pattern suited
to modern conditions. It marked a turning point: the
principle of separate governing bodies for urban and
rural areas was abandoned. The Commission received
considerable means to conduct its research which was
undertaken within wide tenps of reference. As the Herbert
Commission, the Redcliffe-Maude Commission was faced
with the classic problem of all local government reform
everywhere: the search for functional efficiency and
democratic viability. As for the first problem, it is
related to size and population. For some personal services,
such as education and housing, the Commission found that
a minimum number of inhabitants is necessary, whereas for
town and country planning and transport, the geographic
area must be taken into account too (^). However, it
1) Cmnd. Il64 par. 902.
2) Cmnd. 1164 par. 896.
3) Lord Redcliffe-Maud &
4) Cmnd. kOkO par. 257.
Bruce Wood, op. cit. p. 27.
127.
became generally evident that separate authorities for
tovn and surrounding rural areas were no longer in
accordance with conditions of modern society. This meant
in fact the abolishment of county boroughs, a measure
which reduced the complexity of local government structures.
Another Commission, the Seebohn-Commission on Local
Authority and Allied Personal Social Services, appointed
in 1968, came to similar conclusions and recommended
that different services should be brought as far as
possible under a single authority (l). Reducing complexity
and the number of small units has of course healthy
effects on the democratic nature of local government.
It allows elected representatives to comprehend problems
of their area, to set priorities and to take qualified
policy decisions.
Since the passing of the London (government ffict in 19^3
and the Local Government Act in 1972, the two tiers of
local government in England and Wales have been modernized
independently from a possible further development of
regions. It is however proposed ^ the Redcliffe-Maud
report that some regional coordination should take place,
in particularto provide a necessary link between physical
and economic planning.
The metropolitan area is thus restructured on its own;
the London Covmhj Council is replaced by the Greater London
Council, but its area is not extended as far as the
Herbert Commission proposed. Several districts at the
outskirts of London are not included as a result of
political pressures by the inhabitants. The GLC is a
kind of inter-municipal institution (2) with powers
distributed between the GLC and its 32 boroughs The GLC
is responsible for a variety of social services (fire,
ambulance), transport (main roads, driving licences, app-
:roval of traffic schemes and since 1970 also buses and
(1) Cmnd. 3703
(2) 1972 Act, 2nd schd. par. 1.
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tubes) for economic matters such as Thames flood
prevention, refuse disposal, land drainage, main sewers
and sewage disposal and for education in the former
GLC area, now run by the Inner London Education Authority
(ILEA), a special committee to the GLC Londonjboroughs
are empowered to deal with cultural matters, social and
health services (welfare, children's and personal
health services, public health inspection), for sports
facilities, refuse collection, cemeteries end crematoria
and for some other minor functions. The GLC and the
boroughs share responsibility for some services; the
former is responsible for overall planning, the boroughs
for local plans and most of the development control; they
also have full housing powers except for the houses
constructed by the LCC for which the GLC is responsible.
In the other London boroughs, those are not covered by
the ILEA, the boroughs are also empowered to deal with
education matters. Some aspects of transport (minor,
roads, car parks, road signs and marking) are also
devolved to the boroughs, as is the responsibility for
parks (except the former LCC parks). Since the 19&3 >
the Government has transferred some new powers to the GLC,
in particular in matters of transport; the GLC itself has
transferred to the boroughs responsibility for a large
number of council houses. The GLC can borrow money without
loan sanction, as is required for other local authorities;
it promotes its own money bills in Parliament annually (l).
The rest of England and Wales is reorganized by the 1972
Act, taking full effect on 1.4.7^. The recommendations
of the Redcliffe-Maud report to end the town country
dichotomy were followed by the Government. However, when
put into practice, the great metropolitan areas outside
London find themselves still limited to little more than
the builb-up conurbation, mainly because of political
pressures from nearby rural areas (2). Instead of being
(1) 1969 Act, 2nd schd. par 26.
(2) Lord Redcliffe-Maud & Bruce Wood, op. cit. p. ^7
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county boroughs six metropolitan areas now become
metropolitan counties, each divided into metropolitan
districts. In these metropolitan counties, the division
of power is similar to that in London: the county is
responsible for important works and planning, the district
is the main provider of services (l).
This two-level system of government is extended to the
rest of England and Wales, adding thus 39 counties to
the 6 metropolitan counties and London. Many small
counties amalgamated and the boundaries of others were
changed in order to reflect social and economic realities;
three new counties were created too. Districts are also
amalgamated and their number reduced from 930 to 296
which gives them an average population of 90,000, none
being under 40j000. The only previous local government
institution which continues to exist are parish councils
and parish meetings and some new ones have even been
created in small towns. But they do not govern and
have purely advisory tasks. In order to ensure continuous
adaption to changing situations, a local governmemt
boundary commission may propose reviews of existing
boundaries; it can also suggest the creation of a new
metropolitan county to the government.
The 1972 Act lays down the powers and responsibilities of
counties and districts. The former are responsible for
public order, roads, refuse disposal, consumer protection
and planning; they have some limited powers regarding
housing, which is mainly in the hands of districts, to-
tgether with public health, minor roads, refuse collection
(l) Thus the Act takes up the important recommendations
of the Report, but it does not follow the Report
completely. For our purpose it is relevant to see that
they are in agreement about the introduction of a local
and micro regional level of government. The Act
conserves, however, the distinction between urban and rural
areas, which leaves Britain and Germany as the only
countries in the E.E.C. with this much criticised difference.
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and local planning. Counties end districts are
responsible for leisure activities such as sport fac¬
ilities, museums and parks. But a distinction exists
concerning education, social services, libraries and
transport; in metropolitan counties, they are the res¬
ponsibility of the districts, but elsewhere the county
itself is responsible for these matters. However, subject
to county policies, non metropolitan districts can retain
some powers in transport matters.
All counties and districts have a directly elected council.
The council is composed of a number of councillors,
depending on the number of inhabitants; they elect a
chairman among them. Councillors are elected for four
years but the chairman is chosen annually (l). Such an
annual election is likely to prevent the emergence of
a real county president, a strong personality who can
rally the (micro-) region around him except when fcW same
person is re-elected several consecutive years, which is
a frequent practice. France too uses annual election
with the same aim (see further). The council meets as
often as necessary, but at least once a year. Xn order to
be able to perform the tasks of the county, or district
permanently, they employ their own staff. Coordination
of the different departments is in the hands of the clerk
of the council, whom can be considered as the chief
executive of the county - or district.
Local authorities are largely dependent on government
grants and loans to finance part of their activities.
In order to meet costs of expenditure on schools, housing,
roads and on projects of local social or cultural interest,
local authorities can obtain loans from public instit¬
utions . Further they have their own income through
rates on houses and land; determination of the level of
these rates and its "management" is in the hands of the
district councils. However, the state has to add money;
(l) 1972 act, S 3, 7, 22 and 26.
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grants from the government constituted in 1971-72 36^
of the annual income of local authorities; this per¬
centage seems to increase almost every year^)
Rates are fixed annually, as is the budget, both without
government interference, though some limits on spending
are set by flcts of fSarliament; sometimes ministerial
approval is needed (l). The accounts of the councils
are checked annually by an approved auditor; the audit
is public. This financial control has not the same
legal nature as administrative supervision, which in the
United Kingdom does not exist in these matters as
in other E.E.C. states (2). There is of course control
by government departments, even to an unreasonable degree
sometimes (3). It can be said thus that the reforms
are typically European; they modify the scale of local
and micro regional government, but they do not bring
real decentralization (in the sense of taking away
functions from the central government) nor an improvement
of their financial situation or of their financial
autonomy. The British situation is in this respect not
different from other E.E.C. countries.
New local authorities in England and Wales are thus much
larger than previously although some still fail to match
some minimum criteria set by the Redcliffe-Maud Commission
(e.g. a population of 250,000 for effective education and
social services). Town and country are brought under a
single authority in many cases, but again an artificial
separation continues in many parts of the country.
Complexity too is greatly reduced, certainly in theory.
But the division of powers between counties and districts
is difficult to understand, for example, the division of
planning powers. On the point of distribution of powers
in particular, weakness appears due to the fact that new
counties, which because of size and functions can be
considered as micro-regions, are not yet integrated in
an overall regionalization plan. Clearly there has been
(1) In 1978 for example, rate limites were imposed.
(2) Lord Redcliffe-Maud & Bruce Wood, op. cit. p. 120.
(3) J.D.B. Mitchell, op. cit. p. h$2.
131Ms
(4) The proportion of the GNP for which local expenditure accounts has
risen to more than 16% (1973). By controlling expenditure undertaken
locally and supplementing local revenue hy grants, central Government
exercises a great influence on local spending. Local authorities can
make only minor changes in their only local tax (the rates) and in their
charges for services. Local rates and local charges account for about
60 % in the financing of local revenue expenditure; the rest must come
from Government grants. Capital expenditure is financed largely through
loans; a maior source is the Public Works Loan Board. In 1971-72, local
authorities spent about 2,100 million pound on capital account; most of
it was raised through;loans, but over 110 million pound came from
government grants. Obviously, a lot of money goes to repay loans (20%
of annual revenue expenditure or more than 1,200 million pound in 1971-72).
Central government money comes through the rate-support grant (most of
it), which aims to support all council services which do not receive
specific grants and are not self-financing (there is a tendency away
from specific grants and towards block grants). In 1969-70 these
subventions reached 1,500 million pound, in 1973-74* "they reached already
3,000 million pound. This increase indicates that there is a steady
increase in the proportion of council expenditure met from grants.
Nevertheless, it seems that central Government must seek the cooperation
of local authorities and can not impose its views. Por more details, see
Lord Redcliffe-Maud & Bruce Wood, op.cit., p 102-118.
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no decentralization of" state powers to these micro regions
(as was the case in Denmark and Ireland too).
Local government reform in Scotland was initiated by the
appointment in 1966 of the Royal Commission of Local
Government in Scotland (the Wheatley Commission), Reform
was carried through by the Local Government in Scotland
Act, passed in June 1973« TLe existing structure, dating
from 1929 (Local Government of Scotland Act) was largely
similar to the English Welsh structure and showed the same
deficiencies: smallness, complexity and apathy of the
population (l). The evolution of society needed to be
matched by appropriate changes in local government
structure in order to maintain a wide range of services
effectively administered according to democratic principles
(2). The objectives of the proposed reform are therefore
basically the same as in the Redcliffe-Maud Report. Local
authorities in Scotland should be enabled to play an
efficient and important part in the running of the country"
(3).
As in England and Wales, the Commission ruled out the
parish level as inappropriate for local government (4)
and also rejected a separate status for town and country.
Instead, a two tier system was recommended, with districts
and regions. The latter are rather smaller than regions
in European sense, but larger than the micro type regions
as represented by English and Welsh counties; some are
larger in territory, others in population. Though the
Wheatley Commission, like its English counterpart, had
favoured uniformity in size and type, it was clearly
difficult to achieve because of the unequal distribution
of population in Scotland.
(1) Wheatley Report p. 48-52.
(2) idem £ 122.
(3) idem, p. 128
(4) idem, p. 665.
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The nine regions of Scotland are responsible for planning
and all related services such as industrial development,
transport, water supply, river purification, flood prev¬
ention, countryside and tourism, social and personal
eoU.»ca.K ctii
health services ; v"t housing, protective services (police,
fire); consumer protection, coast protection, some
cultural services and sport facilities, refuse disposal
and some mino functions (l). Some of these powers
are exercised together with the districts, such as
cultural services and sport facilities, countryside and
tourism, civil defence, industrial development and
planning. The districts are further responsible for
building control, community centres, environmental health
services (refuse collection, clean air, burial and
cremation etc.), for regulation and licensing, licensing
courts and the administration of justice (2) (3).
Region and district have a council directly elected by the
local population. The functioning of these councils,
and their administration and financing are similar to those
in England and Wales. The major difference is thus the
division of powers. Regions in Scotland have some
important functions which the English and Welsh counties
do not possess, because they have been given partly or
wholly to the districts. A further difference concerns
the absence of metropolitan counties; the two major
built-up areas (Edinburgh and Glasgow) are both districts
within their region, with no further internal division
in the city (4), except wards for electoral purposes.
What appears to be missing in the United Kingdom is the
upper tier of local government, macro-regions. However,
they may emerge one day.
b) A regional structure was indeed already introduced
fl) Wheatley Report, Js 723*
(2) idem, % 780.
(3) This concerns certain types of courts which cannot
be considered as local government properly speahing but
whose functions are within its responsibility.
(4) Wheatley Report, <y 792.
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in the United Kingdom in 19^6: 12 regions wre estab¬
lished within which external services of different
ministrieswere organized. These regions also coincided
with the regional demarcations used by nationalized
enterprises and of the National Health Service. However,
this structure was gradually abandoned in the early 1950's.
New regions were established on 10.12.6U, 13 in total
( 9 in England, 3 in Scotland and Wales). Each of them
is responsible for economic planning and development.
The external services of ministries are organized within
this new framework. They have a regional council composed
of members representing local authorities, employers'
and employees' organisations and experts. Members are
appointed by the fiovernment. These councils have only
advisory powers in matters of economic and social planning.
They can be considered as functional regions, more dev¬
eloped than in Ireland but less important than in France.
The Redcliffe-Maud Report proposed to give these regions,
though with some boundary modifications, responsibility
for strategic planning in a wider sense than the counties
can do (l). It found that planning by counties could
result in not much more than planning of land use. If
the regional councils could be transformed into more
representative local authorities, they could perform a
useful function regarding the necessary coordination
and overall regional planning; their function would,
however, not be operational. :
bob Government and Parliament did not follow the
more radical proposals of the Commission (2).
At the same time, some functions could have been decen¬
tralized from congested departments in London to the
regions, in particular to the regional offices of depart¬
ments of industry, employment, health and social security
and the environment.
1) Lord Redcliffe-Maud & Bruce Wood, op. cit. p. 156.
2) Which would have meant no districts but 6l unitary
areas outside London.
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The findings of the Royal Commission on the Constitution
1969-73 (the Kilbrandon Commission) in a way emphasize
the necessity for a further evolution. The Commission
was concerned in the first place with the constitutional
position of the major components of the United Kingdom.
The multiplying functions of the government have brought
about a complexity and growth of bureacracy with the
inevitable negative effect on the working of democracy;
it is the same phenomenon as seen everywhere in Europe.
This has been exacerbated by the centralization of main
government functions in London. It has apparently led to
dissatisfaction in general and particularly from a regional
point of view. The Commission found that complaints
are made about lack of participation by the regions in
the determination of policies affecting them and lack of
coordination between the regional policies of various
departments (l). This, together with uniformity, has
negative effects on political, economic and cultural
life in the regions and on their identity in general(2).
Tire commission therefore suggested devolution of legis¬
lative and executive powers to elected regional assemblies,
at least for Scotland and Wales, and possibly for the
regions of England as well. Each region would have an
assembly directly elected by a system of proportional
representation (3)« This assembly should have power to
make legal acts in all matters for which the region has
been made responsible (4); this would probably have been
comparable to the legislative powers of Italian regions
as far as its legal nature was concerned (5). Even matters
not within its powers could be debated by the assembly
fl) Kilbrandon Report, I S 27U-278.
(2) idem, 288.
(3) idem, (j 783-78U
(4) idem, ^ 73^
(3) See further S) 3«
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if they We*v^e'! interest to the region (l). However,
even within the sphere of powers transferred to the
regions, Parliament retains sovereignty and can inter-
vene if thought necessary (2). This /should necessarily
lead to confrontation, but hopefully to coordinated
action on specific problems. Such a provision can lead
to continuous central government interference, though
strong regional feelings can limit it. On the other
hand, it opens up the possibility of common planning
between the central state and the regions, in this case
Scotland and Wales. Regional autonomy is a good thing
in itself, so is regional diversity, but it should not
lead to incoherence and contradiction among the policies
of the regions and between the regions and state policy
(3). Cooperation between two levels of government,
(e.g. the Member States and
the E.E.C., the Lander and the federation in West
Germany), can reduce the need for (too) much central
decision making. The remoteness of the government can
thus be reduced and "bringing gov. rament nearer to the
people" becomes less illusory.
Executive authority in the opinion of the Commission
would be exercised by ministers elected within the
regional assemblies and appointed by the Crown. They
would operate as a Cabinet in the same way as the U.K.
Government does and responsibility for the regional
civil service woe/oL be their's" (4). The present offices of
(l) idem, ^ 77b
12J idem, > 762(3) See J.D.B. Mitchell, Decentralization, Devolution
or Deconcentration in the United Kingdom, in Tydschrift
voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht 1970, nr 5»
p. 452 et. seq. In this article, the need for central
management of certain matters is often stressed, because
of "the style and business of modern government".
(4) Kilbrandon Report, ^ 1144-1146.
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Secretary of State for Scotland and for Vales would
disappear, because most of their functions will be
transferred to the regions, (l)
The powers given to Scotland and Wales would include
local government, town and country planning, health
and social services (such as housing, youth and
community services), education, cultural matters (sports
arts etc.); agriculture, tourism, roads and harbours
and some minor functions. Moreover, the Scottish
assembly would be responsible for police and fire
services, the administration of justice, sea transport
and Highlands and Islands development; this list would
not be exhaustive and other powers can be transferred, at
least partly (2).
Whereas this form of devolution should apply to Scotland
and Wales, in England the 8 regions should become more
responsible for coordination and overall planning. This
will imply that they must be partly elected by local
authorities and partly nominated (3). Their powers
would not be legislative but merely executive, decisions
being taken by parliament and Government. It seems
however unfair that Scotland and Wales would continue to
have a certain number of MP's in the United Kingdom
"Parliament who will thus have a say in English regional
affairs.
It is particularly the reform of local government at
district and county level which is interesting. Region-
alization is limited for the time being to functional
regions, whose role is not very strong. In the Scotland
Act and the Wales Act on devolution put before Parliament,
it was proposed to establish two elected assemblies, the
(l) In later proposals, the Secretaries of State for
Scotland and Wales would not disappear.
2) Kilbrandon Report £ 1131-1133.
3) idem, 1195«
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Scottish consisting of about 150 members, the Welsh
about 80. But representation of the people of Scotland
and Wales at Westminster would continue as at present.
This seems to be closer to the federal idea than region-
alization in Italy or Belgium.
The Scottish Assembly would have powers of primary
legislation and an executive body would be established
to administer devolved matters. Within the devolved
areas, the Assembly would be able to pass new laws and
amend or repeal provisions of existing Acts; its Bills
would need the Royal Assent. However, the ultimate
sovereignty over all matters would remain in Westminster.
If measures passed by the Scottish Assembly would be
considered by the Government to exceed the Assembly's
legal powers, it would be able to refer such measures
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, whose
decision as to their legality would be binding. It
would also be possible to challenge Scottish Assembly
bi/te. on
the ground that they fell outside the Assembly's legis¬
lative competence. The Judicial Committee would act
as the final court in such cases. Even more, if the
Government would consider a Scottish Assembly Bill or
an executive measure of the Scottish or Welsh admin¬
istration to have unacceptable repercussions on matters
which were not devolved, it would be able to set them
aside. But Parliament would need to approve such action.
The Government can also do so if Assembly measures would
be incompatible with Britain's obligations to the European
Community.
The Welsh Assembly would have no powers of primary
legislation and no separate executive would be established
(of the kind proposed for Scotland). It would receive
powers of subordinate legislation and executive functions.
Therefore there would be an executive committee.
The most important powers to be devolved to the assemblies
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would be local government matters, health, social welfare
(but not the national social security system), education
housing, planning and development, transport and road
traffic and Scottish law functions. In certain devolved
matters the powers of the Scottish Executive or the
Welsh Assembly would only be exerciseable with the
consent of or concurrently with a central Government
minister.
Although the Government had stated that it was not
opposed to giving the Scottish and Welsh administrations
some marginal tax powers, most of the money would have
to come from block funds voted by the House of Commons
(l). It was estimated that these block funds would
have to meet about 709° of devolved expenditure in Scotland
and 759® iii Wales. Expenditure on services proposed for
devolution would amount to about £2^640 million in Scotland
and £l,l60 million in Wales (in 1975-76).
During the debates, some changes emerged such as res¬
triction of the Government's power to override actions of
devolved administrations, the devolution of responsibility
for implementing E.C. and other international obligations
and provision for legal proceedings to establish whether
the provisions of a Scottish Assembly Act are within
its competence and some other changes.
Devolution for Scotland and Wales seems to be proposed
as a result of a variety of regional pressures, not as a
step towards a general reorganization of the State. Indeed,
the Government dropped the idea of a major constitutional
change in England (2). In Northern Ireland, a constit¬
utional convention was elected in 1975 "to recommend to
Parliament a system of government for this region, but
it was unable to reach agreement. Thus direct rule remains
(1) White Paper on Devolution, Financing the Devolved
Services, July 1977» Cmnd 689O.
(2) Consultative Document on Devolution, The English
Dimension, HMSO 1976.
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The proposals concerning Scotland and Wales resemble
the Belgian reforms on some points: no real tax powers
for the regional assemblies but a system of block funds;
no proper judicial but government control of the working
of the regional assemblies. However, the lack of success
of these proposals in the referenduras held in Scotland
and Wales have held up introduction of devolution.
Ikl.
2. Functional regions
The existence of serious regional dfsequilibria, together
with popular demands for local government reform and
decentralization, does not automatically lead to the
establishment of regions as a new tier of government.
It seems to promote the idea of larger regions more
easily, because regional economic planning normally
occupies a more prominent place. However, this also
depends on the role of planning in general, and the
reasons for the establishment of regions are thus different
in every state. Macro-regions can take various forms,
ranging from functionally decentralized to political
regions (l).
a) Although probably only Italy has experienced such
intense and prolonged pressures to modify its structure
and to establish regions (2), the first step in France
dates from the times of the Vichy-regime (l9k0-kh).
Many proposals were made during the Third Republic, none
of which succeeded with the exception of the introduction
by each Ministry of regional boundaries and the
establishment in 1938 of the beginnings of economic
regions in the form of regional regroupings of the
chambers of commerce (3)« Nevertheless, many ideas from
this period were to be taken up again during the 1950's»
The Vichy-regions themselves cannot be considered as
regions, designed as they were to fortify the central
authority rather than to achieve any genuine decentral¬
ization (4). On that basis commissioners of the Republic
were established after the Liberation (5); they took over
(1) As we have seen, functional regions exist elsewhere
too, but only in France the concept has been really dev¬
eloped.
(2) Flory T., Le mouvement regionaliste francais, Paris
1966.
3) Decret-loi of 1^.6.1938.
4) M. Bourjol, Les institutions regionales de 1789
h. nos jours, Paris 1969 , p. 186.
(5) Decree of 10.1.19*+^.
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services of the regional Prefets (l) which were abolished.
These Commissioners were empowered to d*al not only with
administrative and economic matters, but also with police
and certain regulator)' tasks. They could have provided a
basis for further developments, but they too were abolished
(2), mainly because General de Gaulle favoured their exist¬
ence and parliament therefore opposed them (3). This early
experiment had another negative effect: the idea of
regionalism became associated with the Vichy regime and
therefore rejected (4).
From now on evolution goes towards functional macro regions
(5) avoiding administrative and political decentralization.
Several suggestions made during the 1930*s were realised
in a more or less adapted form.
However, the new Constitution of 27.10.1946 jeopardized
further advances towards regionalization by restricting
decentralization of municipalities and departments: only
these two are territorial collectivities (art. 85). But
the limits of their territory are fixed by law (art. 86)
which in fact leaves the possibility open for fundamental
reforms through amalgamations of municipalities and depart¬
ments. In particular the departments were strengthened
in the new Constitution, but proposals to reduce their
number are not followed. Opposition in parliament to the
idea of changing the "great invention of the great Revolution
of 1789" was very strong. The president of the depart¬
mental council, elected by universal suffrage became
its executive, though at the same time the powers of the
Prefet were strengthened (art. 88) by giving him adminis-
(1) Decree of 3.6.1944.
(2) Act of 22.3.1946.
(3) M. Bourjol, op. cit. p. 208.
(4) M. Bourjol, op. cit. p. 212
(5) The concept is typically French: as long ago as
1911» Vidal de la Blache, a geographer, proposed linking
departments together in functional regions. It was the
first technocratic answer to the request of French region-
:alists.
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trative control over local authorities in the department
and making him responsible for coordination of activities
of state offices in the department. An evolution towards
deconcentration (rather than decentralization) appeared
clearly, but regional deconcentration other than regional
delimitation of ministries was considered unconstitutional
(l). The deconcentration measures favoured only the Prefet
and interdepartmental structures.
However, economic and political pressures make the introd¬
uction of new institutions necessary, and these are
conceived on a regional basis. A first step was the
appointment of the XGAME ("Inspecteurs g£n6raux de 1'
administration en mission extraordinaire") established in
1948 (2). The IGAME were an instrument of the central
government to secure information, and provide coordination
and leadership. As such, they were a form of administrative
(and to a limited extent, political) deconcentration on a
regional basis; the areas within which the IGAMEs operated
were the same as the 9 military regions of France. In the
beginning, the IGAMEs were resident in Paris, but later
their powers were conferred on the Prefet in the capital of
the military region.
The powers of the IGAME were considerable; they not only
informed and advised the government, but in particular they
controlled and coordinated the personnel, services and
institutions of the Prefets of their regional area (3);
6 to 13 departments were included in such an area. They
also controlled administration and commands of police (4)
and cooperated with the military authorities in order to
ensure internal security.
Although IGAME's were not intended as regional institutions
(5) , the fact that military regional boundaries are used
(1) M. Bourjol, op. cit. p. 218.
(2) Act of 21.5.1948.
(3) Decree of 24.5.1951.
(4) idem.
(5) M. Athanassopoulos, Le fait regional dans la vie
politique fran^aise, Paris, i960 p. 199*
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as the most convenient, seems to indicate that the idea of
regions has not completely vanished. Regionalization in e
proper sense is still out of the question.
But the establishment of some form of regions would clearly
happen through economic pressure (l). A serious effort
had to be made, after World War II, to modernize the French
economy, develop national production and foreign exchange,
increase output, ensure full employment and raise the
standards of living. An important role in the fulfillment
of these aims was assigned to the state, which from 19^6
onwards became responsible for economic planning. It was
realised that the objectives of the first and following
plans would be jeopardized if nothing were done to remedy
the grave regional imbalances in economic development,
income per head and distribution of the population.
Regional policy and planning are considered to have positive
effects in that respect, particularly in combination with
an overall economic plan. However, it soon became clear that,
for the purpose of these new policies, the traditional
administrative structures of communes and departments
were not suitable. Regional structures were needed but
they would inevitably have different characteristics from
normal decentralized communities. The demarcation of these
regions would be drawn up on technical grounds, without
talcing much account of historical or natural situations.
However, this does not necessarily imply that these regional
demarcations are artificial; most of them correspond to
economic and social realities, particularly because they
are designed for economic and town and country planning
reasons (2).
The institutions of these emerging economic regions appear
to be technocratic and orientated cowards centralism. The
IGAMEs see their tasks enlarged to include the general
coordination of measures envisaged by economic programs
M. Bourjol, op. cit. p. 227.
M. Bourjol, op. cit. p. 230
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for their region (l). It is carried out together with a
new officer of the government, the IGEN ("Inspecteur
g^n^ral de l'^conomie nationale"), whose regional areas
are similar to those of the IGAME (2). The IGEN assists
the elaboration of regional action programs in the frame¬
work of the national plan. These IGAME and IGEN provide the
basis of the further development of economic regions; they
also indicate its dominant tendency, that is these regional
institutions serve to inform the government, to be con¬
sulted by it and to execute its decisions. Deconcentration
remains thus the main characteristic.
An interesting fact about these bodies (IGAME and IGEN)
is that they are based on a considerably larger type of
macro—region than the 1972 economic regions; there are
9 of them, as against 22 later. This idea of very large
regions was abandoned in the 1972 reforms, but is reappeared
(unofficially) in French central planning (3)« The idea
of regions comparable to West German "Lander" has thus
continued to exist in France, but there is much appreh¬
ension in the central administration and government about
instituting them as a level of macro-regional government
(even as functional decentralization and controlled by the
Prefet).
Another institution which must be mentioned to explain the
development of functional regions in France are the "Comit^s
d'expansion". These economic expansion committees are
created in each department by private initiative, mostly
by local industrialists and businessmen; their aims are
purely economic and therefore quite different from the
aspirations of regionalist movements. These committees
are instituted under private law and composed of repres¬
entatives of industry, banks, commerce and agriculture,
1) Ministerial decree of 13.7«1956.
2) The IGAME fall under the Ministry of the Interior
IGEN FALL under the Ministry of the Economy.
(3) See p. 157.
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trade unions, chambers of commerce and professional and
industrial organizations, advisers of external trade and
representatives of local authorities; sometimes, Prefets
and IGENS also participate in their work. Though they
received governmental recognition in 195^ (l)> they
remain private law institutions. Since their role is
essentially, that of studying economic development in
their department, on their own initiative or on request
they can become thus an instrument for two way inform¬
ation and permanent dialogue between administration
and regional economic representatives (2). These
expansion committees can be considered as a response
from the base to the needs of regional policy and
planning; their composition and objectives fit in well
with the functionalist approach.
Together with the IGAME and IGEN they constitute another
step towards the definition of the objectives of French
regionalization; the French regions emerge as bodies
for consultation and advice; decision making is reserved
for the government and its regional agents. These
expansion committees are coordinated in regional commissions
("commissions r^gionales de coordination") which were
at the basis of the later creation of the CODER.
In 1959 another reform established 21 regional action
areas later increased to 22 in order to make Corsica a
regional area on its own. These areas are based on the
planning regions established in 195^ to elaborate regional
economic planning. They show again that, to be effective,
the government is obliged to gradually abandon the depart¬
ment and move towards regionalization in a pragmatic
way. The relationship between regional policy,
ecoAxmAic planning and regionalization is shown very
clearly here. Amalgamation of departments remains pol-
(l| Decree of 11.12.1954.(2) Documents de la Conference Nationale des Comit6s
d'Expansion Economique, Metz, 195^ •
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itically impossible for a variety of reasons: attach¬
ment to existing structures, opposition of French top
civil servants and the "corps pr^fectoral" (often coming
from the same school, the famous ENA) and a typically
French nationalist fear of splitting up the nation by
creating too powerful and autonomous local and regional
authorities. Although these 22 areas were intended to
be provisional (l), they would continue to exist.
Within each region, a "pr^fet coordinateur" (2) and a
"conference inter-departmentale" (3) were established,
to coordinate the preparation and implementation of
regional economic plans. In the inter-departmental
conference, the Prefet of each department and the IGEN
responsible for the region as well as representatives of
the regional services of different ministries took part.
The powers of this conference were very limited and
each Prefet remained autonomous in his department (U).
The coordinating Prefet was only a chairman of these
meetings and in no way in a hierarchical position
over his colleagues.
However, this cautious beginning of a new regional
administration, which it in fact is, although the govern¬
ment denies it, has been given tasks of a certain
importance, in particular the preparation of public
investment programs in the region (the so-called "tranches
operatoires" of the plan). After their approval by the
national planning authorities, the interdepartmental
conference is responsible for their elaboration. These
reforms which improve the effectiveness and rationality
of regional planning (5)> also underline the very tech¬
nical and economic viewpoints behind them (6).
In 1963 the coordination Prefet formally became the
fl) Assemblee Nationale, 11.12.1968, p. 5331«
(2) Decree of 7»1«1959«
(3) Circular of 20.1.1960.
(4) Circular of 26.1.1961.
(5) K. Allen & M.C. MacLennan, op. cit. p. 22^.
(6) J. Lajugie, Politique de development regional
pour les pays du Marche Commun, in Revue d'Economie
Politique 1959» mai, p. 333.
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regional Prefet (l) and the interdepartmental conference
changed its name into "conference administrative regionale"
but its composition was not modified. However, the
regional Prefet now has a position of authority over his
colleagues in the region: he can give them instructions
but has no powers of execution. The regional Prefet
himself can receive instructions too from relevant
ministers. He coordinates the activities of the other
Prefets and the heads of administration. Later the
regional Prefet becomes the person to whom ministers
normally delegate certain tasks regarding both economic
and administrative matters (with a few exceptions men¬
tioned in the decree of 14.3-1964, art. 3) (2). Since
this decree of 1968, the functions of the regional Prefet
and the departmental prefet are clearly separate; the
secretary general of the head department represents the
Prefet in the administrative regional conference, leaving
the Prefet more completely in his regional role. The
regional Prefet is obliged to consult the conference and
a new body, the CODER.
A CODER ("Commission de developpement e'conomique
regional") is established in each region (3) replacing
officially the departmental committees for economic
expansion (4). Their composition resembles the latter,
with representatives from industry, commerce and agricul¬
ture, economic, scientific and social or cultural
organisations; further members include mayors, depart¬
mental councillors, M.P's elected in the region,
members chosen by the Prefet for their particular qual¬
ifications. Though this composition seems to make the
CODER fairly representative of the "forces vives de la
✓ »
region, none of its members is directly elected on a
(1) Decree of 29-7-1963.
(2) Decrees of 10.5-1968.(33 Decrees of 14.3-1964
(4) These committees for economic expansion in each
department continue nevertheless to exist in a private
capacity.
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regional basis, which makes their representativity one
of the second degree only. In particular the presence
of MPs introduces government influence and it strengthens
the influence of national parties.
The CODER must be consulted by the regional Prefet and
since the 1968 decrees it is particularly involved in the
preparation and implementation of regional planning. Its
members participate in working parties set up by the Prefet
and in administrative regional commissions. At the same
time, the bureau of the CODER has found official recognition.
Regions established in this way mark further progress
in French regionalization. The 1968 decrees envisage
deconcentration in economic and administrative matters
and thus mark a new step forward in the direction of the
region as a general administrative entity (l).
Such a regional organization has been established first
in Paris which requiems a special statute, according to
the government, because of its political, economic,
social and cultural domination. In 1961 (2) the Paris
district was established its powers were enlarged two
years later (3) and its name changed to the Paris region.
In 1966 a regional Prefet was appointed (4). The region
is administered by a " conseil d'administration" whose
members are appointed by the government (one half) or
indirectly elected (one half). The d§legee general"
of this council acts as its executive and represents
the corporation which the region in fact is; this
power is formally in the hands of the regional Prefet,
who is the state's representative.
The powers of the Paris region are the same as those of
other regions, but it can also levy taxes ("taxe speciale
(1) M. Bourjol, op. cit. p. 329«
(2) Act of 2.8.1961.
(3) Act of 10.7.196^.
(4) Decree of IO.8.I966.
(5) Decree of 10.5.1968.
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d'Equipment"). It can also conclude conventions vith
the communities which fall under its authority in order
to provide public services. As in other regions, the
regional Prefet is the normal receiver of powers
delegated by ministers (l). The major difference is
thus the recognition of this region as a corporation as
well as the more extensive powers of the regional Prefet.
The 1969 referendum aimed to make all regions decentralized
communities responsible for the economic, social and
cultural development and town and country planning in the
region. The regional council would be composed of
MP's elected in the region, members elected by municipal
and departmental councils and socio-economic and cultural
organizations. The regional Prefet would remain the
representative of the government but would become also
the executive of the regional council. The region would
have its own budget, provided by sectoral subsidies out
of the general budget; the regional council would decide
how to use this money in accordance with its 5-year plan.
However, the negative result of the referendum, which came
about for reasons not connected with the regional reform
proposals (2), was used by the Pompidou government to
undermine any movement towards regionalization (3)-
The referendum of 27th April, 19^9 rejected the proposals
by 52?o against bj°/o. This happened above all because
the electorate voted on a pro-or-; nti-de Gaulle basis.
Other reasons were that it was linked to the reform of
the Senate and because it was opposed by many local
notables. Thus art 72 of the Constitution of 1958 is
still in force and thus municipalities and departments
continue to be the only decentralised communities in
France. However, the further establishment of regions
has not been abandoned, but remains in line with past
lj Decree of IO.5.1968.
2) R. Irving, in J. Cornford, The failure of the state,
London 1975» P« 26.
(3) J. Baguenard,L'organisation regionale, in Revue de
Droit Public et de Science Politique 1973 P* 1^11-1^1^.
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experiments.
b) The ftct of 5.7.1972 represents this timid attitude
by leaving untouched existing structures, except the
CODER. Although a more fundamental reform of communes
and departments is necessary, the regions are firmly
based on the departments; it is thought that they are
a sociological entity while the regions are not yet seen
as such (l). If this is true, it may be the result of
the rather artificial regional boundaries elaborated
in i960, which continue to exist, and of the functionalist
nature of these regions. Two or more regions can agree
to study, finance and execute together certain invest¬
ments of common interest. In the long run, this can
lead to the modification of regional boundaries in
accordance with economic evolution.
The regions have been given three institutions: the
Prefet, the regional council and the economic, social
and cultural committee. The principal institution is the
Prefet, who is at the same time the delegate of the
government an the executive of the region (2). He attends
the meetings of the two regional assemblies (3)1 can
introduce in the debates any official or qualified person
(k) and decides the agenda of the regional council (5).
However, the regional Prefet remains also the Prefet of
his department, which is not the most practical solution.
It reflects the political attitude of government and
majority in parliament: the region does not receive
its own head as decentralized communities do, but the
Prefet of one of the member departments of this inter¬
departmental construction presides over it, which is
typical of functional decentralization (used in inter-
municipal institutions also)
(1) P. Cremion & J.P. Worms, Les institutions regionales
et la Soci£t£ locale, in Groupe de sociologies des
organisations, 1968, p. 2^8-2^9.
(2) idem, p. 1^25.
(3) decree of 5«9.1973» art. 27.
(4) idem, art. 15.
(5) idem, art. 18.
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In the exercise of his functions, the regional Prefet
use® the state's sendees; no regional administration
is established (l). This can strengthen his position
even more because the two assemblies do not have a
regional administration under their control. The Prefet
alone enjoys the help of substantial technical means.
The functioning of the region thus depends on the way
he permits his administration to function; as a state
civil servant, his loyalties will certainly be split,
to say the least.
Regional participation is provided for through the regional
council and the ESCC. The former is indirectly elected;
its members include all MPs elected in the region,
representatives of departmental and municipal councils.
The presence of MPs in the regional council has given
rise to doubts about its conformity with the constitution,
which declares that MPs represent the Nation and not a
particular section of the country. Practical realities
have given them an important role in the regional economic
and social life, so that their absence in the regional
council might have made them less truly representative
and effective (2). Moreover, the regions are not
territorially decentralized communities which would
have made the argument more valid. It is also noticeable
that mayors must be chosen within the departmental council;
this illustrates the fact that the regions are based on
the departments only.
The ESGC replaced the CODER in representing the socio economic and
professional activities of the region. Its composition
is laid down by decree (3).
The regions thus established are not a new tier of
territorial decentralization: such a solution would have
created a new level of local government while at the
same time reducing the significance and role of the
departments. The government was opposed to both ideas (b)
Act of 1972 art 16.
J. Baguenard, op. cit. p. 1^29.
Decree of 5.9.1973.
(b) Senat, debates of 30.5*1972 intervention of prime
minister Chaban-Delmas.
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as it was to the remoulding of departments. It might
have given rise to strong, well equipped and well
functioning regions, which would not be liked in centra¬
list France. Maybe these functional regions can be
considered as a transitional institution, which could
open the way to territorial decentralization at regional
level (l). The functioning and powers of the French
region seem to underline this.
Each of the three regional institutions has its partic¬
ular role, with the most important role for the Prefet.
Detailed provisions regarding the bureau of the council
leave the region little freedom and reveal the fear
that the bureau may become too dominant a body. Its
short term of office reflects the will of the government
to make it representative of the council, whose compos¬
ition changes according to local elections, but it
aims also to prevent the president of the council becom¬
ing a regional personality and therefore a competitor
of the regional prefet.
The major task of the council is to vote the budget and
to regulate matters within the powers of the regions.
Its deliberations may not be contrary to law and
regulations (2); this makes it clear that the establish¬
ment of this form of region does not alter the hier¬
archy of legal norms.
The ESCC is only a consultative body, but its role should
not be under estimated. It advises on all matters of
interest to the region which fall under the powers of
the region; with that aim it may establish working
parties and associate specialized persons or organis¬
ations. Employers and employees are represented
equally in the bureau of the ESCC. Later decrees have
given more importance to the ESCC than the 1972 act.
(1) J. Baguenard, op. cit. p. 1^40.
(2) Act of 1972, art. 7, 2 al.
l$b
This is probably a result of the predominantly economic
nature of the regional powers and the need to associate
regional representatives of economic and social life in
its planning. Common meetings with the regional council
are possible on the request of both presidents.
As would be expected from their development the French
regions enjoy economic powers only, but these are
significant for regional development since responsibility
for both conception and coordination is left to the
region. Therefore, it can carry out any study which
stimulates regional economic development. As the council has
no administration, it will have to leave this task to
the ESCC or specialized institutions or agencies, which
will reduce proper contribution largely to providing
financial means. Another responsibility concerns the
coordination and where necessary rationalization of
investments by local authorities in the region (l).
However, since the council can only make proposals and
has no power to enforce them it may encounter difficulties
in executing these tasks. Inevitably, by performing these
studies and coordination tasks the region takes over
responsibilities from communes and departments and
becomes a new type of "administration de mission" (2).
What appears to be more important are the region's powers
concerning the provision of collective amenities for the
good of the region (3)» The region can participate in
the financing of these amenities but not in their admin¬
istration, which remains with the local authorities
or in private hands; in the latter case, the region may
participate only if the provision of such amenities would
stimulate regional employment. By decree (^) collective
1972 act, art. b, I, 2.
It can be translated as functional agency.
1972 act, art. b, I, 3 + b.
Decree of 23.12.1970.
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amenities have been divided into four categories:
according to whether they are of interest on a national,
regional, departmental or local scale. The regions are
responsible in particular for the second and third
category.
The regional council itself must be consulted on
economic development and town and country planning (l).
It also participates in studies concerning regional
improvement, in the preparation and execution of the
national plan in every phase of its elaboration, by
putting forward draft proposals regarding general
orientation (2). The Prefet must give an annual report
on the execution of the plan in the region as well ®s on
investments of national or regional interest made by the
state or with its help (3). This report, together with
observations made by the regional council, is sent to
the government, which puts forward a synthesis to
parliament. Advice put forward in this way by the
regional council carries some political weight. When its
consultative function is exercised with regard to
deconcentrated credits (^), the decision remains with the
Prefet, who is in no way obliged to follow the advice
of the council.
However, the 1972 fict did not set up a state regional
structure. New powers can be transferred from the state
by decree (5), which implies that the government exercises
an almost absolute control over the further evolution
and development of the French regions. Departments or local
authorities' groups (intermunicipal bodies or urban
districts) can also transfer powers to the region but in
this case the region has to agree. This sort of trans¬
fer may not include "taches de gestion" (6) a rather
1]1 1972 Pet art 8.
2 1 1972 pet art 8 2 al
3 1 1972 pet art 10
k\> 1972 pet art 9
5 > 1972 pet art 3,1.
6]> 1972 pet art k, 3 2
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nebulous notion which can be explained in a restrictive
sense; only exceptional operations with a strong impact
on the region should then be transferable. Nevertheless
the possibility of new transfers of powers gives a certain
flexibility to French regionalization.
The regions have their own resources (fiscal and others).
The state has transferred the tax on driving licences to
the regions; this tax was chosen because it was con¬
sidered easy to locate and to give each region a fair
deal (l). But it remains a modest income, which in
particular maintains divisions between rich and backward
regions (the latter being often under populated, which
means fewer cars). The regions also have other non fiscal
sources of income, such as state subsidies, mostly given
in connection with a certain activity carried out by the
region (2). As this is rather vaguely defined, it can
stimulate regional authorities to develop an active
policy in order to receive more money e.g. in matters
of economic development. Transfer of powers by local
authorities can also be accompanied by transfer of income.
The regions can subscribe loans; any profits from their
own services will of course also be theirs.
As all this leaves the regions probably with a very limited
income, they can levy additional taxes (on cars and property)
(3). Both taxes may prove to be unpopular, and thus not
enhance the popularity of regionalization, and they will
not bring any redistribution of income among regions either.
Moreover, the government has imposed a maximum limit on
these additional regional taxes. Major criticism concerns
thus the limited income of the regions and the fact that
they continue economic and financial inequalities; they
may in fact even increase these inequalities because
the more developed regions will be able to be more effic¬
ient than others, thus improving further their economic
position.
(1) J. Baguenard, op. cit. p. 1^+57-
(2) 1972 Act, art 19.
(3) 1972 Act, art 17-18.
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A general assessment of French regionalization is diff¬
icult to make. We have already drawn attention to the
fact that regionalization started with the idea of really
large regions (9) and then made a step backwards with
the establishment of 22 regions, which are considered
as macro-regions. It is striking that these 22 regions
were regrouped in 8 regions in the regionalization of
the sixth national plan. This is interesting because
it indicates that the central planning agency does not
consider the 22 regions as the best possible territorial
divisions; the idea of regions of "Lander" size is not
dead. This can lead to a further evolution in the
long run. French munic palities need to bo reformed;
in the first place their number should be greatly
reduced. If this happens one day and more and more
Frenchmen seem to agree that this is necessary - it will
be hard to leave the departmental structure untouched.
One has seen indeed that the other countries have reformed
the municipal and micro-region level of government together.
It is impossible to foresee hov this will evolve in
France, but it seems not unlikely that there will be 8
macro-regions in the end with major planning and economic
functions; according to the evolution of French region¬
alization as a whole, it seems likely that they will
continue to have a functional nature. The present
regions might then well become a new level of territorial
decentralization, instead of the departments; the latter
could continue to exist as supramunicipal institutions.
But although this hypothesis is based on a logical
continuation of the evolution of French regionalization,
it is still no more than speculation at this point.
3. The introduction of macro-regions
In some states, reforms have led to the introduction of
new concepts which combine aspects of traditional territor¬
ial decentralization with aspects of federal structures.
The concept is considered to be typical for Italy, but in
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Belgium too the third revision of the Cons ti tut ion^"fj|.o - j.l_)
introduced a form of regionalization which, with certain
reservations about its functional character, could be
similarly described.
A) Because of the nature of Belgian regional problems,
where cultural and economic problems are mixed to an
extent unknown elsewhere, parliament did not create
one single type of region, but made a distinction between
cultural and economic regions.
a) Cultural regions do not have a territory" in the
traditional sense of public law but they have a double
foundation in the form of the institution of four lan-
sguage regions (Constitution ark 3 bis) and three cultural
communities (art. 3"ter) . Geographically, the kingdom
is divided into four language regions: a French, a
Dutch and German and a bilingual area (art. 3 bis). The
boundaries of these four language regions cannot be
changed except by law passed with an outright majority
in each linguistic group of both chambers provided that
a majority of the members of each group is present and
that the total number of votes cast in favour in both
groups amounts to 2/3 of all votes cast (l). Every
commune of the kingdom is part of one of these regions.
The sociological criterion for the cultural regions is
provided by art 3 ter which declares that Belgium has
three cultural communities: the Dutch speaking, French
speaking and German speaking communities. The cultural
communities are not just geographical divisions. This
becomes particularly clear in the case of Brussels, which
exists geographically as a bilingual region (art 3 bis)
but whose inhabitants belong to the French or Dutch
cultural community.
The normative institutions of the cultural communities
are the cultural councils (art 59 bis) which are composed
(l) More details about this so called qualified
majority will be given later.
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of the members of their respective language groups of both
chambers (l). Constitutional provisions concerning par¬
liament are also applicable to the cultural councils
(art. 59 bis i), except that they meet one week after
the opening of the ordinary session of parliament.
Their powers ratione materiae concern all cultural matters
and education (with some exceptions e.g. the structure
of the education system, subsidies) as well as cooper¬
ation between the cultural communities and international
cultural cooperation. They are also empowered to deal
with linguistic matters in administration, all schools,
and in social relations between employer and employee
(art. 59 bis ^ 2 & 3). This provision has been clar¬
ified by an executive $ct (2) which has described these
powers in more detail: the defence and embellishment of
the language: the encouragement of the scientific res¬
earch; the arts, the theatre and the cinema museums
and . o| scientific or cultural institutions;
libraries and similar services; radio and television
(with the exception of commercial publicity); youth
policy; permanent education and cultural activities:
entertainment and tourism.
The decisions taken by the cultural councils take the
form of decrees. Drafts of all decrees must be submitted
for comment and approval to the Council of State (3).
If the latter should advise that the proposed decree exceeds
the powers of a cultural council, it can only be adopted
after having been passed by both Chambers (4).
The ratione loci powers are laid down by art 59 bis \ 4.
l) This situation in which MP's represent the Nation
art. 23 constitution) and a cultural community (art 59
bis) has been qualified as "personal union". P. Maystadt,
Les communaut^s culturelles et les regions, in: Annales
de droit, 1972, p. 121.
(2} Act of 21.7.1971, art 2.
(3) Act of 3.7.1971, art 10.
(4) Act of 3.7.1971 art 11.
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Regarding the powers mentioned in art 59 bis % 2, the
French and Dutch cultural councils are each responsible
for their linguistic region. The decrees of each cul¬
tural council also apply in Brussels for these matters
which by their nature must be considered as falling under
their authority (e.g. the Dutch or French language theatres
in the capital). Regarding the powers referred to in
art 59 bis 3, the councils each have authority in
their own region, with the exception of services which
also affect other language regions; national and inter¬
national institutions whose activities are common to
the cultural communities and the mun cipalities with
linguistic facilities; in these cases, parliament
remains the authority.
The decrees of cultural councils have the same force in
their respective cultural communities as an ordinary law;
they differ only in the sense that their powers are
limited to those listed in the constitution, but in
these matters the authority of the cultural councils is
exclusive and parliament cannot intervene. There is
thus no gradation between laws and decrees but only a
difference rationae materiae (l). Decrees are
confirmed by the King (art 69) and published in the Official
Gazette (art 129) just as other acts. There is, however,
one restriction on their autonomy: the application of
art 67 on decrees implies that the government is made
responsible for any executive measure (2). For this
reason and because cultural councils are composed of
MP's, cultural communities are not subject to supervision
by the government (3)«
In order to develop cooperation between cultural councils,
a commission of 15 members is established in each council
(4); when they sit together, they form the joint
(l) W. Ganshof van der Meersch, Reflections sur la
revision de la constitution in: Journal des Tribunaux,
9.9.1972.
(2^ idem, p. ^85.
(3) P. Maystadt, op. cit. p. 130.(k) Act of 21.7.1971, art. k.
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commission for cooperation. Its advice is needed if
decisions are taken in one council affecting education
matters in communes with protected minorities. Inside
each council, each political party must be represented
proportionally in the bureau and the commissions of
the council (l)
Cultural councils do not have their own financial
resources. Each year a law is passed in parliament
to fix the amount of the grant they are to receive, but
the councils decide by decree how to spend it. This
grant must be fixed on the basis of objective criteria
and if these cannot be found, each council must receive
the same amount. This act also must state how much out
of this grant each council must spend to develop both
cultures in the metropolitan area (art. 59 bis 6). In
the beginning there were some he^tsiarguments over the
definition of objective criteria especially from region-
alist parties; in general problems have been solved
but for some matters the 50/50 system is applied (e.g.
radio and television).
The preceding applies only to the Dutch and French
cultural councils. According to art 59 ter, a German
cultural council has been established; its powers and
composition are defined by law. The tjerman council will
thus be different from the two others and will not have
the power to issue decrees. There is a practical reason;
the German council would have only two members if it were
to be composed only by German speaking MP's (2).
The introduction of cultural autonomy, as this sytem is
called, is a major innovation which is difficult to define
in traditional terms; it has indeed elements of both
functional and territorial decentralization, though the
first prevails.
Idem, art 21.
There are only about 100,000 German speaking
Belgians.
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Xn order to compose the councils, the elected members
of each chamber are divided into a Dutch and a French
linguistic group every time it is required by the
Constitution (l) and as determined by law (art "}2 bis).
Representatives and senators elected in a Flemish or
Walloon constituency and senators elected by a Flemish
or Walloon provincial council become automatically member
of the Dutch or French linguistic group. Those represent¬
ing a German constituency take part in the French group.
Representatives elected in the constituency of Brussels
belong to the group corresponding to the language in which
they chose to take the oath of office. The same applies
to senators elected in the constituency of Brussels,
by the provincial council of Brabant or to senators coopted
nationally. Normally, the composition of a regional
council by national MP's reduces its significance consider¬
ably, whatever the councils powers may be; because of the
strong feelings about the cultural communities in Belgium;
the cultural councils are considered to be politically
representative even though they are not directly elected.
Though they are not true regionalization measures as such,
two reforms concerning parliament are associated with
regionalization in that they too aim to reduce tensions
between the two cultural communities. One concerns a
new type of majority voting which is made obligatory in
bis
several cases (const, art 1, 1^, 3 bis , 59/1 & 2, 107
quater). This is the so called double majority: it
implies that, in order to be adopted, a proposal or Bill
must receive a simple majority in each linquistic group
of each chamber, on the condition that a majority or
members of each group are present and that the total
number of votes in favour in both groups considered
together amounts to 2/3 of all votes cast . This system
aims to prevent, in certain delicate cultural matters,
——-———
r
(l) Constitutional art 1, j 14, 3 bis, 59 bis 'y 1 and
9 2, 107 quater require such a division into linquistic
groups.
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bloc voting of one ultural community against another,
whereby the Flemish majority could over-rule the others.
Another novelty with similar aims is the so called "alarmbell
procedure" (art 38 section 2). With exception of the
budget and those laws requiring a special majority, a
petition giving reasons and signed by at least j/h of the
members of a linguistic group, may be introduced stating that
provisions of a draft bill or of a motion which it cites are
of such a nature as to have a serious effect on relations
between the communities. Such a petition must be tabled
after presentation of the parliamentary commission's
report on the draft bill or motion and before the final
vote in plenary session. Parliamentary proceedings are
suspended and the motion is passed to the Council of
Ministers which has to give its opinion and the reasons
behind it within 30 days. The chamber where the law
was proposed originally must decide then over this opinion
or over a possible amendment or draft Bill. Such a motion
may be presented only once by the members of a linguistic
group concerning the same proposal or draft bill. Such
a motion is not a veto. In fact, the council of
Ministers has two options; it can amend the text or it
can declare that relations between the communities are not
affected. If no agreement can be reached, the government
can resign, because its political responsibility is at
stake. Indirectly this procedure results in a weakening
of the role of parliament and strengthening of the position
of the government. However, the high number of signatures
required implies that the members of the parties forming
the government have to support the motion too. Therefore
such a motion would not be considered necessarily as a
vote of no-confidence, but merely as a weakening of the
position of the government if the procedure is used. It
is a typical Belgian solution but it may nevertheless
offer a useful example for other European states with diff¬
icult relations between various communities.
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b) Whereas the establishment of cultural councils concerns
state powers, the reform of traditional decentralized
structures (communes and provinces) also seemed to be
necessary. Though several hundred small municipalities
had disappeared, many escaped, often for party political
reasons; even those which had merged, did not always
meet the requirements of scale to carry out their tasks
efficiently. A much practised solution to solve
practical problems was inter municipal cooperation in the
form of functional bodies. It was proposed to provide
a constitutional basis for the establishment of agglo¬
merations and federations of communes (l); at the
same time a special provision concerning cultural matters
in the metropolitan area could be elaborated.
Thus art. 108 bis allows the legislature to establish
•agglomerations* and 'federations' of communes and to
determine their institutions and powers. Each 'agglo¬
meration' and 'federation' must have a council and an
executive, whose chairman is elected by the council and
confirmed by the king. The members of the Brussels
' agglomeration' council are divided into a French and a
Dutch linguistic group for those matters specified by law
and the constitution (art. 108 ter). Each linguistic
group will have an equal number of members in the
executive, not counting the president (2). The so called
"alarmbell procedure" is also applicable in the agglomer¬
ation council of Brussels. Separate Dutch and French
(1) Agglomerations are formed in urban areas, feder¬
ations in the countryside; only the name differs.
An 'agglomeration' consists thus of all municipalities
which make up a city (for example Brussels consists of
nineteen municipalities).
(2) Thus parity in the council of ministers, where the
Flemings should normally be in majority, was exchanged for
parity in the executive of the Brussels agglomeration,
where they normally should be in a minority. This over-
evaluation of the agglomeration council of the capital
reveals the emotional state of affairs which often
existed during the revision procedures.
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cultural commissions are responsible for education and
some cultural matters, each for its cultural community.
Here too the personal alliance prevails thus. Sitting
together, they form the joint cultural commissions with
responsibility for matters concerning the national and
international function of the Brussels' agglomeration'
and matters of common interest. Parliament, cultural
councils and the government can attribute other tasks to
these cultural commissions.
Since 1.1.77* Belgium has drastically reduced the number
of municipalities: from 2^359 to 387. Sometimes against
strong opposition from local authorities, amalgamations
were enforced by law. It is expected that the new communes
will be far better able to carry out their tasks; the powers
of the communes hav not been changed and neither the state or
provinces have transferred any new powers so far. This very
efficient reduction raises doubts as to the usefulness
of agglomerations and federations, except in those cities
where amalgamations have not yet been carried out (Brussels
and Antwerp, delayed until 198O for political reasons).
c)The uncoordinated approach to regionalization becomes more
evident with the establishment of economic region#. In 1970
regional economic councils were set up; they could be
consulted for certain economic matters or could issue
recommendations on the economic development of their region.
Since cultural autonomy was now provided for in the constit¬
utional revision, why not some form of economic decentral¬
ization too? Thus three economic regions are established:
Flanders, ¥allonia and Brussels. Parliament must pass an
act with a qualified majority to define their institutions,
which will be composed of elected officials, and their
powers and how they are to be exercised, with the exclusion
of all powers mentioned in az"t 23 (concerning the use of
languages in the state) and 59 bis; it also fixes the
boundaries of these regions.
According to art 107 quater, these regional institutions
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may make regulations, But their power is more limited in
this respect than that of the cultural councils; it is of
the same nature as the powers of provinces and communes
to make regulations (l). This implies that regional
economic regulations must be submitted to the government
for approval; if the government wants to make their
autonomy real in these matters, it should not exercise a
"controled* opportunite" (i.e. a control on the " suitability")
of the regulations. (2). It is not yet clear in what
sense art 107 quater will be interpreted in prentice as
it is a matter of great controversy between political
parties.
By the ^ct of 15.7*70 three regional economic councils
have been established, one for Flanders, one for Wallonia
and one for the province of Brabant (including Brussels).
They are composed of MPs and members of the provincial
councils and an equal number (3) of representatives of
social and economic organizations, as well as experts.
The governors of the provinces have consultative status in
their respective regional economic councils.
The economic councils have only advisory powers, but in some
cases their advice can be binding. They advise in
particular about the geographic area to be covered by the
regional development companies (SDR-GOM), how the money
for regional economic expansion should be shared out, the
determination of development areas, coordination of the
activities of the regional development companies and
further all problems which it considers important for
regional economic development. The regional economic
council participate thus in the elaboration of regional
plans by the national planning administration.
Like the cultural councils, they have no fiscal powers.
Each year parliament determines the budget of the regional
(1) Chevalier P. de Stexhe, La revision de la constitution
beige 1968-71j Bruxelles 1972 p. I89.
(2) idem, p. 190.
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economic councils; money available for the regions must
be shared out according to criteria such as population,
tax income and territory, which makes 50c/c for Flanders,
kOcjc for Vallonia and 10$c for Brussels. This lack of any
financial autonomy does not prevent the regional economic
councils from giving useful advice in such m; tters as town
and country planning, regional economic expansion and
employment.
A general assessment of Belgian regionalize.!ion is difficult
to make because evolution has not come to a standstill.
Unlike other small states, Belgium has made a clear choice
for macro-regions, not just for cultural matters but also
for economic affairs. The po ers of the cultural councils
are significant, but its lack of financial autonomy reduces
the effective use of this power. Its composition is a
result of a unique situation: two cultural communities in
one state with the r own social and historic background.
The economic regions are no more than a form of functional
decentralization, with only advisory powers The fact
that Belgium is thus divided into two cultural and three
economic regions is often criticised.
Cultural autonomy is accepted by everyone, but a fear
exists that the economic regions may harm the economy of the
country, which uncontrovertibly forms a unity, because in
Wallonia collectivist tendencies are stronger than in
Flanders. Besides this different approach, no procedures
are envisaged for the coordination of regional economic
policies with national economic, commercial and financial
policy. More and more people request that the stincture
of the state, wrhich is very complicated indeed, at present
should be simplified. If the amalgamation of municipalities
is also introduced in Brussels and Antwerp, it may make
federations and agglomerations (l) of communes unnecessary.
Proposals are also made to abandon the provinces and to
make a new second tier of government at the regional level.
(l) After all, only five federations (around Brussels)
and five agglomerations have been established.
Whether this will lead to a federal state is an open
question.
B) Whereas political regionalization has not been fully-
achieved in Belgium, Italian regionalization is considered
generally to provide a classic example of this concept.
The reasons for the establishment of regions lie in the
economic imbalances between north and south, both from
the historic angle (autonomist movements) and with respect
to the imediate post war circumstances under which democracy
had to be re-established.
Political regionalization is based on the Constitution
and not on an ordinary ct of arliament; thus regions
are established as autonomous bodies with their own
constitutional powers and functions (art 115). They have
their own legislative and executive authority and can make
laws which are only subordinate to the constitution. Their
autonomy is of different nature from that of the provinces
and communes which are autonomous within limits laid down
by general laws of the republic which determine their
functions (art 128^ (l). A regionalized state of this type
is still a unitary state, as explicitely stated in the
constitution (art. 5)» The state remains thus the only
source of sovereignty (2); every aspect of the autonomy
of regional and local communities is granted unilaterally
and by the state. Local or regional communities have thus
no residual sovereignty' and no original powers.
A further distinction is made between ordinary regions
(art 115) and regions with a special charter (art ll6);
the latter are established by constitutional laws and
enjoy a degree of autonomy different from the ordinary
regions. This distinction is a result of specific circum¬
stances; some of these special regions had significant
regionalist movements (e.g. Sicily), others have cultural
and linguistic reasons for a special status (e.g. Val d'Aosta
1) C. Esposito, La Costituzione Italiana, Padova 1954 P«
2) G. Baschieri, L. Bianca d'Espinoza, C. Giammattosio,
La Costituzione Italiana, Firenze 1949, P• 24,
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Trentino-Alto Adige, Fruile-Venezia Guilia).
For political reasons the setting up of these regions was
delayed until 1970, when the first regional elections were
held on seven and eight June to install the regional
councils, which had to elaborate the charters of the regions.
These poltical reasons are interesting. The ruling Christian-
Democratic party wanted to build up the party organizations
in the regions before any further elaboration of regional
autonomy and to establish a constitutional Court (in 195^)
to rely on to safeguard the central state. On the other
hand, people (also inside the Christian-Democratic party)
were pressing regional administration as an essential
aid to planning and to more efficiency (l).
a) According to art 123 each region must give itself a
charter, which is a sort of regional constitution. However,
there are limits to this: each charter must be in harmony
with the constitution and lawrs of the state and with art 121,
which lays down the basic organization of each region. They
must have a regional council to make regional laws and
regulations and to perform other functions conferred upon
them by the constitution or by national laws; and an
executive committee and a president to act as the regional
government. The organization of elections for the regional
councils is laid down by national law, in order to have
the same system everywhere.
The regions may draw up their charters as they wish but
taking account of the general prinicples of the state. Each
charter must be approved by law in the national parliament.
The president of the regional council therefore sends the
(1) M. Clark, Italy: Regionalism and Bureaucratic Reform
in J. Cornford (Ed). The failure of the State, London 1975>
P. 51-52.
(2) This procedure was established by art 6 of ^ct nr 60 of
10.2.53 and not abrogated by |ct nr 1084 of 23.12.70. The
provisions of |ct nr 60 were considered to be partly uncon¬
stitutional and were also the main lega.1 reason for the
delay in establishment of the regions. See F. Bassanini &
V. Onida, Gli statuti regionali di fronte al Parlemento,
1971 p. 197 et sec.
charter to the president of the council of ministers, who
passes it to parliament within fifteen days, accompanied by
any observations made by the government (2). Parliament can
refuse to approve a charter if it is contrary to the constit¬
ution, the laws of the Republic or the interest of other
regions of the state. In practice, this introduced a "suit¬
ability control" which was not the intention of art 123.
It could have allowed the parilamentary commission examining
the charters to interfere and to make informal proposals
for the modification of the charters. Regional councils
were almost bound to accept these amendments since they,
otherwise ran the risk of not having their charter approved.
In general, however, there was not much interference and
charters were approved rather easily (l).
The legal nature of these charters is quite different from
that of regional laws. Indeed, as they have to be approved
by national law in order to take force, they can be
considered as a supra - legislative act (2).
Most charters give an enumeration of the general principles
which will stimulate regional activity; they thus accept
fundamental principles of the constitution to regional
situations and to matters which come under their authority.
It is a clear expression of regional autonomy. A prominent
place is also given to participation and planning for the
elaboration of regional policies. Almost all charters
envisage planning in order to orientate economic life
towards social aims and to make economic development more
harmonious (3). It is also a means to allow the regions to
participate in the elaboration of the national plan. Regional
plans are coordinated where necessary at national level and
fundamental objectives are laid down in a general outline
(1) Charter of Abruzzi was approved by act nr 480 of
22.7.1971, of Calabria by act n^ 519 of 28.7.1971; all
others by acts njj 338-350 of 22.5.1971.
(2) P. Ferrari L'Evolution du droit public italien en
1971-72, in: Revue de droit public et de science politique,
1973, P. 1238.
(3) idem, p. 124l.
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law. Tlxese are worked out again by the regions.
Such a system of planning in three stages allows the regions
to organize extensive participation of all interested parties.
All charters envisage the participation of citizens in public
authorities. With that purpose, some regions even installed
a regional ombudsman. More traditional forms are used too:
the right of initiative has been given not only to private
citizens but also to local authorities and trade unions.
It may be exercised on regional laws and administrative
measures; only budget laws and in some charters expropria¬
tion laws are excluded. Some charters have provided for
the active participation of people concerned with the
proposals under examination in a regional council's commission.
Abrogative referendum is possible in every region, though often
more rigorous conditions have been laid down than those of
art 75 concerning the national referendum.
On a modest scale, there are thus quite interesting attempts
to make regional government attractive for the citizens and
to invite his interest and involvement (2) However, more
experiments would have been possible if the constitution
had left the regions more autonomy for the elaboration of
rules concerning their internal organization.
The regional council has the authority to make regional laws
and regulations with respect to matters within its competence.
It performs other functions conferred upon it by law and by
the constitution; this is a reference to art 83 (election
of the president of the republic), art 75 (national referendum),
art 132 (regional referendum and detachment of provinces
and communes) and art 133 (change of provincial and communal
boundaries). Regional councils can propose legislation
to the national parliament (art 12l), which allows it a
form of participation as a regional community in national
politics (though to a far more limited extent than would be
1) G. Baschieri and others, op. cit. p. 39^.
2) The first elections (1972) in ordinary regions were
dis •-ppointing in this respect, there seemed to be not much
popular feeling in favour of the regions and the elections
were fought on national issued. See M. Clark, op. cit.
p. 5^.
the case in a federation). All deliberations of the council
must take place in public; this is not stipulated in so many
words, but it is a logical consequence of the political and
legal nature of the regional councils (l).
The president represents the region and promulgates regional
laws and regulations. In this sense, he has similar char¬
acteristics to the president of the republic. But he is also
the head of the executive committee and directs the admin¬
istrative functions delegated by the state to the regions.
It is understood that this also includes the region's own
administrative functions. The function of president has
thus a certain similarity with the function of the prime
minister too.
Although regional autonomy in these matters is limited, there
is still room for a search for more efficient forms of govern¬
ment and different relations between the regional legislative
and executive than those found at national level. Some reg¬
ional councils opted for a semi-presidential form cf regional
government, others aimed at Em intermediate solution between
a dominant legislative and a semi presidential regime (l)
Many charters provide for the election of the president
independently from the election of the executive committee
("junta"); sometimes the latter can be dismissed while the
president remains in office. In order to protect stability,
dismissal of the executive requires a special majority in
most cases. But no charter endows the president with such
powers as to place him in a dominant position over other
bodies (2). His powers are restricted to coordination and
supervision, while the work of the executive is usually
based on the principle of collegial responsibility. The
executive elaborates the general direction of policies and
stimulates the council's activities. As the powers of the
council are enumerated in many charters, it leaves the executive
(1) P. Ferrari, op. cit. p. 12^6.
(2) idem, p. 12^7«
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rather wide and flexible powers and makes it more independent
of the council than the government is of parliament.
Further innovation® concern the installation of a permanent
commission within the council to supervise the execution
of the executive committee's decisions by the regional admin¬
istration. in a few regions these commissio s are even
associated in the elaboration of regional planning. They
can request any information they need from the executive
committee or from senior officers of the regional adminis¬
tration of politically important administrative acts; in
others, the council appoints directors of the regiona.1 ad¬
ministration. There is thus a tendency at regional level
for relations between the legislative and the administration
to be very direct, probably as a reaction against negative
experiences in this respect at national level. Regional
administrations themselves copy the structure of the state
administration to a large extent (l); too much divergence
here could make cooperation and contacts difficult.
If the objective was to make the regions a centre of political
autonomy and democracy, the results are not negative; many
of their shortcomings originate from the limitations imposed
by the constitutions, laws or government. However, regional
autonomy does not depend on structure alone; the powers
with which the regions are endowed are at least as important.
b) Since Italian regions have no original powers, they
receive theirs from the constitution or from constitutional
laws. Their powers are enumerated and all others remain
with the state.
A distinction must be made between the legislative powers
of ordinary regions and of regions with a special charter;
the powers of the latter differ in their legal nature and
content. This is a result of stronger regional pressures as
well as of specific circumstances. Thus exclusive legis¬
lative powers are conferred upon Sicily, Sardinia, Val d'
(l) P. Ferrari, op. cit. p. 1251
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Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige and Fruile-Venezia Giulia, which
have extra powers in addition to those common to all regions.
They may enact local legislation regarding commerce and
industry (l), the organization of provinces and municipalities
(2), social affairs (3)» education (4), credit, assurance
and savings (5), expropriation for public purposes (6) as
well as some less important matters such as conservation
of works of art of charitable works. Ordinary regions
have no powers in some of these fields (e.g. industry and
commerce); for others they have fewer powers (e.g. education,
social affairs). Some regions with a special charter have
powers relating to particular circumstances; Trentino-Alto
Adige has far reaching powers concerning the German speaking
population of Sud-Tirol (7) and Val d*Aosta has special
powers with respect to alpine sports (8). There is much
variety among the regions with a special charter: Sicily
enjoys more autonomy than any other region because of the
exclusive nature of most of its powers; its position is
close to that of a member state in a federation (9).
But the Constitution and most special charters (except Val
d'Aosta) lay down "nonnes d'application"; their aim is to
specify and interpret the provisions of the special charters
in order to make them applicable they can also provide for
(1) Charters of Sicil .y art 14, Sardinia, art 4, Val d'
Aosta art 3, Fruile-Venezia-Guilia art 4.
(2) Charters of Sicily art 15-16, Sardinia, art 43 & 46
Trentino-Alto Adige art 5, Fruile-Venezia Guilia art 5,
Val d1Aosta art 43.
3) Charter of Sicily art 17.
4) Charters of Sicily art 14 & 17» Sardinia, art 5, Fruile-
Venezia Guilia art 6, Val d'Aosta art 3j 38-40.
(3) Charters of Sicily art 17, Sardinia, art 4, Trentino-
Alto Adige art 5, Fruile-Venezia Guilia art 5«
(6) Charters of Sicily art 14, Sardinia, art 4, Val d'
Aosta art 3, Trentino-Alto adige art 4, Fruile-Venezia
Guilia art 84-87, 96.
(7) Charter of Trentino-Alto Adige art 84-87, 96.
(8) Charter of Val d'Aosta art 2.
(9) C. Palazzoli, L£s regions italiennes, Paris 1966,
p. 67.
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the transfer of relevant parts of central state administration
to the regions. Such "normes d*application" have the legal
nature of ordinary laws (l) though they must be adopted
by special majority. - Tferey have resulted in some restrictions
of regional powers, particularly §icily (2).
Regions with a special charter and ordinary' regions have
the powers enumerated in art 11?: regarding organizations
of regional offices and administrative agencies, boundaries
of communes, local police, urban and rural fairs and
markets, public welfare, sanitation, hospital assistance,
professional and technical schools and scholarships,
museums and local libraries, torn planning, tourist and hotel
industry, regional tramways and motor transport services,
regional roads, water supply, public works, navigation and
port on lakes, mineral and thermal water, quarries and peat¬
bogs, hunting and 'i&oobkc^ _ of game, fishing in inland
waters, agriculture and forestry, artisan trades. Some of
these matters have little importance in a modern state,
others have lost some of their importance, such as agricul¬
ture; in 1948 Italy was still an agricultural country to
a large extent and at that moment it was a significant power
to be given to the region. Tourism on the contrary has
become an important economic activity in Italy since the
late 1950s: But regional legislation must remain within
the limits of general fundamental principles established by
laws of the state and may nor. conflict with the interests
of the state or of other regions (art 117). Parliament
has thus powers to enact outline laws which regional councils
can elaborate. However, the adoption of an outline law is not
necessarily required before a region may enact legislation
regarding the matters listed in art 117j otherwise the
national parliament could paralyse regional councils.
Regional legislation has to conform, in the absence of an
1) idem, p. 75•
2) Martin Clark, op. cit. p. 47. Further restrictions
result in practice from the centralized nature of regional
policy and associated policies (See chapter i).
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outline law, to the general principles of law as laid down
in existing laws of the state (l); any other explanation
would indeed reduce regional legislation to the level of
secondary rules. But major innovations by regional councils
are not possible.
The administrative powers of the regions reflect both the
degree of autonomy they enjoy as well as their intermediate
role between the state and local communities. According to
art 118, regional administration deals with the matters set
out in art 117• The regions1 administrative and legislative
powers are thus parallel but with one legal difference;
the administrative powers of the regions are exclusive; they
are not subordinated to any rules elaborated by the state,
which has given up all administrative powers in these matters
(2).
However, two restrictions are laid down in art 118. Matters
of purely local interest may be delegated by law to
provinces, communes and other local bodies and the regions
will normally perform their administrative functions by
delegating tjiem to provinces or communes and using their
offices for the purpose. Though one can understand the
purpose of this provision, namely to bring administration
close to the people, the provinces and communes are in
their present form anything but efficient and modern in¬
struments of government.
Besides their own administrative powers, the regions can
exercise administrative functions delegated by the state.
In that case, the regions are considered as ordinary decen¬
tralized authorities acting under the direction and control
of the state (3)« Their task is restricted to issuing
detailed rules regarding the matters delegated.
The basis for the transfer of administration to the regions
("?P>
is provided in art 17 flct nr 2oL which leaves thxs power
(l) F. Lorenzoni and F. Merloni, Les regions en Italie,
in: Centre Interuniversitaire de Droit (Ed), Etudes'sur
le rdgionalisme, Bruxelles 1973> p.lGO*
P. Ferrari, Les regions italiennes, Paris 1971> p. 26.




with the government. This procedure is intended to exclude
the opposition parties from transfer discussions and
proceedings. After consultation vith the regions, the
parliamentary commission for regional affairs and the
relevant ministers, such transfer decrees are signed by the
President on the proposal of the Prime Minister (l). These
decrees define in detail those functions transferred to the
regions and those which remain with the state. Some adminis¬
trative powers have been left with the state on the grounds
that they are of national or international interest; also
matters of inter regional interest have been reserved for
the state. Functions which should normally be within the
regions' powers but which are exercised by state agencies
such as IRI or ENI have not been transferred either. The
state has also retained all international responsibilities,
which reduces the regions power in agricultural matters
considerably because the state reserves for itself all
dealings with the E.E.C. (2). Moreover, the decree^
stipulate that the inter ministerial planning committee
of the council of ministers remains responsible for the
general management and coordination of the regions' own
administrative activities. Another technique used to
restrict the regions powers is the delegation of adminis¬
trative tasks; this still leaves the various ministries
the possibility of sending directives to regional officials
who in fact are former state officials working in regional
offices (waiting for promotion to Rome...). Although it
looks like decentralization at first sight in practice
it functions otherwise. The regions are often seen as
a means of reforming the Italian civil service; making it
less centralized and more effective and functional. These
decrees are a step in this direction, but muc4 remains to be
done, even to give the regions the administrative powers
to which they are entitled according to a flexible inter¬
pretation of the constitution.
fl) Decrees nr I-II of 14-15.1.1972.
(2) The problems\arising from direct E.E. C .-regional
relations will be dealt with in Part II.
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In order to be able to carry out their functions, the regions
can levy taxes and have a share of state taxes which will be
assigned to them (l). Some regions will also receive money
from special state funds, particularly the regions of the
Mezzogiorno. Art 119 provides also that the regions have
their own domain and property which is another source of
income.
The system permits both the state and the regions to levy
and administer their own taxes, but guarantees the regions
a share in the state income. The fiscal powers imply that
the regions determine regional fiscal systems autonomously
(2); otherwise their financial autonomy would be reduced
to fixing tax according to national laws. There are two
restrictions on the regions powers: their financial autonomy
must be exercised in the form and within limits established
by the laws of the state and must be coordinated with the
financial system of the state, provinces and municipalities
(art 119, l).
Thus art 1 of $ct nr 281 (3) provides that the regions take
over from the state a number of existing taxes to prevent the
creation of new ones. Some of these have been attributed to
the regions because of their increasing income (e.g. road
tax), others because they are related to regional activities
(e.g. tax on regional concessions). Restrictions are
imposed on the increase of rates in order to prevent the
differences between regions from becoming too wide and to
protect the citizen from the possibility of too heavy a
burden of taxation (4); this might indeed reduce enthusi¬
asm for regionalism.
A National Fund has been set up which collects the income
from six taxes. A decree from the Ministry of Finance
decides the division of this money between the regions,
according to certain criteria: 6/lOof the sum in function
fl) See below.
(2) P. Ferrari op. cit. p. 1365.
(3) Act nr 281 of 16.5.1970.
{k) P. Ferrari, op. cit. p. 1367.
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of population, l/lO in function of territory and 3/l0
in function of emigration, unemployment and income per
capita. The last criterion has been introduced to produce
some redistribution among regions, though the effect is
rather limited. Therefore special contributions to the
development of southern Italy are envisaged (art 12 of
get nr 28l); however, most money going to the Mezzogiorno
will continue to be chanelled through state bodies such as
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno where regional authorities
have no direct influence or participation in decision making.
The regions may also issue securities and public loans.
All this still leaves the regions with limited fiscal powers
and insufficient income; this will reduce their scope for
making the best of the matters for which they are responsible.
Indeed, the National Fund accounts for about three quarters
of the ordinary regions income. It is estimated that their
total annual income will be enough to carry out their day to
day administrative tasks, but it leaves not much to have an
important influence on regional economic development (l)
The intermediate position of Italian regions between states
in a federation and traditional decentralized communities
becomes more apparent in the system of control on legislative
and administrative activities and on the institutions.
The approval of regional charters by parliament is a legal
and political control which takes place only once. The
Constitution has instituted a control on every law passed
by the regional council. It has therefore appointed a
government commissioner for each region, residing in the
regional capital (art 124). Every regional law must be
communicated to him (art 127). He examines the law in the
light of the region's powers and that of the state and other
region's interests. If the government commissioner endorses
the law within thirty days of such communication, it can be
(l) 1^1. Clark, op. cit. p. 56.
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promulgated within ten days of endorsement. It takes face
not earlier than fifteen days after promulgation, unless
the regional council claims urgency and the governmentconsents;
in that case the procedure is speeded up.
If the government commissioner refuses to give his approval
("visum") he must pass the regional law to the government,
which returns it to the regional council within the time
limit fixed for its endorsement (art 125 3aL)» The govern¬
ment delivers its opinion giving its reasons and asks the
regional council to re-examine the law. In this re-examin¬
ation, the regional council may take account of the
government's motives and modify the law. But it may also
refuse to do so, and approve the law again but with an
absolute majority of its members voting in favour. In this
case another control is possible, but posterior to prom¬
ulgation and thus after the law has come into force.
The government may, within fifteen days after the commun-
vication of the government commissioner, raise the matter
before the Constitutional Court (art 127 paragraph 4), if
there are doubts about the legality of the law. Another
regional council can do the same. If the court considers
that the law infringes the constitution or national laws,
it declares it to be invalid "erga omnes"; its judgement
takes effect the day after its publication.
But the government has a second possibility if it considers
the law to be undesirable on grounds of a conflict of
interests: it can raise the matter before parliament.
This procedure is not open to other regions. The law
is examined by the commissions for regional affairs of
both chambers and by permanent commission responsible
and theti discussed in plenary session.
The latter procedure is dangerous for regional autonomy,
particularly if the political majority in a regional
council is different from the majority in parliament. Where-
181.
sas a control of the legality of regional laws by the con¬
stitutional court is perfectly normal, the provision of
art 127 give the government the possibility of exercising
a "suitability control" (l) although this is in principle
forbidden. But the formulation "undesirable on grounds of
conflict of interest" is so vague that almost anything can come
under that heading.
The regions have only one means of controlling the legali£y--~"~
of state laws which infringe their powers, namely starting
proceedings in the constitutional court.
The constitutional court is also competent if a conflict
arises between two regions or between a region and the
state over an administrative regulation. The court renders
it void if it is found to infringe the division of powers.
This provision is more favourable to regional autonomy,
because it leaves state and region the same rights to defend
their administrative powers.
Art 125 institutes another control on the legality of
administrative acts of the regions. It is exercised by a
decentralized state agency, called the commission of control
and installed in the region's capital. Its members are the
government commissioner, a magistrate of the court of accounts,
three state civil servants and two experts in administrative
lav;. In regions with a special charter, the composition of
these commissions is different and is constituted by a section
of the court of accounts (2) or a delegation of it (3)«
has tfceJi ,
In Val d'Aosta a mixed commission created \k) and in
Sardinia and Trentino-Alto Adige there is nothing of that
sort envisaged by the charters. The commission controls
legality, but as state servants are in a majority, this
control can in some cases look like a kind of supervision.
(1) F. Lorenzoni & F. Merloni, op. cit. p. 215-
(2) Charter of Sicily art 23.
(3) Charter of Fhiile-Venezia Guilia, art 58.
(4) Charter of Val d'Aosta art k^-U6.
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The commission can also examine an act on its merits with a
view to satisfying a request; they can send it for re-examin-
ation to the regional council. If the regional council
confirms its decision by an absolute majority, it takes
force. But such a majority may be difficult to obtain, in
which case execution is obstructed.
Administrative control over provinces and communes is exer¬
cised by the regions themselves as normal supervision (art
130). The region can substitute itself for the province
or communes and, except in the case of proceedings before an
administrative tribunal, a decision by the regional council
concerning control of legality of local decisions is final.
Clearly fearing differences between the majority in the state
as a whole and in individual regions, the constitutional
fathers have provided another control. Thus art 126
provides for the dissolution of a regional council in the
case of acts contrary to the constitution or grave breaches
of the law. A regional council may also be dissolved for
reasons of national safety or if a regional council cannot
perform its functions through resignations or the impossibility
of forming a majority. The matter is completely in the hands
of the government, which decides. But elections must be
organized within three months of such a dissolution.
This ill-designed article can become a weapon in the hands of
a centralist-minded government; its vague formulation leaves
the government very wide scope for exercising (illegal)
pressure on the regions without ever coming before court.
Italian regions are thus clearly in an intermediate position
between traditional decentralized authorities and states of
a federation. Their weakness is shown most clearly by the
powers they received in 19^8 > a new redistribution of powers
between the regions and the state, taking account of the
economic and social evolution, would strengthen their role
but is at the moment politically impossible. Another
weakness is the control mechanism which the central govern-
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,ment has built into the system and which reflects typical
centralist mistrust of regionalization; this is strengthened
in Italy by political circumstances since some regional
governments are in the hands of parties which are members of
the opposition at state level. But in spite of these weak¬
nesses, the Italian system is most interesting and may
provide some extremely useful examples.
k. Federal systems
For the time being, only one E.E.C. state is a federation:
West Germany. This is as much a result of German history,
where federal or confederal structures were always present,
as of recent events. As in Italy, after the fascist
dictatorship, too strong a central state was seen as a danger
for democracy and the decentralization of power as a means
of guaranteeing it (l). Unlike Italy, which had no feder¬
alist tradition (only federalist movements) the restructuring
of the western part of Germany was closely linked with
Germany's federal past, through there was also a lot of
American influence.
The constitution of the Federal Republic gives to the states,
Lander, all powers which are not transferred to the federation
(art 30)• The states also administer matters determined by
federal acts unless the constitution provides otherwise (art
83). However, the federal government retains a certain
degree of control and supervision over these matters without
reducing the strict division of federal state administration
(art 84-85).
In matter which are the exclusive responsibility of the
federation, states cannot interfere unless invited to do so
by federal law (art 71); in other matters, the state can
legislate in so far as the federation has not yet done so
(art 72) but there are conditions to be fulfilled by the
federation im such a case; there must be a real need for a
federal act, for example the states separately cannot solve
(l) Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht, 12, p. 205
(229).
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e problem efficiently or if the legal or economic unity of
the federation requires it. However, the federal parliament
itself decides whether the conditions for federal interventions
are fulfilled, which is a political act without constitutional
control (l). Thus the federation makes the framework for
municipal and other local structures in the states; it also
intervenes in matters of regional policy in order to try to
harmonize living standards throughout the federation.
Judgements of the constitutional court have somewhat enlarged
the legislative powers of the federation, but in administrat¬
ive matters the states retain a dominant position (2).
They execute their own laws but also federal laws, except
where federal administrative powers are explicitely provided
for. The strict distinction between the two legal orders (as
in the USA) does not exist here as far as execution is
concerned. For the execution of federal acts, the federal
government has control over the legality of states acts and
over their acceptability; this resembles the position of the
Italian regions to which certain administrative tasks can
also be delegated by the state but which are then in the
position of ordinary decentralized communities. Regarding
the state's own administrative acts, the only control on
their legality is through the constitutional court (though
the federal government can open the case if necessary). West
Germany also has mixed administrations of both federal and
state authorities; in such cases, both authorities participate
in decision making (3)« However, this form of administration
is only permitted if expressly provided for in the constitution.
In jurisdictional matters, powers are distributed vertically
between the states and the federation. The same principle
as for legal and administrative powers applies here: the
states are competent unless the constitution expressly states
otherwise. Disputes between states, between a state and the
(1) Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht, 12 p. 230
(233).
(2) A. Fisher, le federalisme allemand, in: Centre Inter-
universitaire de Droit public (Ed), Etudes sur le federal-
isme, Bruxelles 1973 P« 35«
(3) F. Mayer, Verwaltung Von Bund und Landern in ? Jjia
bundesstaatlichen Ordnung, in Zur Struktur der Deutchen
Verwaltung, Speyer, p. 36.
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federation and between constitutional bodies are dealt with
by the constitutional court. As happens elsewhere, even in
legal matters, political considerations can play a part (l).
The position of the is stronger than the position of the
regions in a politically regionalized system. They participate
directly in federal decision making through the
. (second chamber); members are appointed by the govern¬
ments of the states (art 51) and the states have four votes
if they have a population of over four million and five votes
if over six million inhabitants. The federal Government
must introduce its bills first in the which
must deliver its opinion within three months. Laws voted
in the must be passed to the .
If problems arise, the can convene a meeting
of the conciliation commission, which is composed of eleven
members of each chamber; the federal Government and the
liwjLoieitrxg can also request such a meeting if it concerns a
law which needs approval by the , This
conciliation commission can propose amendments. If there
are no results or the 1does not take account of
the amendments, the . can veto the law. How-
sever, the can undo this veto by a second vote;
if the rejected the law with a two-thirds
majority, the must also obtain a two-thirds
majority in this second vote.
The . must also approve certain regulations in
matters of transport, post and telecommunications as well as
regulations based on federal laws which need approval by the
federal council or which are to be executed by the states in
their own right or by delegation. Instructions given by the
federal government to the states concerning the execution
laws need the approval of the federal council too.
As in a regionalized state (e.g. Italy), the federal Govern¬
ment can oblige the states to act (art 37) if" they do not
fulfill their obligations as set out in the constitution or
(l) T. Maunz, Deutches Staatsrecht, Munchen 1968, p. 259
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federal laws, although the government needs the approval
of the federal council for this. This offers the state
a guarantee which the Italian regions do not have.
Two more aspects of the West German federal system need to
be mentioned in the context of this work. The first
concerns an unwritten constitutional rule. The "bundesfreud-
liches Verhalten" (l): it implies that federation and
states must take a loyal and benevolent attitude towards
each others* problems. It implies more concretely that
state legislation must take into account the interests of
other states and of the federation (2), that economically
prosperous states must assist states with economic
difficulties (3)» that the state must use its powers of
supervision over municipalities which act against federal
interests (k) and that the states must respect international
treaties (5)» The regions in Italy and decentralized
communities in other states also have similar obligations,
but here control is exercised by the constitutional court;
this offers a much better guarantee to the states against
governmental misise of these principles.
A second aspect concerns the cooperation in the federation.
During the 1960s subsidies from the federation to the states
increased in number and in quantity. The federation has
indeed a structural surplus of income while the states usually
have a deficit resulting from an uneven distribution of income
and responsibilities by the constitution (6). A second
reason for this cooperation was the necessity of cooperation
in the planning and/or execution of projects which because
of their importance could not be carried out by one state
alone (7)* In 1969 this practice was given a constitutional
1) A. Fisher, op. cit. p. k2
2) Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht, kt p.
115 (1^0).
13) Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1, p. 117131).k) idem, 8, p. 122 (138).5) idem, 6, p. 309 (328).6 0. Barbari o, Zur Revision des Grudges tzes: Planerische
und finanzielle Aspekte des Bund-Lander Verhaltnisses unter
besonderer Berucksichtigung. des Gemeinschaftsaufgaben, in Die
Offentliche Verwaltung, 1973» 19 P« 20.
(7) B. Tiemann, Die neuen Gemeinschaftsaufgaben in System des
Grundgesetzes, ins Die Offentliche Verwaltung 1970f l6l.
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basis by the introduction of a new article 91 &» concerning
provision, the federation participates in important state
tasks concerning higher education and hospitals, improvement
of regional economic structures, of agricultural structures
and coast protection.
The states elaborate projects in these fields which are
then discussed in the xmterministerial committee for regional
policy where the responsible ministers from each state and
the ministers of economy and finance of the federation sit
together. The two federal ministers have as many votes
number of states must agree with the federal position. The
execution of the projects is entirely in the hands of the
states, and the federation pays about half of the costs. The
procedure is the same for improvement projects in agricul¬
ture and coast protection, though the financial particip¬
ation of the federation is higher (60$ and 70$ of the total
costs respectively).
It must be noted that this cooperation does not change the
legal responsibilities which remain with the states (l).
However, politically the problem is somewhat different,
because the "Gemeinschaftsaufgaben" tend to increase in
importanfee to such an extent that doubts arise over the
future of the Lander as states (2). Though it is true that
the system permits the federal government to intervene in
state planning and the execution of certain projects, the
states only receive some additional duties (3)» that is, they
must take more account of federal objectives and act in
accordance with federal principles in the matters listed in
art 91 a (**)• Political influence from the federation is
likely to come first of all through party politics: in
(1) A. Fisher, op. cit. p. k7.
(2) F. Rietdorf, Die Gemeinschaftaufgaben, in: Die
Offtenliche Verwaltung 1972, p. 513*
(3) B. Tiemann, Die Beteilungsgrad des Bundes an den
Gemeinschaftsaufgaben, in: Die Offentliche Verwaltung, 1971»
p. 86-87.
(k) F. Klein, Die Regelung des Gemeinschaftsaufgaben von
Rund under Landers in Grundgesd:z, Der Staat 1972, 289.
"Gemeinschaftsaufgaben" (common tasks). According to this
as all states together, but decision must be taken
which implies that at least half the
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order to reach a decision, states governed by the same
parties as those which are in power in Bonn will normally
go along with federal proposals, while opposition parties
will tend to oppose them. The "Gemeinschaftsaufgaben" have
thus weakened the position of the states (l) but of course
not to such an extent as to put the states in a position
comparable to that of the Italian regions.
The legal and political position of the Lander also emerges
clearly from the various and numerous forms of cooperation
between them. In matters within their powers, states have
concluded agreements between each other and have established
common institutions with legal personality (e.g. the second
television network). This too goes further than cooperation
between regions or traditional decentralized communities.
As has already been mentioned, the financial position of the
Loa^oUa is similar to that of regions and decentralized
communities in many states: there is no balance between
responsibilities and income. The constitution gives the
federation exclusive legislative powers (custom duties,
fiscal monopolies) and competitive legislative powers over
other taxes. The have legislative powers over taxes
on local income (art 105)# The division of the income
is provided for by art 106; which leaves some significant
taxes to the U*amLxa such as death duties, capital taxes and
taxes on cars. Other taxes (e.g. on enterprises 01- the VAT)
are divided between federation and the states by law. Attempts
are made by this law to redistribute income between the •
the economically advanced states must make compensatory payments
to economically weak states; the federation adds supplementary
payment to the latter and can also give financial aid to
investments which aim to bring a better economic equilibrium
in the federation. In budget matters, both federations and
are autonomous, though they must take general economic
interests into account. General economic policy is detennin-
(l) idem p. 310.
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ed by the federation, but the states may elaborate regional
economic policy within the national framework. So here too,
cooperation between federation and states is the rule. In
general West German federalist? has been labelled as cooperative
federalism, because of the many forms of cooperation between
the states and between states and the federation (l).
However, two problems should be mentioned. The first concerns
municipalities and has been solved. Since September 1976
municipalities have been amalgand;ed in order to make them
more efficient, though the reforms differ from state to state.
In Nordrhein-Westfalen, for example, 82% of the communes dis¬
appeared, and in Schleswig-"Holstein only 15$- Together with
this reform, the Kreise have been reduced in number too and now
have more than 100.000 inhabitants in most cases. Compared
with micro-regions in other states (e.g. the counties in the
United Kingdom) they remain relatively small, except the
"Stadtkreise" (90 in total).
A second problem concerns the Lander whose territory does not
always correspond to social and economic realities. Therefore
proposals were made to reduce the number of states (2) but
political problems (3) have quietly buried the whole idea.
1) A. Fisher, op. cit. p. 59.
2) See Bundesministerium des Innem, Kurzfassung des
Berichts der Sachverstandigenkommission fur die Neugliederung
des Bundesgebietes, Bonn 197^;V. Ernst, Die Vorschlage der
Sachverstandigenkommission, in: Institut fur Wirtschaft-
ssdienst, Hamburg 1973 nr. 3» E. Thiel, Neugliederung als
politische Entscheindung, in: idem; P. Feuchte, Neuglie-
:derung, in: Die Offentliche Verwaltung, 1968, nr. 13-1^
G. Puttner, Die Landesneugliederung als Problem der
poliyischen Nachverteilung in Gesamtstaat, in: Die Offenliche
Verwaltung, 1971 nr 15-16
(3) For example their was never any question of reforming
Bayern, in order not to displease the CSU, whereas the
disappearance of the city states of Hamburg and Bremen in
a mainly Christian Democrat state did not please the Social
Democratic party.
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CONCLUSIONS OF PART ONE
After the discussion of local and regional reforms in each
of the Member States, we can now draw a first series of
conclusions. We have seen that the reasons behind these
reforms are fundamentally the same in each Member State:
one reason is the gradual evolution of regional policy
from regional aid and assistance to planning of regional
economic development cu-uLtown and country planning; the
second reason is the need for more effective government
at the existing local and regional levels of government;
more democratic government and decentralization is another.
This is of course a schematic view of things, but quite
adequate for the purposes of this thesis. The emphasis is
different in each country; for example in Denmark the
second reason has been the dominant one, in the Netherlands
too; in France reforms have been stimulated most by the
first reason. There are also specific circumstances behind
reforms, such as the nationalist demands in Belgium and
Britain, or the centralist nightmares in Italy and Germany.
But that does not detract from the validity of our findings
surprising though they may be: the reasons behind local
and regional reforms in the various countries show more
similarity than dissimilarity. Although the Member States
consider their internal structural reforms as internal
matters, they are in fact reforming for basically similar
reasons.
But it is probably more important that these reforms, which
are always carried out without reference to neighbouring
states, let alone consultation or exchange of views with
them9 nevertheless move in the same direction. One is
tempted to say: almost automatically; or in other words:
driven by the similar problems to similar solutions. At
local level the common solution is the amalgamation of
municipalities to form larger ones. How large these new
municipalities are still differs widely, but they all have
a minimum of 10.000 people. Their institutions, powers and
financial means are not fundamentally modified or are not
modified at all; this second stage of municipal reforms may
come only later (for example in Belgium) once a better view of
the new possibilities offered by these larger municipalities
has been gained. Interesting ajf this may be, we are more
interested in the intermediate level of government, because
it is more than likely that this level will sooner or later
achieve some significance in the perspective of further
European integration (see Part II). Among other things, we
think that two developments are the most noticeable in a
European perspective: the emergence of micro-and macro-
regions. uMLex*- micro—regional structures exc^b, bfU^j cute
not immune to amalgamations (Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland),
though in two countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) exactly
the opposite may well happen; there the number of provinces
will probably increase. The reason is to be found in the
opposition to inter-municipal forms of cooperation and, in
the case of Belgium, in the establishment of macro-regions
which it is intended to decentralize further. The attention
given to the micro—regional level of government shows a
recognition that an area of interests exists between local and
macro regional or national level. It shows a wish to
establish a clear hierarchical structure from local to national
(and European) levels of government, around secondary growth
and service centos and their hinterland (micro regions).
But in several countries evolution does not stop there and
macro—regional structures emerge too. Denmark is the only
exception to this rule; in the Netherlands, the matter is
not yet settled and it may be that a division of the state
into three macro-regions ("landsdelen") will be accepted, but
this will certainly be a very weak administrative structure
in the beginning. Maybe an exception can be made for West
Germany and Italy, although in these countries, too, voices
are raised for reforms (in particular amalgamations and the
attribution of new powers) of Lander and regions respectively,
but in all others the macro-regional level is still "on the move".
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In France, Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands it is not
yet clear which developments can be expected, but two things
seem certain: in almost every f*jmber -S'tate a macro-regional
level o|? government, which can take the form of territorial
(Belgium, Great Britain, Italy) or functional (France, the
Netherlands) decentralization, will continue to exist and
increase in importance. Whereas micro-regional government
is given powers mostly in the field of services to the public,
macro-regions receive, as we have seen, powers in the field
of planning in particular. And this is important in the
perspective of further European integration.
193-
PART II: REGIONAL POLICY OF THE E.C.
INTRODUCTION
Can one finish the thesis here? We have seen that
reforms of local and regional government are being
elaborated in each Member State, that there are similar
causes behind these reforms and that they tend to favour
similar solutions. Have-the L E.C. any authority in these
Internal matters? Yes and no. The institutions of the
E.C. have no say at all in matters concerning local and
regional reforms, but the policies which local and region¬
al authorities elaborate can be influenced by the . E.C.
in a positive or negative sense. Indeed, we have seen
that the evolution of regional policy in the Member States
has arrived at a point where reforms of existing local and
regional structures have become more or less necessary, or
at least useful. We have seen that other factors have
influenced this process too, but the development of
regional policy remains one of the most important elements.
As we shall see in the first chapter, the E.E.C. is also
elaborating a regional policy, in addition to the national
regional policies elaborated in the Member States. The
question which arises immediately is whether this E.C.
regional policy also bears a relation to regionalization;
in other words, is there a point in the evolution of the
E.E.C. regional policy where some form of overall regional
structure becomes necessary for the Community as a whole?
Have we reached this point already? If so, is such a
structure emerging? Are there certain forms of regional¬
ization which are preferable from the point of view of
the E.C. policies? How can this be achieved? Does
what is going «n at E.C. level bear any relationship to
what is going on at national level? Is there incoherence
or coherence between the policies at these two levels?
These are the questions behind the discussion in this
19*4.
second part of the thesis.
In the first chapter, the povers of the E.E.C. in the
field of regional policy will be discussed. This is
necessary because the E.E.C. has no full powers in this
respect; but also the Member States do not have full
powers any more. The limits to the E.E.C's powers must
be clearly defined before we start a discussion of the
elaboration of the E.E.C. regional policy. In the
conclusions we shall make some general comments which
will then lead on to the general conclusions in which
the possible repercussions of the E.E.C. regional
policy on regionalization in the Member States will be
discussed: this is the point towards which we have been
working in this thesis.
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CHAPTER I: THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF E.E.C.
REGIONAL POLICY
INTRODUCTION
A discussion of the regional policy of the E.E.C. with¬
out a preliminary chapter about its background would
lead to many questions: why this was done or not done,
why this solution was chosen and not that etc. We
should therefore take a look first at the powers of the
at
E.E.C. to draw up a regional policy and/the institutions
which do so. The purely legal aspect has been dealt
with already (l) and would not in fact be a very valuable
approach to take in this thesis because the legal prov¬
isions in the Treaties are rather limited and not very
relevant to the emergence of a regional policy in one
form or another, and its subsequent evolution. We
shall therefore discuss the most important influences of
a more political nature behind the definition of regional
policy in the treaties and its actual elaboration by the
institutions.
1. What the Treaties say.
It is obvious that the E.E.C. may only exercise the
powers conferred by the Treaties, and other powers
necessarily implied. Essential economic issues are
decided on the European level. In these spheres, the
institutions of the EEC operate independently or in
conjunction with the authorities of the Member States.
The aim is to achieve the economic integration of the
Member States by gradually building up an economic union
based on a customs union, common policies, coordination
of policies and freedom of movement for capital, services
(l) M. Melchior, La politique regionale de la
Communautd: aspects juridiques, Rapport au 6 ieme
Colloque sur les C.E., Liege 197^+«
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and employees. The common policies are important factors
in this process: the agricultural, transport and commer¬
cial policies. A separate chapter is dedicated to
each one in the Treaty of Rome. Other policies of the
E.E.C. are also set out in separate chapters e.g. social
policy, although Member States have retained the main
powers in these fields.
But the "treaties do not contain a separate chapter on
regional policy. This fact did not prevent the European
authorities from both having an interest in this matter
and acting upon it. Some aspects of the economic
activities of the EEC have repercussions on regional
situations. There has always been some degree of atten¬
tion for regional policy considerations at community
level. This interest had been demonstrated clearly by
the allocation in 1973 of responsibility for regional
policy to a special commissioner (l).
In the absence of a distinct chapter on regional policy,
a legal basis must be sought in different parts of the
"treaties. Xn the first place, a reference to regional
problems is made in the preamble, and a number of isolated
provisions are found here and there in various chapters
of the Treaties.
The question aXso arises of whether the Treaty has
provided adequate instruments and appropriate measures
for the realization of regionaX policy aims. Art 235
of the E.E.C. Treaty provides that, under certain con¬
ditions, possible lacunae may be remedied.
The preamble of the EEC Treaty gives it its terms of
reference; in particular it mentions as one of the aims
of this Treaty "to strengthen the unity of their econ¬
omies and to ensure their harmonious development by
reducing the disparity existing between the various
regions and the backwardness of the less developed regions".
(l) See Chapter IV.
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But the difficulty which arises is how to know whether
the provisions of a preamble can be legally binding.
Some authors refuse to give legal force to the preamble
of a treaty. The problem is not easy to solve because
the nature of the treaty can influence the answer.
The treaties establishing the E.E.C. were concluded in
the form of classical international treaties, but their
content has more far reaching implications. They are
the founding charter of the E.E.C. and they create a
new legal order. The legal force of the E.E.C. preamble
can be discussed interminably. In international treat¬
ies it seems to be generally accepted that a preamble
can be used for the interpretation of the treaties (l);
this is also the case with preambles to constitutions
(2). If the provisions of the preamble are precise
enough, they may be considered to have the same legal
force as the specific articles of the treaty or
constitution (3). So one may suggest that the preambles
to the E.E.C. "treaties can at least be used as pointers
to their interpretation; the court has referred to the
E.E.C. preamble on at least two occasions in connection
with the interpretation of the treaty (4).
Whether or not the EEC preambles can have the same legal
force as other provisions in the Treaties (5)* is a
debatable matter and not very relevant to our thesis. It
is a political fact that more and more attention is paid
to regional matters and that there seems to be a polit¬
ical will to reduce regional imbalances. Even if the
Treaties had made no mention of regional problems, it is
very likely that they would have been introduced in the
E.E.C. political sphere, as happened with consumer and
(1) R. Bernhardt, Die Auslegung volkerrechtliche Vertrage,
Koln, 1963. p. 89.
(2) G. Leibholz, + H.J. Rinck, Grundgesetz, Kommentar,
Koln, 1966 p. 39. M. Duverger, Manuel de droit constit¬
utional, Paris, 1970 p. 37^.
(3) G. Scelle, Precis de droit de gens, Paris 193^ H»
p. k6k.
k) Rec. IX, aff 26-62; Rec XII, aff 32-65
5) For the argument in favour, see Groeben + Broeckh,
Kommentar zum EWG. -Vertrag I, p. 1. For the argument
against this, M. Melchior, op. cit.
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environmental matters, If the Member States make
further steps towards an economic and monetary union,
it is indeed impossible to exclude such matters irres¬
pective of whether they are mentioned specifically and
at length in the Treaties or not.
The treaties establishing the ECSC and the EAEC are
sectoral treaties. They contain no provisions concern¬
ing regional policy, with one exception in the ECSC
treaty (art. 56,1). This does not mean that their
application has no regional consequences, as we will see
later. The treaty establishing the E.E.C, is concerned
with the economy as a whole. Regional policy is a
necessary part of economic policies which aim at the
harmonious development of all regions. It is thus in
the EEC Treaty that one has to find the provisions for
the realization of the regional objectives defined in the
preamble.
The EEC Treaty does not contain a separate chapter on
regional policy. Such a chapter could have set out the
aims and the measures and instruments with which to achieve
them. It could have facilitated the elaboration of a
coherent regional policy.
In the absence of such a chapter, one has to search out
the articles of the treaty by dealing with regional
policy. They are dispersed in different chapters and in
the protocols on Italy and Ireland^). Some of these
articles are directly concerned with regional policy;
they mention the regions as one of the aspects to take into
account for the elaboration of a certain policy. Other
articles have an indirect effect on regional policy;
the term "region" is not mentioned, but their application
can influence a regional situation,
The provisions referring expressly to regional problems
are ECSC art 56 1; EEC art 39, 2a (agricultural regions).
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(2) Mention must "be made also of the provision of ESC art 2. This article
mentions as one of the aims of the E.E.C. the harmonious development of
economic activity within the Community as well as a balanced expansion.
Considering what has been said about the preamble of the EEC Treaty, this
article can be interpreted in such a way that it serves also as a basis
for the elaboration of a European regional policy. However, it seems
that the phrase "harmonious development of economic activity" does not
refer to regional policy alone; it can just as well mean the harmonious




art 40, 4 (guidance and guarantee funds); art 42,A +
B (aid); art 75t3 and 80,1 (transport); art 92,2 and 3
(state aids); art 82 ("Zonenrandgebieten" in Vest
Germany); art. 129-130 (European Xnvestment Bank);
protocols on Italy and Ireland. Provisions not expressly
referring to regional problems but which are important for
the elaboration of E.E.C. regional policy are art 40,4
(basis for the establishment of FEOGA by regulation nr
25 of 4.4.1962); art 123 (basis for the Social Fund);
art 6,1 and 145 (about coordination of economic policies
(1).
It is striking that there is no special chapter on region¬
al policy, not even a coherent set of provisions.
Articles which are relevant for the definition and
elaboration of regional policy are scattered throughout
the EEC "preaty. This is less surprising if one considers
when the Treaty of Rome was elaborated. Around 195^
none of the Six had yet worked out a coherent regional
policy. In Italy, the Cassa per ilMezzogiorno had been
established only a few years before and its period of
operation was too short to yield any conclusions which
could influence the treaty fundamentally. In France
too, regional policy had not yet come to the point of
regional economic planning. Regional imbalances existed
in the other Mvnber States too, but there was a general
belief in all Six that general economic progress would
reduce these d^sequilibria and that meanwhile these
backward areas could do with special financial assistance.
This is the idea which one finds in the Treaty of Rome,
which also contains no provisions for regional economic
development planning, but allows exceptions to general
rules and provides for financial aid to backward regions.
Going through the memoirs of the founding fathers of the
(1) For a legal discussion of all this, see M. Melchior,
Op. Cit. For policies elaborated on the basis of these
articles, see chapter II-IV.
(2) See figures in Commission des CE;Rapport sur les
problemes regionaux dans la Communatlte Elargie, Bruxelles
1973.
EEC (in particular these of Spaak and Beyen) one finds
again this idea that backward regions should be assisted
(as one assists for example the handicapped or the
unemployed), until there is a general recovery of the
(weak) European economy which would benefit these regions
too. As we will see further, they were right, all back¬
ward areas have benefited from it, people there are
living better, but the gap in economic possibilities and
wealth has remained almost the same, and that had not been
foreseen. It is quite interesting that at the end, after
the technical discussions, when the text of the treaty
was ready the Italians insisted in the political dis¬
cussions on a protocol on Italy which would expressly
refer to the South. Why did they not insist on special
provision in the Treaty, as the Germans did for their
1Zonenrandgebiete1? It seems due to a lack of coordin¬
ation between Italian ministries;while a delegation was
participating in the elaboration of the treaty (l955~
56) another group was at the same time assessing the
first years of the Cassa and the first post-war regional
measures. So 1957 was the start of a new Cassa policy,
with much more emphasis on industrialization. Also
during the EEC Treaty negotiations, the ten year Vanoni-
plan had started, which concerned Italy's general economic
progress as well as the narrowing of the North-South
gapV It marked the beginning of regional planning in
Italy, but one finds no reflection of this in the Treaty.
Both facts however were probably the reasons that in the
final stages the Italian government wanted this special
protocol with its reference to regional development. It
is not unlikely that the EEC Treaty would have contained
a regional policy at the instigation of Italy, if it had
been drafted just two or three years later. Now the
Italian delegation seems to have agreed to a concept
of regional policy which was being modified in Rome at
the same time as they were negotiating but without
their knowledge.
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The special mention of the German "Zonenraxidgebiete" does
not alter the view expressed earlier about the ideas
behind the EEC regional policy provisions. First of all,
it does not introduce any idea of planning either; this
provision fits completely into the general pattern of
special assistance to backward areas. The mention of
these areas in the treaties is more due to political
them to regional economic regions. Had the latter
been the case, one could have named these areas differ¬
ently. The formulation in the Treaty draws attention
now to the division of Germany and to the problems this
involves (l). Besides this political reason, which is
not disputed, there may be another. Indeed, the
German government was not in favour of the association
of former colonies (mainly French) and feared that it
might have to pay for their economic development. Is it
unreasonable to suggest that German negotiators brought
in the problems of the Zonenrandgebiete as a sort of
counterbalance to this? It is a weak one, of course,
but the idea behind this move seems to he: we too
have special interests, we too have areas afflicted by
historic circumstances. While all documents about the
negotiations leading to the Treaty of Rome are not
accessible it remains difficult to prove this idea, but
it seems reasonable to suggest it. The fact that the
Zonenrandgebiete are mentioned in the treaties does not
imply that the German (sovernment was interested in
regional policies as such, because there were other areas
in West Germany with as weak an economic situation as the
Zonenrandgebiete (e.g. north-Schleswig, parts of Bavaria);
but they are not mentioned. This would confirm again
the political reason behind the provision regarding the
Zonenrandgebiete in West Germany. There are in the EEC
many other areas where economic development is hindered
(l) The economic problems of the German border regions
are a direct result of the division of Germany. Age-old
economic and commercial links were disrupted; these areas
became suddenly peripheral and had to reorientate their
economic activities to new centers (for example, instead
of Leipzigf to Frankfurt). Some parts of the "Zonenrand-
sgebiete" were also backward agricultural areas with no
modern industrial development. See E. Von Boventer,
Regional economic problems in West Germany, in International
Economic Association, Conference on backward areas in
advanced countries, Varenna 1967.
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because they are frontier regions. However, there was no
interest in special needs of frontier regions, as the
absence in the treaties of any reference to this problem
clearly shows.
Thus there is no concept of regional policy in the EEC
treaty beyond the notion of assistance for backward
areas. There is also no concept of region in the
treaties. Some provisions refer to regions, sometimes
the word areas is used. Translation is just as confus¬
ing because in every language, different words are used
to indicate regions, areas etc... It shows again that
the idea of regional economic development planning was
not present during the negotiations of the "JTreaty of
Rome. Had it been otherwise one would expect to find
a common body of terminology in the field of regional
economic planning; in particular one could expect a
distinction to be made between micro-and macro-regions.
Even though these terms were not general at that time,
even though the distinction between micro-and macro-
regions was imprecise and still is, this distinction
refers to economic realities which are not disputed. In
every Member State, quite precise maps have been made
about the economic and social influence (the "hinterland")
of towns of secondary economic importance as well as of
primary growth centres. The concept of the French
"mltropoles d'^quilibre* is based on such macro—regional
influences, and recently the Dutch government aimed to
reorganise the provinces on the basis of secondary growth
centres (l). However, this distinction was not elaborated
in the early fifties as it is today. There is also the
supplementary difficulty that it does not (or rarely)
coincide with existing administrative divisions; local
and regional government reforms are thus needed first.
(l) See Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Vet tot
wyziging van de provinciale indeling, Memorie van
toelichting, 1976 , 1^323.
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The absence of this concept of regions has consequences
during the later elaboration of regional policy." Already
limited by the concept of regional assistance (instead
of planning), the EEC policy is confused about the
territorial size of the unit to which its aid is given.
Indeed, the idea of micro-and macro-regions is based on
the existence or creation of secondary and primary growth
centres. Normally the EEC aid should go only to the
latter category, because European institutions should
be concerned in the first place with European solutions
to European problems, leaving such matters as micro
regional development to the Member States and/or to the
macro-regional institutions. Any other solution must
be refused as being too centralist, bureaucratic and
undemocratic because decision-making would then take
place at too high a level of government. If there
would be a coherent macro-regional division in the EC,
if there would be "metropoles d'^quilibre" and primary
(European) economic growth centres all over the EC, then
the European institutions (in particular the Commission)
would have more possibilities to elaborate coherent
regional development plans for all macro-regions (l).
The EEC should take an interest only in macro-regional
development and thus limit its aid to projects which are
of primary importance for the economic progress of say,
the Mezzogiorno, or Aquitaine, or Scotland (2). But in
the absence of a clear notion of a region, this is not
what happens. The EEC institutions work with regional
development areas ranging from macro-regions (e.g.
Scotland, Ireland, Southern Italy) to micro-regions (e.g.
in France) and even smaller areas (in the Netherlands
and Belgium). Because there is no definition in the
(1) What they try to do at present could have been
done much earlier and much better.
(2) See also the discussion of the 1961 conference on
regional economies, chapter II, section II.
Treaties of what a region means in a European sense
the EEC institutions are at a loss and the Member States
can request EEC aid for whatever size of area they like.
The reason for the lack of a definition of a region that
the Member States had not arrived at significant forms of
regionalization in 195^; even Italian regions, created
by the Constitution in 19^8, were not yet functioning.
The absence of a definition of a region and of a planning
concept of regional planning are thus two major obstacles
in the Treaties for the elaboration of a coherent EEC
regional policy. Their absence can be explained by the
fact that the treaties were elaborated and negotiated
in a period when both matters were still in their infancy
in the Member States too, Had the Treaties come a few
years later, it probably would have been different.
A third obstacle concerns the absence of a coherent
set of rules about regional policy. The proviji ons or fcGt
cU> -^ob add up to a_ 1 regional policy; one
can say that they envisage a regional policy,
because they are mostly exceptions to the general working
of other policies (agriculture, transport etc.) Within
the framework of these policies they allow for special
treatment of backward regions and areas. It is evident
that such an approach can hardly result in the elaboration
of a coherent EEC regional policy; this clearly was not
the aim of the people who worked out the Treaties. The
magnitude of regional problems was known at that time
(e.g. the Mezzogiorno problem) but people were not fully
aware of the methods of solving it. However, it seems
that there was no political will or interest in giving
the EEC institutions a special task in these matters.
Most Member States were politically not prepared to
concede more powers in these matters to a supranational
institution. This is also shown by the fact that no
provision expressly refers to the coordination of
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national regional policy, therefore when the EEC
institutions attempt such coordination, they can hardly
there is the establishment of the EIB, at the request
bring additional capital to its southern problem area.
Does this then contradict the view that there was then
no concept of an active regional policy and that no one
had any desire to give the EEC institutions an influence
in regional development. It does not. The EIB is an
institution which is largely autonomous; It channels
capital to underdeveloped regions without the Commission
being able to really influence its decisions; the
Commission can only hope that the EIB chooses to take
account of its views and programmes. The Bank's
autonomy makes it an unsuitable instrument for a coherent
regional policy, including regional economic planning
achieve significant results (l). On the other hand
of the Italian government which hoped that it would
(2).
See following chapters.
The creation of the ERDF proves that there was
a gap here.
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2. THE INSTITUTIONS AND THE ELABORATION OF REGIONAL
POLICY
In the beginning, the Commission and the Council were
concerned most of all with the establishment of the
common market, the common policies envisaged in the
Treaties and the strengthening of the European level
of politics in general. Regional disequilibria were
considered to be a national problem which would disappear
automatically with general economic progress; the
deliberations and hopes of the Commission and the Council
were fully in line with the basic ideas in the EEC
Treaty in this respect. It was not realized that the
very fact of the establishment of a common market would
seriously affect regions with a weak economic structure
(1).
The Commission's first activities in regional matters
were limited to research, primarily for the purpose of
collecting objective data. But there was also a
secondary, unofficial aim behind this research: it allows
the Commission to bring certain matters which have
received insufficient attention, or none at all, into the
European sphere, even if only as discussion topics in
the beginning: the chances thus increase that at some
future date the Council of Ministers will turn its
attention to these matters. Two main aspects of the
regional problem in the EEC are hereby covered: national
(l) This is remarkable: the idea of establishing a
common market was not a new one, as one could refer to
experience with the German Zollverein and the Italian
unification. The latter in particular showed that econ¬
omic integration between an economically weak state
(southern kingdom of the two Sicilies) and a more advanced
one (the northern part of Italy) is to the disadvantage
of the former if no adequate provisions are made. Maybe
both the Italian and French governments were aware of this,
because they insisted on the possibility of allowing
protective measures (for example state aids); Italy was
also the driving force behind the idea of a European
Investment bank. But in general all believed that general
economic progress would also benefit backward regions
almost automatically. As we shall see, it did: they made
progress but not enough to bridge the gap.
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regional policies and the concept of a region. This is
a surprising choice which seems to indicate the existence
of a minimalist and a maximalist view on this matter:
according to the first opinion, the Commission should
limit L-ts activities to the coordination of national re¬
gional policies, hence the study of what is going on
in the Member States in this field; according to the
second opinion, a more comprehensive policy should be
elaborat eel, something which is impossible or at least very
difficult without a European regional scheme. The latter
view was held in particular in the European Parliament
(1).
However, this is an optimistic view of what happened
in the first years and must be qualified immediately.
National regional policies were indeed examined in the
first place in order to measure their compatibility with
the provisions of the treaty (2); though understandable,
this approach shows that the seriousness of regional
disequilibria was nob fully recognised and that there
was clearly a hope that they would disappear almost
automatically as a result of the general economic progress
generated by the establishment of a common market. This
aspect of the minimalist view was to restrict the growth
of the idea for some years and made coordination of nat¬
ional regional policies rather weak. But pressures,
from Parliament prompted the Commission to ask experts
to work out the regional divisions in the EEC (3), for
the analysis of regional problems from a European view¬
point and as a framework for a European regional policy
(4), The conflict between these two approaches is
clear: it is like trying to sit on two chairs at once,




See B^AKbWt- • ^
Commission de la CEE, 2ieme rapport general
58-59, P- 53;
idem, 4ieme rapport general 1960-61, p. 124
idem, p. 125.
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not to fall between them. The Commission's attempt
to achieve a wider view on regional problems in the EEC
in thel96l conference on regional economies (l) was
unsuccessful and would have left it no choice but to
follow its own ideas (and not so much parliament's views)
on regional problems and policy.
A second aspect of the Commission's role concerns the
regional implications of common policies. Though the
Commission paid attention to this problem early enough
(2), its approach is somewhat limited. The regional
implications of each EEC policy are taken into account,
d,
but separately, rather than in coordinated plan. The
Commission recognized that regional policy at national
level alone can not bring a solution^but a plea for
the adaptation of regional measures to the condition of
an enlarged market was followed by a statement about the
subsidiary nature of the EEC's role in regional matters
(3). The Commission thus seems to accept the place
given to regional policy in the treaty rather than trying
to work towards as wide an interpretation as possible
or even applying EEC art 233• This prudent attitude can
be explained by the objections of various Governments
those of France and Belgium in particular to what they
regarded as European interference in a matter which became
politically more and more sensitive in the mid-sixties
The Commission?s role is also to coordinate national
policies wherever it is necessary for the realization
of the aims of the EEC; this includes regional policy
if there is ever going to be a reduction of the economic
gap between European regions. However, the Commission
itself admits that coordination in this matter has not
been very successful (4). The coordination of national
1) See Section II, Chapter II.
^
2) Commission de la CEE, 3ie'me rapport general
1959-60 K ^ „
(3) idem, 7 ierae rapport general 1963-64, p. 167. It
is likely that the negative reactions of several
Governments to the 1961 conference on regional
economies are the reason for all this carefulness.
(4) Commission de la CEE, lOieme rapport gene'ral
1966-67 p. 46.
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regional policies by the Commission was obstructed by
the governments and national administrations but co¬
ordination of the various ways and means of establishing
a European regional policy has not been very successful
either. Powers were dispersed over a variety of the
Commission's Directorates General whose principal interest
was something other than regional policy. The appoint¬
ment of a Commissioner with principal responsibility
for regional policy(in 1972) was a step towards easier
internal coordination.
The absence of a global concept of regional policy made
it difficult for the Commission to use its right of in¬
itiative in such a way as to stimulate the Council
towards taking more comprehensive and more coordinated
regional policy measures. The fact that underdeveloped
regions benefited less from the general economic growth
than regions which were already economically well
developed was the Commission's inevitable conclusion
about its role during the first decade (l). It is at
the same time an indirect recognition of the failure
of the Treaty's concept of regional policy.
Various studies were carried out on new aspects of the
»
problem of regional imbalances, particularly regarding
the costs of excessive industrial concentration and the
role of local authorities (2) but they are merely a cont¬
inuation of a role with the Commission has played from
the beginning and which could be carried out as well by
specialized research institutions.
In its attempt to achieve more efficiency, the Commission
has made direct contact with regional authorities, first
of all to expand the mutual exchange of information (3)?
cooperation has however been hindered by the suspicion
of national bureaucracies (4).
1) idem p. 47.
2) Commission of the EEC, 1st general report 1967,
p. 231-232.
3) idem, 2nd general report 1968 p. 291.
4) Example: an Italian circular nr 200/13940/14 of
27.12.1972 from the Prime Minister's office to govern-
sment Commissioners asking the regions to make all
contacts with the Commission through the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
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The absence or weakness of a relationship between the
Commission and regional authorities is of course caused
by the difficulty of finding appropriate partners in all
Member States. One can hardly imagine the Commission
cooperating in the same way with provincial authorities
in the Netherlands, counties in Denmark, Lander in
Germany and regions in Italy. Micro—regions, which are
the service level of local government, are not much
use to the Commission; as we have seen, this level has
so far been developed further than the macTo -regional
level which would suit a European context much better
for exchange of information, advice, planning and even
execution.
The effect for European regional policy is certainly
negative. Inside the Member States, local and regional
authorities can be politically active as national pressure
groups (e.g. municipal councils). The EEC decision ~
r making mechanism is not a computer into which the Comm¬
ission puts an initiative so that the Council can
produce a regulation, but a confrontation of national
and European administration, political parties and
socio economic interest groups; a regulation or a policy
in general results from a compromise between a series of
proposals and counter proposals. The legal power of
the institutions is not always the same as their real
political power to realize what they want or to prevent
other political activist actors (e.g. pressure groups)
from exerting any influence (l). But regional authorities
have no role in the European political game. Even the
Committee for Regional Policy (established in 197*0 is
composed of national civil servants, so that regional
influence or demands can still be filtered before they
eventually pass on to the European level of policy making.
Direct relations between the Commission and local and
regional authorities involve some particular problems. In
(l) L. Diericks, Het Europese besluitvormingsproces,
Brussel 1972, p. 258.
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theory it is easy to maintain that there is no need for
direct relations: federal states also have no legally
established contacts between federal and local authorities.
jn the EEC, there are two distinct legal and political
levels, the and the national, and local author¬
ities belong only to the latter. It is thus quite
normal that the Committee for Regional Policy is
composed of national representatives only. Further, it
would be impossible to compose a regional policy committee
with representatives from European regions, because they
do not exist as such. The present forms of regionaliz-
ation in the Member States make this impossible because
of too great a diversity of structures and powers. One
would have to take representatives from macro-regions in
one state and from micro-regions in another. And the
problem remains of course that the Treaties have no view
about the type of region EEC policies have to deal with.
If there were a harmonious macro-regional structure in
the Member States and if there was a political will to
elaborate European (macro-) regional economic development
planning including both EEC measures and coordination of
national measures, then direct contacts between the
Commission and representatives of these (macro) regions
could be envisaged and an advisory committee could be
established.
A problem also arises from the specialist nature of
Council meetings, which bring together Ministers of
Agriculture, Transport, Finance etc. Normally this
would be advantageous but not in the case of regional
policy which always involves several other policies.
With the exception of Italy, no other Member State has
a Minister for Regional Policy. Belgium has two
Secretaries of State for regional economic policy, one for
Flanders and one for Wallonia, but they fall under the
Minister for the Economy who normally represents the
state at Council meetings, as each state is entitled to
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one representative only. Even in these Member States,
regional problems are dealt with by various ministries,
as is the case in all others. Usually there is one
Ministry which has the main power for dealing with
regional problems and this is normally the Ministry of
Economy. At EEC level, regional matters are therefore
normally brought up at the meetings of the Ministers
of the Economy and Finance. However, decision-making
at European level can still be delayed because of the
dispersed nature of decision-making in the Member States
in matters of regional policy. Similar delays do
of course happen in other meetings too: the Ministers
of Agriculture for example may delay a decision until
the Finance Ministers have met. But in the case of
regional policy it appears that such delays happen more
frequently, though the secrecy which surrounds Council
meetings makes it difficult to be precise.
Another problem hampers the Council in the elaboration of
a European regional policy. Any solution to regional
underdevelopment always needs intervention in the form
of a wide range of measures: it is difficult to coordin¬
ate these measures and construct an all-round coherent
plan through a series of meetings with ministers with
different responsibilities. Because the Council had
moved towards more diplomatic methods, progress can
often be made only if other measures are agreed at the
same time: a Member State may declare its willingness
to capitulate on a particular issue if it obtains
satisfaction on another point which may be an entirely
different matter. Thus it can happen that some aspects
of a Commission proposal are agreed upon and others are
not although the application of accepted measures may
not be hindered by this lack of coordination, their
effect will be reduced co nsiderably.
The Council chooses between the various solutions proposed
for a certain problem, but it does not elaborate the al¬
ternatives presented to it (if any). In matters of
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regional policy, the Commission can thus come with
truly European solutions; it can identify the common
interests in doing so and stimulate integration (l).
But it has been hindered by insufficient pressures from
regional authorities and the reluctance of the Council
to treat regional problems other than as a matter of
"as much aid as possible".
The position of the Committee of Permanent Representatives
must be mentioned too in relation to the role of the
Council. Its position can be ambiguous: in dealings
with the Commission, Permanent Representatives defend
national interests, but it appears that they often
defend European interest in dealings with their govern¬
ment (2); during the preparatory phase of a decision,
they therefore act as 'go-between'. This state of
affairs cannot offer any particular advantage for region¬
al policy matters; the Commission's views have emerged
largely without regional participation, and from their
respective capitals, the Permanent Representatives only
hear the opinions of their national administration.
Though precise information is hard to come by, it appears
that the Permanent Representatives deal first and foremost
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (they are in fact
diplomats) and to a lesser extent with the technical mi¬
nistries: however, when it concerns a common policy,
for example agriculture, this practice does not apply.
As we have noted already, there are no ministries for
regional policy, so the Permanent Representative has
nowhere to go with the Commission's proposals (except in
Italy). However, it seems that there is consultation on
such matters between the Permanent Representatives of the
United Kingdom and the Scottish and Welsh offices in
London.
Contacts between the Permanent Representatives and the
(1) L.N. Lindberg, Political dynamics of European
integration, p. 8.
(2) L. Diericks, op. cit. p. 262.
Secretaries of State for the Flemish and Walloon economy
appear to be neglig able; the permanent Representative
seems to deal almost exclusively with the Ministry of
the Economy. No consultation of any significance appears
to take place between the Permanent Representative and
regional, authorities either (e.g. in Italy or with the
Lander governments in Germany). However, it is possible
that the size of their staffs makes consultation on a
permanent basis rather difficult. But there are
certainly political reasons too; when in 1977 a
consultative committee on regional policy of local and
regional authorities from the Member States was establ¬
ished, no permanent representative was willing to deal
with it, although they now maintain some contacts on
an unofficial basis with representatives of their res¬
pective countries.
Control of the activities of both Commission and Council
is exercised by the Court of Justice and the European
Parliament. The latter exercises a political control
over the Commission, but its other powers are not yet
of any great significance. The jurisdictional control
is exercised by the Court of Justice.
Until now, it was not necessary for the Court to pro¬
nounce judgement on powers directly concerned with
regional policy or the legal acceptability of certain
regional measures. In some cases, regional matters
were dealt with indirectly by the interpretation given
by the Court to other articles (l).
The nature of the Court is such that its role in these
matters can be no more than jurisdictional control of
the treaties. In the interpretation of the Treaties,
however, the Court has the possibility of widening the
EEC's responsibilities as regards regional policy; this
could be important since this is not covered completely
in the Treaties.
(l) See Receuil CJ, VI. i960 Nr 3*18, 26-58.
215.
The European Parliament exercises political control
which implies that its role in the elaboration of the
EEC's regional policy could be significant. Its control
in fact concerns only the Commission, which can be forced
to resign by a vote of no confidence. Parliament has no
control over the activities of the principal decision¬
making institution, the Council of Ministers it can
of course make some embarassing political noises, but it
cannot force the Council to do or not to do something.
Indeed, it has taken years to persuade the Council to
accept that its president should appear before parlia¬
ment to make statements and to answer questions, and
a real debate is still not possible. As things look at
the moment, farliament's powers will not be increased
when it elected directlyf
Parliament's legislative powers are restricted to giving
advice on the proposals of the Commission before these
are examined and decided upon by the Council. However,
discussions often start in the Committee of Permanent
Representatives and when the opinion of the European
Parliament arrives, the views of the national admin¬
istrations has often preceded it, and the Committee
of Permanent Representatives may have worked out a
compromise already. The Commission, too, can change
its proposals during the discussions in the Council
and thus the opinion of Parliament can be out of
touch. The Council has therefore agreed to ask
Parliament again if a fundamental modification is made,
but this is rather vague. Since 1975» Parliament has
budgetary powers over the EEC's own resources which
otherwise would not be controlled because national
parliaments have no say in these matters.
Originally the European Parliament and the Commission
were partners, but Parliament's importance has decreased
together with the increased cooperation between the
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Commission and the Council. After the Hallstein-
Commission, the real supranational character of the
Commission has been weakened; the Commission tries to
avoid conflicts with the Council, which inevitably im¬
plies that it takes more account of national interests
and less of European interests, though in general it has
remained the voice of common interests, together with
Parliament. The technical and careful approach of the
Commission V as particularly noticeable during the
Ortoli Commission (l).
The European Parliament has a politically important role
as intermediary between public opinion and the European
institutions; it can in particular bring to the attention
of the Commission and the Council certain problems which
they may be inclined to neglect because they do not
figure prominently in the treaties or because some Member
States do not want to bring them into the European sphere.
Regional problems are a striking example of Parliament's
role as a stimulus for the Commission and the Council
(or rather of attempts to stimulate them ).
In the beginning, Parliament appeared to have more
influence than at the moment, at least in matters of
regional policy. Instead of receiving paternalistic
warnings from the Commission responsible for regional
policy to be realistic, the Commission would follow
Parliament's advice (e.g. the organization of the 1961
conference on regional economies), even if the Council
did after all not take the decisions both institutions
had wished. Gradually, this changed; a precise date
can of course not be given, but the change in the position
of the European parliament quite clear bfc-e. tovou^ c^j^c-e tfce,
Ortoli Commission. In matters of regional policy, a
technocratic approach replaced earlier idealism more
completely than before; the Commission returned to
(l) See Chapter V.
the narrow view of "what is possible shall be done" and
not of "what must be done shall be attempted". Parlia¬
ment inevitably followed the example of the Commission,
with the result that even its more timid proposals did
not have a chance any more, according to the political
principle that he who asks too little gets nothing.
In i960, things were different. At a time when regional
policy in the Member States and in the Communities was
still largely seen, at least officially, as a matter
of aid, Parliament produced the Motte Report (l).
Though it is out of date now on certain points, it
remains an example of political vision. It aims to
reconcile one of the most delicate aspects of regional
policy, its human and social implications, with technical
necessities and this at a time that regional matters were
often treated either romantically, or on a purely tech¬
nocratic basis. The report is already moving towards
a concept of what a region is, and proposed the basis
for a European regional policy.
The European parliament has ever since continued to pay
much attention to regional problems. The Birkelbach
Report (1963) examined, the regional consequences of
the establishment of the common market and the necessi¬
ty and possible means of coordinating national regional
policies. It drQw attention to the representation of
local authorities in EEC policy-making and urges the
Commission to seek solutions. The comments of the
European Parliament on the first communication of the
Commission to the Council about regional policy in the
EEC, the Bersani Report (1966), demonstrateiagain the
global and long term view which Parliament takes. The
approach in all these reports shows at the same time an
understanding of the social and cultural implications
and of the techniques of regional policy; Parliament
(l) This and other reports will be analysed in
section II. They are mentioned here only as an
indication of the role of the European Parliament.
clearly continues in the tradition of the Motte Report.
Reading these reports, one regrets even more that
Parliament has no decision making powers in the field
of regional policy.
Mitterdorfer Report (1970) and the Delmotte Report (1973)
seem to show a shift towards a more technical approach
to regional problems on the part of Parliament. Of
course, these reports discuss technical Commission
proposals, but another reason may be that Parliament
gave up producing reports which were ignored almost
completely by the Council and also to some extent by the
Commission, which is more concerned to reach some agree¬
ment in the Council than to achieve global and com¬
prehensive agreement. It was also in Parliament that
the importance of a harmonious regional structure in the
EEC has been stressed. In order to elaborate a global
and coherent regional policy it will be necessary to
complete the treaties and to extend the powers of the
EEC to include regional matters, as well as to set up a
regional framework of European dimensions.
In general it can be said that the European Parliament
has been the regional conscience of the EEC. It has
repeatedly drawn attention to regional problems and the
necessity of solving them, and has indicated possible
ways of doing so. This interest is the more striking
because Parliament is normally not composed of "regional"
representatives. The only Member State which aims at
equal representation of its two regions is Belgium, where
there are sufficient internal pressures to send an equal
number of MP's from the Dutch speaking and French speak¬
ing parts of the state. However, this is based on the
cultural regions in Belgium, not on economic regions. The
delegation of the United Kingdom MPs from
Wales and Scotland who are apparently selected to give
these regions a representative in the European Parliament;
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Other Member States give primary consideration to
maintaining party political balances.
The European Parliament has thus tried to push the
European institutions towards a more global regional
policy; it tried to fill the gap in the treaties in
this respect, its political powers were inadequate for
it to succeed.
The most important consultative institution has been
established by the EEC Treaty itself, the Economic and
Social Committee (EEC art 193). Such an institution
was absent in the ECSC and has been much regretted by
the economic and social organizations concerned. The
Economic and Social Committee is composed of repres¬
entatives of all sectors of economic life, appointed
by the Council. It must be consulted by the Commission
or the Council as provided for in the Treaty or when
they consider it to be necessary.
According to the Trea^y» the Economic and Social Committee
to be consulted in matters concerning regional
policy; the Commission, however, has done so. Like
the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee
has usually stressed the need for a global and comp¬
rehensive regional policy. It has also given particular
attention to the unemployment and underemployment in
backward regions; this concern has led it to draw
wide ranging conclusions to remedy this situation.
Though it receives less publicity than the European
Parliament, the influence of the Economic and Social
Committee should not be underestimated, because it is
composed of high ranking persons from industry, commerce
and the trade unions (l). In general its role in matters
of regional policy cannot be expected to be important
(l) L. Diericks, op. cit. p. 263
because its objectives and its members composition are
oriented more towards general economic and social
matters; regional problems only come indirectly.
Other consultative committees can be established
by the Council. In 1973 a Committee for Regional
Policy was established, something for which the European
Parliament had long been pressing. This Committee is
composed of top civil servants dealing with regional policy
in the Member States. It may help to achieve better
coordination between national regional policies and the
EEC's regional policy. One should, however, not expect
too much of it since it is often the national bureaucrats
who block the elaboration of European measures or attempt to
do so. What is still lacking is official consultation
with regional authorities; there is of course strong
opposition from the national governments, but there are
also practical difficulties because of-the great dis¬
parity in regional structures and authorities and their
powers in the various Member States of the EEC.
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CONCLUSIONS
There are therefore several obstacles to the elaboration
of EEC regional policy; the absence of a concept of
what a region is, the absence of a concept of regional
economic development planning, the absence of coherent
EEC powers regarding regional policy. All these are
inter-related problems and, as we have explained, they
result mainly from the fact that the Member Spates
themselves were not alive to these problems at the time
of the elaboration of the treaties. As we have observed
EEC powers and instruments in the field of regional
policy are not grouped in a coherent way and some
necessary powers are absent in the EEC (e.g. regarding
the planning of the general regional economic develop¬
ment), but nevertheless it is the task of the insti¬
tutions to make an effort in order to contribute to
the realization of the treaty's aims.
It is not surprising if the activities of the Commission
and the Council reflect both the limited attention given
to regional policy in the Treaties, and the concepts
prevalent in the Member States at certain times.
However, allowing for these limitations, the EEC has not
neglected regional problems. From the establishment of
the ECSC onwards, its institutions have been conscious
of the need to remedy the poor economic conditions of
so many parts of the Community. Learning from early
experiences and aware of the increasingly urgent need to
do something to narrow the economic and social gap
between developed and backward regions, the EEC has
tried to work out a more comprehensive regional policy.
It cannot be claimed to have been a great success, as the
1972 Paris summit conference implicitly admits when it
calls for nev action in this field.
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Though every division may be arbitrary to a certain extent,
a study of EEC regional policy has shown that three periods
can be distinguished. From the early days of the ECSC,
concern about the regions was already beginning to grow;
it increased after the establishment of the EEC. A
turning point was reached in 1965 when the Commission
sent its first communication on regional policy to the
Council, in which it makes an attempt towards a more
global regional policy. One can see a third period
emerging in 1972: three new Member States entered the
EEC (two of which had serious regional imbalances) and
the Paris summit declaration proposed the creation of
new possibilities for EEC regional policy. The long
term results of this third period are of course not
known yet, but some conclusions can already be made
about the last Commission's regional activities (1972-
1976).
As we have indicated in the general introduction, our
analysis will not be made from an economic viewpoint,
though the description of many EEC measures can of
course not be done from an entirely political or legal
viewpoint. It is also not our aim to go into every
detail of EEC regional policy, but to make an analysis
of the main regional policy measures and the use of
special instruments in order to show some of the weak¬
nesses of the legal provisions of the Treaties and of
political realities in the EEC.
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CHAPTER II:
THE EMERGENCE OF EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY (1952-I965)
INTRODUCTION
After the devastations of the Second World War, the
first concern of all states was to rebuild their
economies and to deal with the enormous human problems.
Regional thinking was a concept which was mostly absent
in their pre-war economic thinking and no one thought
of taking the regional factor into account in recon¬
struction and redevelopment programmes. In some
states a certain regional interest existed, but in
the form of regionalism based on historical, cultural
or ethnic considerations; political administrative
and economic regionalization had not yet emerged (l).
Of all the states which became members of the ECSC,
only Italy and France had shown the beginnings of more
developed regional policy concepts. However, in general
no serious regional efforts were made until the second
half of the fifties; little legislation was introduced
in this field and not enough to constitute a global
regional policy. It is therefore not surprising that
so little attention was paid to regional imbalances
during the negotiations preceding the Treaty of Paris
and in the treaty itself.
Another reason is that the Treaty of Paris only covers
the coal and steel industries," These were mainly located
in a few parts of the Community; some of these coal
or steel regions needed reconversion and the Treaty
envisaged measures to assist them in this. These
measures were an attempt to cure the symptoms of
regional problems, but not necessarily the causes of
; regions with difficulties in
(l) See part I, Chapter III.
other sectors of economic life, for example backward
agricultural regions, were not covered by the treaty.
The Treaty of Rome, and the Spaak Report which preceded
it, gave more attention to regional problems. Though
the Treaty sees regional policy as secondary to other
policies, it does offer European institutions some
scope for action, especially regarding underdeveloped
regions, as a result of the general nature of the EEC
treaty and because of increasing concern over the
negative effects on economic and social life of wide
disparities between regions. However, regional policy
in the EEC was considered to be an aspect of o\rerall
economic growth and the utilisation of all the resources
of the Community; the neo-liberal economic view had
high hopes that general economic growth would lead
almost automatically to a better distribution of econ¬
omic activities and to more prosperity in backward
regions. Difficulties might continue and even increase
temporarily, but special measures were envisaged in the
treaty to counterbalance a possible worsening of the
position of the underdeveloped regions through the
establishment of the common market. As we have noticed
before, these measures reflect the conception of regional
policy as a form of aid and not really as a developed
planning concept; this fitted in well with the general
economic beliefs behind the Treaty and with the policies
generally found in the Member States at that time.
1. THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE ECSC
The situation of the coal and steel industry in 1951
was not too favourable. Coal mines were heavily con¬
centrated in a few regions close to each other; 939^
of the total coal production took place in l/l6 of the
Community's territory. The coal areas with difficulties
were all outside this Ruhr-North of France-Lorraine
triangle^with the exceptions of the Borinage mines.
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Output in the mines was between lkOO to 1600 kg per
miner, but in the Lorraine mines the output was 2300
kg, in Borinage only 1000 kg and in the Sulcis mines,
950 kg per miner. From the first year of the ECSC,
a certain regrouping of prices took place, except in
Belgium where the coal price remained higher than the
European average. The evolution of production was
therefore predictable: expansions in Lorraine, Saar
and Belgium and Dutch Limburg, which together had about
259^ of the total production in 1957; stagnation in the
Ruhr, which still produced half of the total coal out¬
put, and in the small mines in the Centre Midi and
Niedersachsen; a distinct decline in the Borinage coal
mines whose share in the total output fell from I890
to 7$> (l). Regional problems are closely related to
this situation; only the fittest could survive in a
common market. The role of the high authority would
be to help these regions to integrate more easily in
the common market. But the artificial maintenance
of inefficient mines was of course out of the question.
In the steel sector, 3/k of the total production took
place in the "triangleM; both industries needed each
other, certainly in the 19th century. However, while
the total steel output in this period (1951-1957)
increased, the percentage produced in the triangle
fell from 80^ to 76^, as a result of the development
of steel industries in Member States which had hither¬
to a very small output such as the Netherlands and
Italy. This evolution resulted in particular from the
steel industry's tendency to move closer to the sea,
for easier delivery of supplies.
The extremely limited provisions for regional policy
in the Treaty of Paris could not have much effect on
political and economic realities. The High Authority
had to ensure that the transition from a protected
(l) P. Romus, Expansion economique regionale et
Communaute Europ^enne, Leiden, 1958, p. 312-313*
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national market to a common market took place without
regional difficulties; therefore, the Treaty envisaged
a gradual transformation of the economic structures,
and provided for measures to deal with the social
consequences. The ECSC would try to compensate for the
consequences of the establishment of a common market
but it would not have an active regional, policy; it
would remain "kurieren am Symptom". Regional measures
were envisaged for social reasons and were not con¬
sidered as a direct redevelopment policy for the
coal and steel regions. Powers regarding regional
policy as such remained entirely in the hands of the
Member States and the role of the ECSC was restricted
to that of giving secondary assistance. This dichotomy,
which resulted mainly from the nature of the Treaty
of Paris, would nevertheless have serious consequences.
a. Readaptation and reconversion policy
The aim of the readaptation policy of the ECSC is to
protect the standards of living of workers affected
by changes in the coal and steel industry resulting
from the establishment of a common market, and to
contribute to the professional mobility of workers (l).
The mechanism of the readaptation policy was originally
envisaged for the transitional period only, but was
later extended. A clear distinction must be made
between the readaptation policy, which concerns
specific enterprises whose workers become redundant,
and the reconversion policy which concerns industries
whose workers become redundant when the treaty is in
force as a result of the introduction of new techniques.
The conditions of the reconversion policy concern the
labour market while these of the readaptation policy
concern certain specific enterprises.
(l) L.P. Suetens, Les investissments et les aides
financieres, in Les Novelles, Bruxelles, 19&9 P-5^5«
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The readaptation policy of the ECSC aims to readapt
workers by providing tideover and resettlement allow¬
ances, payment to enterprises to help them to pay
their workers during a period of temporary unemploy¬
ment resulting from changes and also by financing
vocational retraining for workers who have to change
their employment; these aids are non repayable. The
High Authority can also give direct aid to enterprises
which undertake their own readaptation or which are
created to integrate licensed workers from the coal
and steel industry; non repayable aid may be given
to enterprises which have to close down if this is a
direct result of the establishment of the common
market and if this will lead to a relative increase in
the output of other ECSC undertakings (art 23 of the
convention, k & 5).
Though these aid measures can only be used if the Member
State concerned provides at least an equivalent sum
itself, the system has proved to be flexible and
effective (l). The High Authority could evaluate
different situations and adapt its action according
to the specific needs of the Member State or a particular
region. Between 195^ a^d 19^0, the ECSC spent
42j518,00 EUA on the readaptation of 115,085 workers in
Belgium, Germany and Italy and France.
The readaptation policy started with a large programme
to transfer miners from declining Centre Midi collieries
to Lorraine. The reluctance of the workers to leave
their region made the programme an almost complete
failure. The High Authority had expected to resettle
5000 workers in three years, but only a few hundred
volunteered (2). A healthy economy does of course
need some mobility of the factors of production, but
mobility of one factor alone, the worker, can hardly
(1) F. Perrin, la politique regionale et la CEE,
Grenoble 1968, p. 131.
(2) ECSC, rapport general 195^ nr h p. 215.
be accepted. The High Authority understood that
"gentle deportations" were not the right way to solve
the problems of coal mines. A closer look at this
failure reveals that it was social and regionalist
factors xn particular which influenced worker's decision
to stay; they were attached to their local community and
reluctant to go to Lorraine because of the difficulties
of adapting to a new region where another dialect was
spoken and where they would have to accustom them¬
selves to a different way of life, different weather
etc.; housing conditions and services also played an
important role. Their refusal was influenced too by
local forces such as tradesmen, foremen, local officials
of trade unions, mayors and anti ECSC propaganda from
the Communists (l). They feared and not without reason
that the departure of such a large group would accelerat
the decline of the region. It is indeed an accepted
principle of regional policy that well trained workers
should stay in a backward region because they can be a
great asset for its redevelopment.
If, as in this case, the major economic activity proves
to be inefficient, new industries should be attracted
or others expanded; with skilled workers on the spot
ready to be employed after following a retraining
programe, an important difficulty is already solved.
But this requires a coherent regional plan, something
the ECSC obviously lacked, and because of the treaty's
provisions could not produce. Resettlement of workers
is a possibility if all other means of solving a
regional problem have failed (2); but in this case
all the other means were not tried.
In order to avoid such a failure and criticism from a
regional viewpoint, the High Authoirty carried out six
(1) V. Diebold jr., The Schuman Plan, New York 1959>
p. 407-410. His analysis, too, was of a particular time
(2) V. Siebrecht, Anpassung und berufliche Ausbildung,
in Actes officiels du Congr^s International d'Etudes
sur le CECA, Milano-Stresa 31«5«1957» P- 229
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sociological studies. These brought to light the
considerable influence of regionalist factors such as
attachment to the local community, social and cultural
factors, housing conditions and vocational training,
and to a lesser extent the role of factors such as the
legislation on naturalization and on freedom of move¬
ment within the state or the problems of country
bred workers moving to a city (l). More attention
to the social factors and public relations, psychological
and physical factors would give better results in the
future. Later, the High .Authority admitted this and
agreed to take these various factors into account (2).
The first experiment also demonstrated that if no clear
division of the responsibility for regional policy is
made between the Member States and the ECSC, the effect
of the regional policy measures of the European in¬
stitution could be easily jeopardized by the unwilling¬
ness of one national government. To avoid unemploy¬
ment in the Centre Midi collieries, the High Authority
had in fact invited the French Government to join in
examining the opportunities for re-employment in the
region, in industries connected with coal and steel or
in different industries (2). French regional policy,
however, was still in its initial phase with no division
of the territory into regions and only incentives for
enterprises to move into depressed areas. But enter¬
prises usually do not move freely to depressed regions
if they can establish new plants in flourishing areas,
whatever the incentives offered, for purely economic
reasons (high costs, bad infrastructure etc.) and also
for psychological reasons . So the result was negligible.
The High Authority lacked the power to take initiatives
ECSC, rapport general 19 5^ nr k p. 219.
ECSC, general report 1958, nr 6, XX, p. X89.
ECSC, general report 1955* nr 3» P« 152
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on its own to fill the gaps in an incoherent and weak
regional policy at state level.
The negative role of the Member States, at least from
a regional viewpoint, came to light again in another
case, that of the readaptation of the Hennebaut (France).
The dossier for readaptation had been approved by the
High Authority, but the French Government refused to
take part in the programme, for internal reasons (l).
After a series of protests, the government reluctantly
accepted its responsibility, but never carried out what
it undertook to do conscientiously; the Hennebaut
was finally closed, despite the fact that it was
located in a region with high unemployment and severe
economic development problems (namely Brittany). Other
examples also demonstrate that particularly in this
initial period; governments and national administrations
were reluctant to apply for readaptation, while the
High Authority also showed an unwillingness to press
them very hard (2). The result was that requests
for assistance from the High Authority were sent in
by governments long after workers had become unemployed;
this made readaptation more difficult. These delays
were mostly due to the national administrations. In
order to obtain faster arrangements, a joint meeting
of the consultative committee and the Council of
Europe's sub-committee for local authorities requested
that local authorities should be authorized to ask the
High Authority for readaptation assistance (3). Local
authorities are indeed closer to the realities of the
situation and it seems hardly necessary to involve
national administrations in the first phase, only to
(l) R. Lafont, Decoloniser la France, Paris 1971,
p. lb.
f2) W. Diebold, op. cit. p. b21.
(3) L.P. Suetens, op. cit. p. 229.
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transmit demands. This together with a greater free¬
dom of initiative for the High Authority could have
led to closer cooperation, between European and regional
levels of decision making, and could have obviated
many shortcomings. It is rather surprising and indicative
of the reluctance of governments to permit direct
contacts between the European authority and local or
regional authorities, particularly because in this
case there was the Treaty's provision that governments
had to pay at least half of the costs, which gave them
in practice a veto over the final decision. However,
coordination of ECSC policies and national policies
was certainly not easy in the beginning; the involve¬
ment of local and regional authorities would have
complicated matters even more.
The second case in which ECSC policy came into action,
the Belgian coal crisis, showed most clearly the
necessity of integrating a readaptation policy into a
coherent regional plan. As elsewhere, the High Author¬
ity left the execution of its readaptation to the
government of the Member State itself. This proved
not to be the best solution: it meant that the Belgian
government could easily postpone readaptation and use
the money to cover the operating deficits, with the
result that at the end of the transitional period, the
Belgian coal mines had the same difficulties as in the
beginning (l). Such a short-term policy proved to be
very detrimental for the Borinage as well as for the
Kempen mining areas; the existence of a regional plan,
executed jointly by the regional authorities and the
High Authority, without the interference of internal
political disputes, could have saved the Kempen mines
and made the redevelopment of the Borinage a reality.
However, this is speculation; the High Authority
could hardly press the Belgian Government which was
(l) ¥. Diebold, op. cit. p. 211
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more concerned with keeping a balance between the two
cultural communities than with following a healthy
economic and regional policy.
Belgium had a bad situation in comparison with other
Member States of the ECSC; the cost of mining coal
was higher and productivity lower them in other Member
States. This was particularly so in the Borinage,
which produced 2/3 of the total Belgian output, and
was a result of bad natural conditions as well as in¬
adequate renewal of the installations; in the Kempen
mines, conditions were better.
Therefore the High Authority made a special ruling
for Belgium. A special tax on the coal sold was
imposed on the producers of those states whose
average costs were lower than the weighted ECSC aver¬
age; the funds which this tax yielded were used
for aid for the Belgian coal mines. It was an
example of European solidarity. In the transition
period export subsidies were given by the High Authority
and by the Belgian government, so that the export
of Belgian coal to other states of the ECSC rose
rapidly; but at the same time, as a result of the
establishment of the common market, import of coal
from other Member States increased; so enormous
stocks were building up. It became evident to everyone
that the problem could not be solved that way.
Hopes that the adaptation of the Belgian coal mines
would be realized by the end of the transition period
were dashed. Instead Of eliminating inefficient coal
mines and re-equipping others, Belgian governments
continued to put vast sums of money into mines which
were not viable in the long run (l).
In 1955 the High Authority decided to give increased
aid to four Borinage mines to re-equip them and to close
(l) F. Baudhuin, Histoire economique de la Belgique
1937-68, Bruxelles, 1970, p. 119.
nine others before the end of 1958; aid given to three
Kempen mines and to those of Liege was stopped immed¬
iately. In the late 195&, the High Authority mod¬
ified this policy and divided the Belgian coal mining
companies into three groups: the first group of
twenty one mines were left without subsidies; the
subsidies of four Borinage mines which could not be
adapted were cut off from the beginning of 1957 > the
others continued to receive ECSC aid until the end of
the transition period and were even allowed to receive
two more years subsidies from the Belgian overament.
However, the Belgian Government continued to cover the
losses of the Borinage mines which had to be closed
and made extremely slow progress with the adaptation
and re-equipment of the others. So the result was
that Belgium still had the same disadvantages at the
end of the transition period as at the beginning
(l). The crisis came, as expected, at the time
that all subsidies had to be stopped. Strikes,
involving several deaths and injuries were the price
of a bad policy: the shortsightedness of the Belgian
Government, violation of ECSC rules, weakness of the
High Authority, absence of regional economic devel¬
opment planning would be key words to describe the
situation.
Many problems could have been prevented or at least
solved if the ECSC and the Belgian Government had
worked out a coherent regional policy for the mining
regions. But this was obstructed by the fact that
other economic activities could not be integrated into
such a policy and by the lack of a regional concept
and of legal administrative instruments. We have
noted already that the nature of integration of the
ECSC and the general absence of attention for regional
policy as such did not give much hope that the High
Authority would take a regional approach. In Belgium
(l) W# Diebold, op. cit. p. 211
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itself, the governments dealing with economic problems
looked no further than the immediate cultural ling¬
uistic problems involved, which resulted in a short
sighted policy. Instead of following a strong regional
policy in Wallonia, governments used the money to support
inefficient mines; on the other hand, there was not
enough money made available to re-equip the Kempen
mines, which were in a much better position, comparable
with or better than the position of the mines in Dutch
Limburg and the Aachen basin (l).
In this transition period, the measures envisaged by
art 56,1 have therefore not been used because art 23
of the convention offered an adequate basis (2).
However, before the end of the transition period, a
proposal had already been made to revise art 36.1 in
order to make its application more flexible and efficient
(3).
b. Other policies with regional implications
An important aspect of every regional policy is
transport. Transport tariffs can be diversified to
help industries in peripheral regions or situated far
from their markets to remain competitive; such special
tariffs were used by most Member States. After the
establishment of the ECSC, these tariffs had to be
passed by the High Authority prior to their application,
so as to ensure that they were in conformity with the
treaty. In doing so, the High Authority was not able
to weigh up all the regional policy arguments and adjust
its transport policy accordingly because the Treaty
only envisages integration of coal and steel. Region¬
al policy remains outside the partial economic policy
of the ECSC and transport policy was only part of this
(1) idem, p. 214.
(2) P. Romus, op. cit. p. 308.
(3) European farliament, Kreyssig report 1958,
p. 22 et seq.
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policy in so far as it was related to the coal and
steel industries, directly or indirectly. But it
was impossible to allow special tariffs on a regional
basis, the High Authority had the power to do it on
the basis of ECSC art. 2, namely to avoid fundamental
economic disturbances and the unemployment of workers,
though this does not exclude the closing of enterprises
and offers no basis for giving aid to individual enter¬
prises, since its provisions only cover aid on a
large scale (l).
However,during the transition period, the High
Authority was able to accept special tariffs for
peripheral or underdeveloped regions of France and
Vest Germany on the basis of ECSC art. 10, 7 of the
convention. This was of course only temporary: if the
enterprises in these regions were not viable without
this aid, the High Authority could not prolong its
aid, even if it were necessary from a regional view¬
point .
The European Parliament has pressed the High Authority
to go as far as possible and even further than the
Treaty permits on transport policy matters, because
the obligatory harmonization would make it necessary
for the ECSC to do so (2). The High Authority itself
was inclined to give a regional bias to its transport
policy (3). However, a decision of the Court of
Justice put clear limits on the interpretation of the
Treaty (4).
(1) Receuil de la Cour de Justice VI i960, aff 27-58,
28-58, 29-58 p. 579-581.
(2) European Parliament, Kapteyn Report 1954, p. 18.
3) ECSC, rapport general 1957» P- 23-
4) The Court has stated that the ECSC treaty envis-
sages sectorial integration: therefore the High
Authority cannot take into account all matters related
to regional policy. See Receuil VI, 1 aff 27-28-29/
58. Although this interpretation was legally right,
it was a blow for those who hoped for a more region-
sally conscious ECSC policy from the High Authority.
They had to wait until the fusion of the Institutions
in I965 before something in that direction could be
attempted again.
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The ECSC played a role in the establishment of degress¬
ive international train tariffs, taking into account
the total distance; this can favour certain regions
indirectly if they are provided with a good network.
The ECSC also signed an agreement in 1958 to adapt
internal tariffs on the Rhine to international tariffs,
but failed to obtain an agreement on tariffs concern¬
ing what were called the waterways west of the Rhine;
the system proposed would in fact protect France from
competition from regions with a modern canal system
such as the provinces of Hainaut and East and West
Flanders in Belgium (l).
The most important achievement was the beginning of
the canalization of the Moselle between Thionville
and Koblenz, which connects Lorraine with the Ruhr
and is therefore an important route for these coal
and steel regions. This work was completed in 196^.
In accordance with ECSC art k6,k the ECSC participated
in studies on regional development concerning mobility
and readaptation of workers and has carried out region¬
al employment surveys in coal and steel regions.
This is of interest for all regions concerned, such
studies have the advantage that they consider region¬
al problems from a European viewpoint and that, if
they are used by national or regional authorities,
they give a much wider perspective on a region's
economic chances than studies which consider regional
problems from a national viewpoint at this point,
economic life became more and more European and even
world orientated.
It is therefore clear that the ECSC was handicapped
from the beginning in the field of regional policy
because of the approach of the Treaty: partial
(l) P. Romus, op. cit. p. 30^-
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economic integration with the prior aims of ration¬
al development and expansion of the coal and steel
production. It were the first (shocking) experiences
which made the High Authority aware of the regional
impact of its policies. Though some policies favoured
some regions indirectly, the High Authority never
had (or could have) a global regional policy, not even
for the coal and steel regions, because its powers were
too restricted. Regional development thus was an
accessory and incidental aim; in a certain sense it
was a social policy with regional implications.
The 1952 to 1958 period nevertheless shows a growing
regional consciousness in different Member States and
at European level, Italy and France, having the most
serious regional disequilibria, gradually move towards
more elaborate concepts of regional policy; France
finally established twenty two planning regions. The
Benelux had fewer regional problems (apart from the
Belgian coal regions) and in fact remained without
any proper regional policy; some ad hoc measures were
taken there as in West Germany, where the regions
("Lender") had the advantage of a large degree of
autonomy (l).
The European repercussions of regional imbalances and
the need to find solutions on a European scale were not
yet fully understood. There was no coordination
between ECSC policy and national regional policies;
this had not been envisaged and Member States did not
welcome "interference" from a supra national authority.
In spite of all these restrictions, this period was
useful because it made more people aware of the need to
do "something" for the development of backward regions.
(l) About the evolution in the Member States, see
part I, Chapter I
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2. THE EMERGENCE OF EEC REGIONAL POLICY (1958-I965)
The start of a vast project such as the establishment
of a common market involved various difficulties.
Perhaps one of the most delicate problems was how to
realize the principal aim of the Treaty of Rome while
at the same time taking account of its secondary
but no less significant objectives. Thus the difficul¬
ties resulting from the establishment of a common
market were increased by the request to attend to the
interests of backward regions.
a) The first step towards an EEC regional policy was
to analyse the regional policies of the Member States
in order to examine the compatibility of national
measures with the Treaty's provisions (l). This
approach inevitably led to the domination of the
general aim of economic unification over the interests
of the regions; particularly after the establishment
of a common market, regions with weak economies might
need more assistance in order to maintain employment
and per capita income. However, in EEC art 92-93
the Treaty itself provided the means of softening the
effects of the common market in backward regions, but
the provisions of these articles are not defined
precisely (2); this led to a situation where it be¬
came very difficult for the Commission to intervene
effectively. Once the Member States discovered that
these articles offered a way round the strict rules
on free competition, it became a real compeitition to
see which state could offer the most attractive invest¬
ment aid under the cover of regional aid. Though
such measures must be condemned in principle, because
they do not constitute fair application of the "^Treaty's
(1) Commission, 2e rapport general 1958-59? P« 53»
(2) See Section I, Chapter 1^
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provisions, they probably did contribute to improving
the economic situation in some regions. On the other
hand, this aid given by the Member States not only
distorted competition, but was in fact also given to
regions who did not really need it. It was not until
the third period of EEC regional policy that some
limitations were introduced.
These studies had a second aim: to find the elements
for a common regional policy (l). In the perspective
of long-term economic development, a working programme
had to be established to examine the problems raised
by the "rapproachement" of various regions with unequal
economic development. It is quite remarkable that such
a study was carried out after the Treaty had taken
force; had it been done beforehand, more effective
measures could have been envisaged, if it was pol¬
itically possible. Such a working programme would be
based on an analysis of regional economic structures,
using criteria such as per capita income, unemployment
and GNP per head. However, one of the first discov¬
eries was that no analysis could be made and no
regional policy carried out without first identifying
the economic regions in the EEC. There were two sides
to this problem: the complete lack of harmonization
of the Member States' regionalization projects or
measures and the absence of a definition of a region
in the Treaty; both aspects are linked indirectly.
One comment should be made about these studies. It
seems that the Commission has to study problems for
which it was not or only partly competent, to bring
them into the European arena. It could thus broaden
discussions on some topics without being accused by
governments of exceeding its powers. It is almost
(l) Commission, 2e rapport general 1958-59» p. 53.
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impossible to assess the impact of the many studies
which the Commission carried out on regional or other
problems in the Community, but it is certain that they
broadened the general vision regarding possible
solutions.
Each Member State had defined regions according to its
own historic, geographic, cultural, economic and admin¬
istrative criteria (l). The powers and institutions
of these regions are so different that cooperation
with EEC institutions is very difficult; even
cooperation with each other at the EEC-internal front¬
iers is extremely difficult under these circumstances.
These differences are one of the reasons for the absence
of a clear concept of what a region is in the Treaty,
and indeed for the different concepts behind its various
provisions.
However, just as Member States have felt it necessary'
to establish a regional structure, for the same reasons
the EEC institutions needed regions adapted to the
scale of their policies. They had no powers to establish
such regions, but the Commission could envisage a
comprehensive study of such regional delimitation in the
EEC. The European Parliament is the institution
which from the beginning encouraged attention for region¬
al problems and supported the Commission in this
respect.
As far back as 1958 the European Parliament had indic¬
ated certain aspects of economic policy, though given
only secondary" mention in the treaty, should be includ¬
ed in the EEC policy (2). The establishment of a common
market made regional policy an important aspect of a
long term economic policy but this common market creat¬
ed more and new dangers for the regions' economic
See part I, section II, Chapter II.
European Parliament, rapport nr 54 (Van Campen)
1958, p. 14.
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situationj it also created new possibilities for
regional recovery. The report proposed the full
use of all the powers envisaged in the Treaty to
help underdeveloped regions, including those provisions
allowing exceptions to general rules (l). It nrust
also be remembered that this report already indicates
that regional policy is not only in the interests of
a few poor areas but of the whole Community because
regional imbalances are one of the factors which lead
to excessive fluctuations in the state of the economy
in the EEC (2). This warning was to be forgotten for
a long time ...
The Commission and Parliament were clearly thinking along
similar lines in matters of regional policy. The
Commission took account of Parliament's requests; thus
when custom tariffs for certain products on list G £s)
had to be fixed, the Commission favoured an agreement
which would facilitate economic reconversion in the
regions concerned (3)« However, the general economic
interest prevailed; in the second year of the esta¬
blishment of the common market, it might have been
politically unwise to permit too many exceptions.
In i960 the European Parliament produced its first
comprehensive report on regional policy in the EEC
(4). It stated that the differences in economic
development between various parts of the EEC must be
reduced; not only because the Trea^y said so but
also because it was necessary to make economic inte¬
gration a step towards forming a real community. The
coordination of national regional policy and the





European Parliament, rapport nr 54 (Van Carapen)
958, p. 22.
3) EEC Commission 3 rapport general 1959-60, p. l64.
4) European Parliament, rapport nr 2k (Motte) i960.
[5) Link £ ^ ciAAAXcXetL fct> ESC- , CO^C^A\s<u-CLzJcu^
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be necessary (l). Each economic activity took
place in a certain geographic area and around certain
institutions, and both had a regional character. On
this basis, each Member State had created a different
organization and structure for its regional economic
policy, all of which were analysed in the Report (2).
The report clearly made a more political than legal
analysis of EEC regional policy. It stated that this
must be based on two principles: regional participation
and the introduction of a regional dimension in the
general economic policy together with European infra-
"structure planning (3). No doubt European regional
policy based on such principles would have been
more effective, but it appeared that the EEC instit¬
utions have no legal powers to do more than introduce
a regional dimension into their different policies.
Nevertheless, the report proposed establishing a
consultative committee for regional economies to
provide for institutionalised consultation with the
regions (^). It also proposed that an extensive study
should be made of regional prospects and the possibil¬
ities of using social policy in its widest inter¬
pretation, investment and infrastructure programmes
and other promotional activities such as transport
and energy policy in order to realize the Treaty*s
regional objectives (5)- By making these suggestions,
Parliament seems to be aware of the fact that the
establishment of a customs union favours the strong
enterprises and regions and disfavours the weak if
no adequate measures are taken. This does not imply
(1) idem, p. 1-2.
(2) idem, p. 6-13.
(3) idem p. 17.
(4) idem, p. 18.
(5) European Parliament, rapport nr 2k (i960)
(Motte) p. 6k
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that a custom union in itself is a bad thing for
backward regions, on the contrary, it can offer them
many new possibilities (frontier regions are a good
example of this).
It is difficult to assess the influence of this
parliament airy report on the development of regional
policy by the Commission and the Council. Doubtless
it has prompted them to give more attention to the
regional dimensions of various policies, though the
Commission itself had recognized this aspect already
(l). The Commission in particular must have felt its
position to be stronger with the support of the
European Parliament for its regional thinking, as some
of its further actions prove (namely the organization
of the 1961 conference on regional economies). Other
suggestions, particularly the establishment of a
consultative committee for regional economies and the
elaboration of infrastructure planning, would be
politically impossible to realize. The European
Parliament bases its requests on the necessity of
realizing the treaty's aims, while the Council bases
its policies on the powers conferred upon the EEC
by the treaty. This is the main reason for the gap
between the Council and the European Parliament.
In a resolution, the Parliament encouraged the Commission
to work towards the coordination of national regional
policies and to continue its research into a possible
regional delimitation of the EEC (2). In those days,
the latter problem occupied a prominent place in the
thinking of both Commission and Parliament. The
coordination of national regional policies and the
elaboration of an EEC regional policy appeared difficult
(1) Commission, 3 rapport general 1959-60, p. 16k.
(2) European Parliament, rapport nr 36 (Deist), i960.
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because of the absence of any coherent regional frame-
,work of proper European dimensions. Indeed since
it was impossible to work out an efficient regional
policy at regional level based on out dated admin¬
istrative structures, it w/as a fortiori impossible to
use the same structure for a European regional policy.
The intention of the "Conference, des Economies
Regionales" organized by the Commission in December
1961 were not and could not be to intervene in the
administrative political structures of the Member
States, but only to analyse the most appropriate
possible regional structure based on existing structures
(France, Italy, Germany) or on the largest decen¬
tralized institutions (provinces in Belgium and the
Netherlands). There may have been other secondary
aims too: since 1959 regular meetings had taken
place between top civil servants responsible for
regional policy in the Member States and the Commission
(l). The aim of these meetings was to compare nation¬
al regional policies and to bring together the people
responsible for their elaboration. It appears that
the idea of a large conference on regional problems
in the EEC either originated from this group (2), or
at least received much encouragement from it. Such a
conference was therefore an excellent opportunity to
give an expose to the whole of the EEC not only of the
national policies of the respective Member States and
their goodwill towards poor regions but also of the
different methods in use (centralist planning in
France, more decentralization in Germany and Italy).
For the Commission it was an exercise in public
relations, showing its concern for the European aspects
of regional problems. It all happened in the enthusias¬
tic atmosphere of the first years of the Hallstein-
(1) The activities of this group ceased during the
1965 crisis.
(2) P. Romus, op. cit. p. 213.
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Commission.
The conference made an extensive analysis of regional
problems and policies in the Member States. As the
European Parliament had done in its reports, the
conference agreed on the necessity of developing a
regional policy, without which regional disparities
would increase as a result of the establishment of a
common market (l). Regional disequilibria can no
longer be considered or solved at national level;
indeed, the economic policies of both public instit¬
utions (the EEC) and private companies are realized
more and more on the European level, and regional
policy must follow this shift from the national to
the European level of thinking and decision-making.
The Commission was therefore urged to introduce a full
regional dimension in each EEC policy. All this is
not new: the Commission had made similar declarations,
and so had the European Parliament. Politically it is
significant that these ideas are expressed or at least
endorsed by a large number of independent experts and
by top civil servants responsible for regional policy
in the Member States.
The most important aspect of the conference's activities
seems to be the regional delimitation of the EEC. This
has been done in a pragmatic way, aiming at a compromise
between existing political structures and the objectives
of harmonious economic development. One consequence of
this approach is that all regional delimitations respect
national frontiers, although it is precisely where there
are ar tificial divisions of economically, socially
and culturally linked areas that the need for a European
(l) Documents de la Conference des Economies
Regionales, Bruxelles 1961, C, p. 9«
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approach is most felt. However, that appears to be
politically too delicate a matter and the conference
therefore limits itself to suggestions regarding
increased cooperation and coordination in frontier
regions. Geographic, demographic, social, economic
and political administrative criteria are used to
define thirty one macro-economic regions in the EEC;
besides statistical facts, these criteria include
qualitative elements such as the main economic activity,
transport facilities, existence of large cities and
financial and administrative factors.
The so called "European" regions show a great diversity
in economic development. Income per capita in a few
regions is above the EEC average, but in many others it
is lower; in the latter the growth rate should be
high, in the former low (l). Clearly such a suggestion,
though essential for the realization of a European
equilibrium, could not be followed by the Commission,
which lacks the necessary powers; the control of the
growth rate involves far-reaching powers in the field
of economic planning (medium and long term), a field
in which the Member States are unwilling even to
coordinate, let alone delegate powers to a supra¬
national institution.
Concrete results of this conference are difficult to
find. Some suggestions for an EEC regional policy
had been made earlier and received only a sort of
common blessing at the conference; others could not
be followed up for political reasons. This was the
case with the regional delimitation of the EEC in
particular which received emotional criticism from
some governments (2) and was more quietly blocked by
1) Documents de la Conference, II, p. 162.
2) M. Debre, Region, Europe, Nation, in
Promotions 1966, nr special Nr 77 > P- 13-20.
2k 7.
others. The Belgian government was already opposed
to a regional delimitation of the Kingdom before the
conference; as a result of this opposition (or veto ?),
no macro—economic regions were proposed. The govern¬
ment clearly did not desire what it regarded as
European interference in a delicate internal matter,
particularly because the criteria used by the confer¬
ence were likely to lead to conclusions which were not
in line with the government's ideas about regionaliz-
ation. The Italian Government did not seem very
enthusiastic either; the regionalization laid down
in the 19^8 Constitution had still not been completed,
but political pressures were at the time already
mounting to vote the ftcts necessary to permit the
ordinary regions to function (l). Even considering
that the conference envisaged larger regions than
those delineated by the constitution, its conclusions
still provided many arguments for opposition parties
and regionalists in Italy. This opposition was quite
unreasonable: some Member States, such as the Nether¬
lands and France, would many years later implement
(in silence) conference proposals, the former by the
informal introduction of two parts in the state (north
and south), the latter by putting its regions together
into eight macro-regions for the purposes of the sixth
plan (2).
However, although the Commission hoped that a coherent
regional structure would gradually emerge, based on
existing economic regions grouped together to form
larger European regions -which would provide the frame¬
work for structural analysis and the regional policy
of the EEC institutions (3)» this hope was dashed by
(1) About the situation and evolution in the Member
States, see Part I, Chapter III.
(2) See j>art I, Chapter III.
(3) Commission, b rapport general I96O-61, p.
12^-125.
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the Member States. Perhaps the conference came a
few years too early; the fact that regionalization
was essential for economic planning and the achievement
of harmonious growth was not fully recognized in the
early sixties; it was still a technocratic idea, not
a political concept. However, its lack of a concrete
follow-up also made the problem of regional delimitation
taboo in the EEC for many years to come. National
regionalization plans took no accoant of the conclusions
of the conference; lip service was paid to adapting
the state to the new Europe and other similar phrases,
but regionalization remained an exclusively national
affair, not only in its elaboration but also in its
conception.
The Commission's research after the conference was
almost exclusively directed towards the study of the
regional implications of common policies and of concrete
achievements such as the industrial development pole
in southern Italy and cooperation in frontier regions
(l). The former study continued for another year and
led to the creation of a plant for producing and
processing steel in Taronto-Bari. More attention
was paid to southern Italy, the most underdeveloped
region in the EEC. In order to seek a solution for
the sulphur industry in Sicily, a committee was set
up in September 1962 with the aim of studying the
possibilities of continuing production and the employ¬
ment situation.
One cannot but criticize the hypocrisy of some govern¬
ments. Proposals to establish the basis for a real
European regional policy are vetoed, but European
aid is welcome to realize prestige projects, which do
not necessarily promote the balanced economic develop¬
ment of the region (the steel pole renamed an isolated
(l) Commission, 5° rapport general 1961-62, p. 141-142.
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project); European help is welcome too if the situa¬
tion in a particular industry has become disast rous,
including employment prospects. Enormous amounts of
money are handed out for single, uncoordinated projects
(1)
The European Parliament asked for the establishment
of a consultative committee for regional economies,
an aim which the Commission seemed willing to realize.
Several working parties were set up to elaborate a
global concept of regional policy. On the request
of the German government, these working parties are
composed only of national civil servants, without the
independent experts the Commission wanted (2). Common
meetings of these groups of experts can be held
together with regional authorities (3). This would
help the Commission to work out its common policies
during the second phase (^). However, before these
reports were finished, Parliament sent in a new request.
The Birkelbach Report aimed to give a new impetus to
the development of EEC regional policy after the
conference on regional economies in 1961. The question
of regionalization occupied a much less prominent
place; people resigned themselves to the fact that the
EEC institutions would have to work on the basis of
existing structures and they tried to make the best
of it by being as practical as possible. This was not
a,
said in so many words, but it could be red between the
lines.
Having stressed again the responsibilities of the EEC
regarding regional policy (5) and the consequences of
the common market (6), the report analysed the cond-
ID See further (b)European Parliament, rapport nr 99 (Birkelbach)
1966, p. 29. Q , _
Commission, 6 rapport general 1962-63, p. 138.
k) Commission, 7 rapport general 1963-64, p. 167.
5) European Parliament, rapport nr 99» P- . l-9«
6) idem, p. 9~15«
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itions for the elaboration of a successful EEC
regional policy. There was no longer any mention of
a coherent regional structure in this context. Besides
limiting undesirable evolutions, the report envisaged
an active role fb r the EEC institutions in matters
concerning the professional training of workers (EEC
art 128) , the development of means of communication,
the energy supply and commercial policy (l). Parlia¬
ment, which originally acted as a sort of regional
conscience, seemed to become more an advisory body
of the Commission at this point, carefully considering
the legal powers of the EEC and proposing actions on
that basis. Maybe it could not act otherwise.
Rejecting a geographic or sectorial regional policy,
the report urged the Commission again to work out a
"doctrine generale" (a general view) of regional
policy and to do so in cooperation with the authorities
concerned; any European centralization would have to
be avoided (2). But how realistic was this proposal?
How could the Commission work out a "doctrine generale"
without a clear concept of what a region is in the
treaty without a European regional framework, with
limited powers for regional policy and having to work
with governments unwilling to Europeanize these
matters? According to Parliament, in such a European
regional policy, the various instruments created by
the treaties needed to be adapted to allow a better
functioning (3) and various working parties would
also comprise independent experts and regional experts
(k). The latter would increase the exchange of
information and encourage cooperation between the
Commission and local and regional authorities.
Concrete measures were proposed for agricultural and
(1) idem, p. 16-22.
(2) European Parliament, rapport nr 99 > P* 23.
(3) The most important suggestions are discussed in (b)
(J*) European Parliament, rapport nr 99 > P« 29.
peripheral regions, for regions with economic devel¬
opments based on a single economic activity and
frontier regions. A prominent place was given to
transport policy, which is within the EEC's powers
and can be an important stimulus for regional develop¬
ment; the report also suggested that a policy on
professional training would also be worked out in
conjunction with the redevelopment policy.
The report of the working party showed a similar
tendency to propose practical measures, though the
emphasis was different. The European Parliament
clearly aimed to establish a European regional policy
in its own right; the coordination of national
regional policies, hardly mentioned in the Birkelbach
report was part of such a policy. National experts
saw things differently: national regional policies
would be the principal element of an EEC regional
policy which would in fact consist in the coordination
of these national policies and their completion by
means of EEC instruments, and the inclusion of a
regional dimension in common policies.
Suggestions made in the experts report did not appear
to be fundamentally different from Parliament's report,
except for one point. The idea of basing European
policy on growth poles in most backward regions and
growth poles of a secondary nature in those regions
which are not so far from existing industrial centers
now appeared to have been introduced openly in European
thinking (l). This might become an important aspect
of European regional policy, though the question arises
of whether national authorities would continue to
indicate growth centers mainly on the basis of pred¬
ominantly national priorities; this would reduce EEC
(l) Commission, 8° rapport general 196^-65, p. 178.
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policy in this matter to a secondary role.
Before the Commission proposed a more comprehensive
regional policy, EEC activities were not limited to
research and conferences. Attempts were made early
to follow up many suggestions during the elaboration
of various policies.
(B) It has been mentioned already that the Commission
could do little to stop the Member States handing
out financial aid to regions under cover of EEC art
92-93. The treaty also provides for exceptions to
other policies in favour of regional development.
a) In matters of transport policy, the ECSC treaty
allows the introduction of special tariffs, if agreed
by the High Authority, to support one or more enter¬
prises which are important for the economy of a
region (ECSC art JO, ^tal).
In this way the High Authority has authorized certain
tariffs to subsidize the transport of coal, steel and
metal products from small enterprises; this permission
was always given as a temporary or conditional
measure and the enterprises concerned were usually in
the process of reconversion or closing down. The High
Authority may exercise certain discretionay powers
when granting or withholding its permission. This
led to a famous case in 196k over the application of
special tariffs in favour of the coal and steel indus¬
tries in the Saar which might suffer as a result of
competition from a canal which did not yet exist (the
so-called "als-ob" or "as-if" tariffs of the German
railways) (l). In general however, the regional
impact of these measures was limited; they could
hardly be considered as a contribution to economic
(re) development since they were typical regional




The EEC Treaty too permits support tariffs whose field
of application is much wider than that of the ECSC
treaty. Support tariffs may be granted to regions
as such, and the "Zonenrandgebiete" receive them
automatically. In addition they can be used in
favour of underdeveloped regions as an element of
regional policy.
As urged to do by the European Parliament (l) the
Commission has used these provisions widely, in
particular in Italy (2) and France (3) to support
agriculture and industry in southern Italy and
peripheral regions or regions with difficult access
in France. However, it appears that these excep¬
tions were not an appropriate means of promoting
regional development. In certain cases they can
lead to an uneconomic location of economic activi¬
ties and it is difficult to estimate the benefits
that they constitute for certain enterprises. These
support tariffs, and the way they were used in the
beginning show the limited and often exceptional
nature of the EEC regional policy of transport.
Other aspects requested by the European parliament,
such as a policy for ports (4) had not yet been
covered.
It appears that the Member States have not been very
enthusiastic about developing a real common transport
policy. Recommendations to integrate Member States
and regions into a European system of infrastructure
were hardly followed by the Member States, thus
jeopardizing economic development of peripheral and
frontier regions in particular (5). It is impossible
(1) European Parliament rapport nr 99> P- 35-
(2) Eg. Com. Decision JO nr 38, 17.5.1962 and Com.
Decision JO nr 57» 6.4.1964.
(3) Eg. Com. Decision JO nr 44, 13.3.1964 and Com.
Decision JO nr 57» 6.4.1964.
4) European Parliament, rapport nr 99» P* 35-
5) Doc. Com. (60) 76 final, i960 and Doc. Com.
(6l) 115 final, 1961.
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to assess what has been lost by the delays in the
system
development of a proper European transport /which would
take full account of regional needs, but it may well
be that many regions, particularly frontier regions,
would have profited more from the economic boom which
started in the early sixties if they had been inte¬
grated into the main economic and commercial circuits
in the EEC.
b) One of the EEC's most important policies with far-
going implications for regional economies, is the
common agricultural policy. Underdeveloped regions
all have mainly agricultural economies with a high
population input and low productivity; the highest
productivity and the lowest percentage of active
population employed in agriculture is found in indus¬
trialized regions. The former are also often at a
disadvantage because of unfavourable nature (climate,
soil) or socio-cultural conditions (emigrations, out¬
dated social structures). Unification of the agricul¬
tural markets would have severe consequences for
these regions and might even increase disequilibria
(1).
However, the EEC Treaty itself stipulates that structural
and natural differences between various regions must be
taken into account during the elaboration of the common
agricultural policy (EEC art 39 ) • It is therefore
recognized that a structural policy is needed to
eliminate what is the principal cause of Europe's bad
agricultural situation: its structural deficiencies.
In order to finance interventions in this field, the
FEOGA was established on the basis of EEC art 40 S 4
(2); at the same time, a Permanent Committee for
Agricultural Structures was also created (3)«
1) F. Perrin, op. cit. p. 181.
2) Com. Resolution of 30«6.1960 and regulation nr
23 if Hire Co uncil, JO 20.4.62.
(3) Council decision of 4.12.1962, JO 17*12.1962.
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Such a structural policy must be elaborated for both
the agricultural enterprises and the regions. On the
first level, the social and economic factors must be
considered so as to improve the productivity and the
profitability of the free (family) enterprise (l).
On the regional level, a solution can be found in
general economic development; as agriculture is an
integral part of the economy, structural reforms will
be efficient if they are integrated into a policy of
regional development as a whole (2). It seems that
the use made of the FEOGA was rather limited in this
period and confined in particular to regions of
north-east and southern Italy, the West of France and
Bavaria (3)•
Nevertheless, the FEOGA has a guarantee section and a
guidance section whose activities differ. The guidance
section finances structural reforms, adaptation and
improvement of conditions of production and commercial¬
ization of agricultural products. Originally it was
planned to establish a separate fund for agricultural
structures, but this project was vetoed by the German
Government, which was afraid of having to pay too
much (4). Financial assistance in structural matters
in fact benefits mostly those Member States which
benefit less from guarantee operations (5). As a
result of this opposition, the EEC's role in this
field was reduced, which delayed the improvement of
agricultural structures in many regions.
The Permanent Committee for Agricultural Structures must
(1) J. Bourrinet, Le probleme agricole dans 1'
integration europeenne, Montpellier, {196k) p. 168.
(2) L. Cartou, Organisations europeenes, Paris 1971,
p. 210.
(3) P. Reuter, op. cit. p. ho6.
(k) J. Bourrinet, op. cit. p. 175«
(5) P. Romus, op. cit. p. k06.
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be consulted by the Commission about intervention by
the guidance section. The Member States communicate
to the Commission all information concerning the state
of their agricultural structures, regional conditions,
projects and policies regarding regional development.
The permanent Committee can then ensure coordination
between national and European measures.
The Council laid down certain rules concerning the
interventions of the guidance section of the FEOGA
(l). They concerned the adaptation and improvement
of conditions of production and the commercialization
of agriculture (reg. 17/6*4 art ll). Priority was
given to projects which are part of a plan to encourage
general economic development in the regions in which
they were carried out (art 15 of reg 17/6*4). This
was a particularly important provision because it
encouraged the elaboration of coherent and global
regional development planning and prevented the
implementation of single uncoordinated and thus in¬
efficient projects (2). Further, there was also a
provision for the elaboration of European programmes
indicating the zones which need priority treatment
(reg. 17/6*4, art 16). This provision, too, was an
invitation to the EEC institutions to work out com¬
prehensive plans for backward agricultural regions;
these plans would thus include other policies or at
least coordinate with other policies.
This Council regulation of 196*4 has been the real
start of the functioning of the guidance section of
FEOGA, eight years after the farmers felt the first
effects of the emerging common market. It is academic
speculation, but it would seem logical that if this
sort of intervention had been available from 1958
(1) Council regulations 17/6*4 of 5*2.196*4, JO
27.2.196*4.
(2) It shows also the need for regional structures
able to participate in the elaboration and execution
of such plans, in order to avoid centralization and
inefficiency.
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onwards it would have eased the situation in some under¬
developed regions and given them a better chance to
catch up with more developed regions. Under what is
known as the Mansholt plan, backward agricultural
structures should be replaced by modern, technically
well-equipped agricultural enterprises; greater use
of the structural funds of FEOGA should be made to aid
this transition. This process will inevitably, make
many farmeisredundant, but during the economic expansion
of the sixties their reconversion chances looked better
than in the seventies, when EEC agricultural policy
absorbs more and more of the EEC budget (l).
c) It can be said that social policy is of similar
importance to the EEC's underdeveloped regions as
agricultural policy, since the EEC institutions have
certain powers which can produce a considerable effect.
The ECSC Treaty provides for financial aid to workers
from coal and steel industries who become unemployed
as a result of the establishment of the common market
(S 23 of the Convention on the transitional period
and ECSC art. ^6 for the definitive period). These
aids (2) are aimed to give social protection to workers
and to help their reintegration in economic life.
Strictly speaking, they are not regional measures, but
because coal mining and steel industries are often
located in problem areas; they have indirect regional
repercussions and can be part of an EEC regional policy.
On the basis of ECSC Treaty art. 56 al2, the High
Authority had financed housing schemes for workers
in regions offering reasonable employment prospects;
this was a contribution of considerable importance to
the stability of work forces, because it is estimated
that a large proportion of emigration is for socio-
(1) See also Chapter III S 2, c.
(2) See also S 1.
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cultural reasons and not in the first place for
better financial rewards (at least, if the differences
are not too great).
The ECSC provisions have inspired the social policy
provisions in the Treaty of Rome, though the Italian
government, confronted with a high unemployment, rate,
has pressed hard for it too (l). The EEC articles
concern essentially the establishment of a social fund
(art. 123-128) which would promote employment facilities
and geographic and professional mobility of workers.
It was expected indeed that the disappearance of inter¬
national frontiers would lead to the elimination of
technicall}' backward enterprises; as the^ are often
located in poor areas, the regional implications of
the proposed social fund are inevitable.
The social fund is administered by the Commission,
assisted by a committee composed in equal proportions
of representatives of the Member States, employers'
and employees' organizations; they have formed four
working parties, on underemployment, professional
retraining, reinstallation and revision of the
principles of the social fund. The committee must
be consulted by the Commission on important decisions
but it may also act on its own initiative. The absence
of any regional representation or any form of organized
consultation with authorities from areas concerned is
conspicuous here. Regional expectations must be passed
on through national representatives, which inevitably
may take a different view of their problems (they
will tend to integrate them into their national way of
thinking, whereas European solutions may be needed).
The functioning of the social fund was determined by
several regulations(2), which made precise provisions
for possible interventions (3)« These conditions and
(1) Revue du Marche Commun 1967* b» P» 201.
(2) Council regulation no 9 of 25.8.1960 JO 31.8.1960.
(3) J. Ribas, la politique sociale des CE, Paris
1969, p. 259-264.
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the interpretations made were criticized as too
strict; a technical modification was soon made to
enlarge them (l).
Though it is recognized that the social fund is a
valuable instrument in principle, it has often been
criticized (2). From a regional point of view,
it was stated in the European Parliament from the
beginning that the full success of the social fund
depended on its inclusion in an overall EEC regional
policy (3). In the absence of this, regulations
regarding the social fund made no reference to the
economic situation or the possible evolution in the
regions either. The narrow social interpretation
of the Council was so extreme that it even refused to
finance the consequences of the reconversion of the
sulphur industry in southern Italy from the social
fund (k). In general, the conditions of EEC art.
125 and regulation 9 were too strict to allow
effective application in regions with continuous and
high unemployment (5); thus few workers who really
needed it have in fact benefited from the social fund.
d) It may be inappropriate to describe as industr¬
ial policy the various measures allowed by the
treaties, but they can have an effect on the economic
situation in the regions covered by EEC actions in
this field.
The EEC Treaty provides that, during the transition
period, permission may be given by the Commission to
Member States to apply protective measures if serious
and continuous difficulties exist in an economic
sector or region (EEC art. 226 Si). Aid measures
(1) Council regulation no h7 of 31«3.1963» JO
IO.6.I963.
(2) L.E. Troclet, La politique sociale, in Les
Novelles , p. 961.
3) European Parliament, document of 12.1.1960.
h) L.E. Troclet, op. cit. p. 966.
(5) J. Ribas, op. cit. p. 253.
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may be granted to assist the development of certain
activities or regions, and the treaty mentions ship¬
building in particular (EEC art. 92 S 3» B+C). On
this basis, the Commission permitted state aids for
restructuring, reorganizing and reconverting textile
industries and for shipbuilding; for the latter,
state aid amounting to 10^ of the price of ships
was granted to compensate for competition distortions
on the worldmarket. Both activities were heavily
concentrated in certain regions of the EEC; it
appeared however, that aid was granted to enter¬
prises located in regions with economic difficulties
as well as to enterprises in expanding regions. Thus
shipbuilding industries in some ports received aid
while other industries offered sufficient employment
prospects (e.g. Antwerp). This probably resulted
from national pressures, but did not favour a healthy
European situation.
Interesting pointers for the regional aspects of
industrial policy are the measures granted to aid the
sulphur industry in Sicily and lead and zinc in
Sardinia (l). These industries could not be kept going
because of their completely uncompetitive position.
However, state aid had been permitted during the process
of reducing production and establishing new enter¬
prises and professional retraining of workers. The
net result in Sicily was that much money was wasted
by keeping inefficient mines in production instead of
using all the funds immediately for new and productive
investments in other sectors.
e) The principal institution established by the
Treatyitself to assist economic development in
backward regions is the European Investment Bank
(l) Rapport de la Commission du Conseil 15-H.1963
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(EEC art. 130). It is also the only instrument
directly aimed at regional development (art. 130,
a); projects in underdeveloped regions receive
priority treatment over modernization and conversion
projects or projects of common interest (l). The
protocol on Italy further enforces this priority
for regions of the Mezzogiorno. The European
Investment Bank is also the only EEC instrument
directly accessible for the regions (EIB statutes
art. 2l); the Commission gives advice about the
regional importance of a project.
These projects have to conform to several criteria;
they must be investment projects carried out in one
of the Member States; they must be specific (l) or,
if they constitute an all-round programme, they must
be a group of specific programmes. The EIB inter¬
ventions are suppletitive (statutes art. 18) for
projects which have a certain economic importance and
financial profitability (statutes art. 20).
From 1958 to 1964 the European Investment Bank approved
loans for a total of 422.9 million UA; this rep¬
resented an average of 235» of the investments in
which the EIB participated (2). Most aid went to
industrial projects (in particular chemical and petro-
chwmical projects), followed by transport projects.
The latter projects were selected according to prior¬
ities set by the Committee of Ministers of Transport.
In this period, the EIB put less emphasis on the
agricultural infrastructure sector, where investments
only become profitable after a much longer period.
Italy benefited most from the EIB (735° all loans).
These amounts were paid out to the Cassa per il
(1) Directives generales annex au rapport annuel
1958 de la BEI.
(2) Revue de la B.E.I. 1965, a, p. 444.
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Mezzogiorao. This presented several advantages; the
regions did not have exchange risks and they could re¬
ceive interest rebates and the EIB received a guarantee
from a state agency (l). On the other hand, because
of the Cassa's role and position (2), Italian regions
were bypassed by a state body in dealing with Euro¬
pean institutions. In France, the EIB often co¬
operated with national or mixed economy companies.
Probably the most frequent criticism of the European
Investment Bank was the lack of coordination with
other EEC instruments. This is obviously a result
of the independence which the bank enjoys, though
the Commission gives advice on the regional importance
of projects presented to the Bank. This allows for
a certain degree of coordination. Criticism there¬
fore needed not to be directed at EIB itself, but
at those institutions responsible for the elaboration
of a comprehensive European regional policy. However,
the European Parliament also stressed the need for
more coordination between the Commission's policies
and the investments of the EIB (3)«
CONCLUSION
One cannot blame the European institutions (except
the Council of Ministers) for having neglected reg¬
ional problems in this 1952-1965 period. They did
quite a lot, but it did not add up to a comprehensive,
overall regional policy. Probably the most remarkable
event of this period was the 1961 conference on regional
economies and its conclusions about a regional frame-
the
work in the EEC. It could have been/start of a
European regional policy which was really in accordance
with the objectives of the "treaty. If the Member
il) idem, p. *445.2) See section II of part I, chapter III.3) European Parliament, Opinion of 30»3«1962,
p. 130.
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States had been willing to take account of the
of the conference's ideas about a coherent macro —
regional structure in the Community, if there had been
more planning of regional economic development at
European and national level, if there had been more
coordination between the various financial instru¬
ments at the Commission's disposal, if.... But as
we have seen, the conference reports were heavily
criticised and therefore a lot of interesting ideas
were buried. However, the experiments of this
period were a preparation for the next.
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CHAPTER III
ATTEMPTS AT A MORE COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL POLICY
(1965-1972)
INTRODUCTION
This period opened with two events which were likely
to influence the elaboration of EEC regional policy
and open up new perspectives. In 1965 the EEC
Commission sent its first communication on regional
policy to the Council of Ministers. This document
implicity admits the failure of previous EEC actions
in this matter and proposed a new approach. Then
196s saw the signing of the
unifying the institutions of the three Treaties.
Though the one Commission for the three Communities
would not start work before 1st January, 1967, it
opened the way for a more coordinated and comprehen¬
sive regional policy; the regional measures of the
ECSC Treaty in particular could be more easily inte¬
grated in an overall regional policy, and regional
aspects could be taken into account also in the
execution of the Euratom Treaty. Other factors
likely to influence the EEC institutions were the
increasing consciousness of regional problems in the
Member States, leading to more economic planning and
interest in regionalization, and the completion of the
common market ahead of the time schedule. Towards
the end of this period, attention was shifting some¬
what to the negotiations for the entry of new Member
States, though the EEC regional policy seemed to be
one of the attractions for the candidates.
1. BACKGROUND
The first communication of the Commission to the
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Council on regional policy can be considered to be
both the result of previous studies and research
projects and an expression of dissatisfaction with the
results of regional policy as carried out between
1952 and 1965. The first aspect of the 19^5 commun¬
ication is obvious from its content and is also
indicated by the fact that the Commission completed
its study of the development of southern Italy at
around the same time. This of course was not the
first study carried out by the Commission concerning
the economic problems of a particular region or
group of regions, but it was the first study which
actually led to the establishment of a major growth
pole in an underdeveloped area by the EEC. Its aim
was to try out new methods of industrialization for
large underdeveloped regions (l). These methods
consisted in establishing simultaneously various
interconnected industrial activities belonging to one
branch of industry (e.g. engineering, plus a suffic¬
ient number of other economic and commercial activ¬
ities and necessary public structures to give an
economic coherence to the whole and enable the region's
economy to achieve a real take-off. In other words,
the Commission proposed the sort of approach to
regional underdevelopment for which the European
Parliament had been pressing and which the Commission
itself had recognized as necessary.
The other background element of this communication
seemed a certain dissatisfaction with previous regional
measures. This was recognized expressly by the Comm¬
ission in its general report following the commun-
acation, as if the gravity of regional problems needed
to be underlined again. From 1958 to 19^7» regions
(l) EEC Commission, 9° rapport general, 1965-66,
p. m.
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already in a favourable economic position benefited
most from the common market, but underdeveloped regions
made only slow progress. At this point there
seemed to emerge a general realization of the validity
of warnings based on the experience of the Italian
unification, that without adequate policies the estab¬
lishment of a common market only benefits the econ¬
omically well developed regions. The regional
provisions of the Treaty had been used, but they
only permitted empirical interventions; a global
concept of regiona^isequilibria and their causes
and remedies was absent (l).
Coordination (2) of national regional policies seemed
to be a major failure in this context (3)» Coordin¬
ation is an important means of maintaining solid¬
arity in dealing with regional problems; however,
there has been a real escalation of state aids in
the Member States, which has distorted competition
without bringing a solution for backward regions.
The first communication of the Commission to the
Council on regional policy appeared to be based on
previous reports, in particular the report of the
group of experts (1964). Its principal importance
laij in the concrete proposals aimed to renew EEC
regional policy fundamentally. The Commission propos¬
ed to elaborate regional programmes for each region
in the EEC according to a common method; this would
make the coordination of these programmes much easier.
Urgency programmes would be worked out for regions
with special difficulties while coordination in
frontier regions also appeared to be high on the list
(1) EEC Commission, 10° Rapport general 1966-67,
P. 47.
(2) Coordination still leaves the initiative with
the Member States, but it implies an assessment of
coherence or consistency with Community programmes
or objectives, J.D.B. Mitchell, A view of regional
policy from the outside, 7th Colloque sur les C.E.
Liege 7-9.11.1974, report p. 9.
(3) Idem, p. 46.
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of priorities. The Commission wished to organize
its contacts with regional and local authorities
effectively and also requested more powers for the
social fund and the possibility of giving interest
rebates on loans from the EIB. The latter proposals
had all been suggested earlier in the Parliament
and in various studies.
The opinion of the European Parliament on the first
communication is a most interesting document, which
reveals that Parliament was following the new
trend towards a more technical approach to regional
problems. However, it did make a remark which shows
that the basis of Parliament's approach was still
fco
different from the Commission's concept and close but
not identical earlier reports , namely in expressing
the opinion that in finding a solution for regional
disequilibria in the EEC, the principal problem
is to realize a real political and economic union
(l). The Commission seemed to consider the solution
of this problem more as a necessary correction, which
was not crucial to the EC's future. In the first
communication, the opinion was expressed that a common
economic policy should be worked out integrating
national economic policies and regional policy. But
this seemed difficult to achieve within the existing
framework of the EEC. Parliament therefore suggested
adapting the concepts of regional policy and defining
a framework for coordination and cooperation at the
three main levels of decision-making and executions
the European, national and regional tiers. Regional
delimitation in the EEC had become unmentionable.
One can hardly imagine any efficient cooperation
between European and regional authorities without a
harmonious (but not necessarily identical) structure
(l) European Parliament, rapport No. 58, 1966
(Bersani), p. 5«
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of the latter. Even on purely technical matters,
such as statistics and other means of obtaining
regional information, it seemed very difficult to plan
effectively with the existing regional or ordinary
decentralized structures in the Member States. Govern
ments recognized the need for a regional delimitation
for thoir national regional policy but were unwilling
to accept the same principle at European level, and
thus to take account of the European implications of
their own plans for regionalization (l). Both Parl¬
iament and Commission seemed to have resigned them¬
selves to this imperfect situation (2) though they
were aware of the need for the harmonization of reg¬
ional data and structures (3).
Parliament followed the regional classification of the
Birkelbach report: peripheral, mainly agricultural
regions, frontier regions in the EEC and industrial
regions with difficulties; a new element was that
regions with excessive urban concentration were
included in the latter group. This was a first step
towards including the environmental aspects of
regional policy and to considering more fully the
other side of regional problems (namely over-develop¬
ment). Priorities for intervention should be set
in the framework of an plan outlining the EEC
actions for all regions.
The Commission had proposed that it should elaborate
orientation programmes. Parliament approved but
added a suggestion to the proposed special action
programmes for regional authorities which would help
them to overcome serious difficulties. Interest for
a growth pole policy was increasing in this respect
(1) See Part I, Chapter III.
(2) European Parliament, rapport no. 58, p. l6.
(3) Idem, p. hO; EEC Commission, 1st general
report 1967* P« 229.
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though, in order to avoid concentration, secondary
growth poles spread in a coordinated way over the
region have to be included in these programmes (l).
In such growth poles , the EEC should contribute more
to professional training or re-training (2); the
importance given to this point in every EP report on
regional policy seemed to result from the fact that
the EEC have some concrete and valuable powers at
their disposal in this matter. Parliament also urged
the Commission to cooperate not only with regional
authorities but, in the secondary growth poles, with
local authorities too (3)« The latter point( .ito
receive criticism: H European regional
policy situated within a European economic policy
should not be preoccupied with secondary growth centres
nor with local authorities; the EEC should concen¬
trate on large development projects,( such as the
Bari-Taretnte projects Otherwise, too much decision
making in matters of regional policy might be concen¬
trated on the European level, which is not favourable
for participation or efficiency. However, Parliament's
suggestion shows a concern to democratize the funct¬
ioning of the EEC, as does its own consultation with
regional and local authorities and the establishment of
an intergroup with the executive secretariat of the
"Conference des Pouvoirs Locaux" of the Council of
Europe and the secretariat of the "Conseil des
Communes d'Europe" (*+).
As regards the methods to be used, it has been remarked
already that much attention was given to professional
training both in the first communication and in
Parliament's comments. The ultimate aim must be an
(1) EP, rapport no. 58, p. 21-22.
(2) Idem, p. l6.
(3) Idem, p. 17.
(4) Idem, p. 38.
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employment policy which achieves an equilibrium
between supply and demand at all qualification
levels within the large economic regions (l) of the
EEC (2). Parliament requested a study to be made
of the reasons for emigration, indirectly implying
that they might not be only economic reasons. Much
attention was devoted to infrastincture too, which
is not at all surprising because many regions in the
EEC are the victims of the centralized communication
systems of many states. A European communications
scheme should be worked out as a function of indus¬
trial and commercial policy, making sure that all
regions participate in it (3)«
Together with measures to encourage regional dev¬
elopment, other measures should be taken to dis¬
courage concentration in overdeveloped regions (4).
However, it is not clear on what legal basis the
Commission can do so; this matter depends on the
Member States themselves, and they can at the most
be pushed by the Commission in that direction. Co¬
ordination of both categories of measures is necessary,
as is the coordination of regional policy with medium-
term economic policy. Since the fusion of execut¬
ives has now taken place, Parliament also has paid
much attention to regional measures drawn up on the
basis of the ECSC Treaty; they could now be included
more easily in a global regional policy, particularly
measures concerning reconversion and professional
training (5)» Parliament's request is understandable:
it probably expected that decision-making would evolve
more and more along EEC lines, as indeed it did: the
role of the Council increased generally, and the
(1) This is the only reference to this 1961 idea!
(2) Idem, p. 19.
(3) Idem, p. 22.
(4) Idem, p. 23.
(5) European Parliament, report no. 58, p. 29-31•
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position of the Commission weakened. Parliament also
urged again for the modification of the statutes and
functioning of the European Investment Bank, the social
fund and FEOGA; the guidance section of FEOGA should
work more on the basis of regional planning in order
to obtain a maximum effect on the region's economic
progress. Besides the EIB, Parliament requested the
establishment of a regional development fund which
should intervene for projects in particularly back¬
ward regions with few other financial possibilities
(1).
The first communication of the Commission to the
Council on regional policy and the report of the
European Parliament seemed promising for a new
approach to regional policy in the EEC. However,
even before Parliament's report was completed, a major
political crisis disrupted the EEC (July 1965), in




the first communication did not receive the attention
that could be wished for.
This became apparent when the first medium term
economic programme (1966-70) was published (2). Its
elaboration took place largely during the crisis
and it reflects the nationalist versus supranational
struggle of the time. Its regional policy proposals
are clearly based on the first communication but with
one remarkable exception: instead of the coordination
of national regional policies, as the Commission orig¬
inally wished, the programme mentioned only the confron-
(1) See further.
(2) JO 25.^.1967.
tation of these policies (l). The consequences
of this retreat seem serious. The EEC does not
enjoy the necessary powers to elaborate a coherent
and complete set of regional measures; therefore,
EEC measures must necessarily be coordinated with
national policies. This seems impossible if each
Member State takes its own course as regards reg¬
ional policy, unless one imagines EEC regional
policy coordinated in nine different ways.
Predictably, the European Parliament was anything
but satisfied with the regional implications of the
first medium-term economic programme. It noted
as a positive fact that regional policy was consid¬
ered as an integral part of medium term economic
policy (2), but criticised the lack of precision
about the methods and instruments to be used for its
elaboration. As Parliament saw it, the Commission
was over preoccupied with economic criteria and neg¬
lected the social and other repercussions of
regional policy (3)» Urging again for the elaboration
of medium-term planning for all regions, Parliament
suddenly noted the need to improve the financial
position of communes in the Member States (k) . It
is not unlikely that this suggestion was made under
the influence of Parliament's contacts with the
Conseil des Communes d'Europe or the Conferences des
Pouvoirs Locaux, both very active in these matters.
Strictly speaking, this problem is not (and should
not be) within the competence of the EEC, but it is
another example of the fact that Parliament is the
(1) First medium term economic programme 1966-70,
Chapter 6.
(2) EP, rapport no. 129» P« 23.
(3) Idem, p. 2k.
(4) Idem, p. 15.
only institution in which grass root demands can
publicly reach the European level of politics. It
is certainly a truly democratic aspect of Parliament's
role.
Realising that the first elaboration of EEC regional
policy was making little progress because of the
Council's attitude, Parliament requested the Council to
take the necessary steps to ensure a balanced
economic development (l). There seems to have been
no immediate response. However, as we have seen,
the attention of the EC institutions was now focusing
on the other side of regional problems too and the
Commission carried out a study of the additional costs
of excessive industrial concentration; its aim was
to obtain a better idea of the optimum distribution
of activities and resources throughout the EEC (2).
The Commission also followed Parliament's suggestion
and made a survey of the financing of local authorities,
which revealed that over 505= of public investments in
the Member States are made by regional and local auth¬
orities (3)» This may be a good argument in favour
of direct cooperation between the Commission and
regional authorities. Contacts remained nevertheless
on the level of the exchange of information rather
than active cooperation (4).
In 1969, the Commission took a concrete step towards
better organization of the tools of regional action
in the EEC (5)- this proposal, the basic idea
(1) EP, resolution 8-11.5.1967.
(2) First general report 1967 , p. 231•
(3) Idem, p. 232.
(4) Second general report 1968, p. 291.
(5) Proposal by the Commission to the Council 15.10.1969 ,
JO KrC 152, 28.ll.i969. It was preceded by another
publication which served as an introduction: CE,
Une politique regionale pour la Commohnure , 1969.
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of the Treaty of Rome regarding the regions namely
that the establishment of the common market would lead
almost automatically to more harmonious economic
development, was rejected for the first time in an
official Commission document; at the same time,
it was stated that national regional policies were
inadequate and had not taken account of the common
market. Almost twelve years after the signature of
the EEC Treaty, the Commission openly admitted that
there had been a complete failure to achieve the
harmonious regional development requested in the
Treaty; there had been no approxi.ma.blen of any
significance between the regional economies in the
EEC and this could endanger further evolution towards
European unification (l).
A number of improvements were proposed regarding
agricultural, transport and energy policy as well as
the EIB (2). The EEC should also stimulate national
regional policies to take into account the requirements
and the implications of the establishment of the
common market and the progressive rapproachment of
economic policies (3)«
of
Since the fusion/the executives and the consequent
reorganization of the Commission's services, a
general orientation had thus been established for
regional policy, but the results of these proposals
seem rather limited. Maybe the Commission was following
a policy of advancing little by little so as to avoid
arousing the fears of the Council and the national
bureaucracies again about what they regard as EEC
interference (in a matter where national policies
have been far from successful....).
Regional Bulletin, Trim. 1970* no. 2, p. 3«
They will be discussed further.
Bulletin, p.
The Commission's proposals were not too well received
doubts about the concept then favoured by the Comm¬
ission that regional policy is in the first place
a matter for the Member States. The Commission's
powers were not proportionate to its regional tasks
but it should therefore request that more powers and
better instruments should be put at its disposal.
The Commission should have the means of making its
decisions in this field legally binding if there was
ever going to be any coordination of national regional
policies and their repercussions on the EEC (l).
Parliament criticized the Commission's division of the
regions into frontier regions, congested regions, and
regions suffering from industrial decline and generally
backward economic development, but it did not propose
a real alternative. It also seemed difficult to
imagine other categories, unless non-economic (socio-
cultural) factors were taken into account. This
might be desirable for regionalization but it can only
complicate the elaboration of regional policy, which is
concerned in the first place with economics. The
proposal to establish a permanent committee for regional
development was of course approved, but Parliament
commented that its efficiency would depend on its
composition and its relationship with the Commission
Although earlier reports had already mentioned the
insufficient attention given to the social objectives
of the Treaty, this was repeated, perhaps in the light
of the proposed reforms of the social fund. A new
element was that ecological aspects of agricultural
policy were brought up in the discussion. The
Parliament objected strongly to the Commission's
in the European Parliament. It expressed serious
(2).
EP, Rapport nr 29, 1970, p. 19-
Rapport nr 29, p. 19•
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underlying assumption that agricultural regions were
a priori underdeveloped (l).
In general, however, Parliament approved the Commission
proposal (2). So did the Economic and ^Social Comm¬
ittee whose advice has been requested too by the
Council (3). In its deliberations on 26.10.70 the
Council agreed that the Commission had a responsib¬
ility for regional policy: it also accepted the
fundamental points of the Commission's proposal. But
difficulties arose concerning the practical follow up.
The Council disagreed about whether the proposed
permanent committee for regional development should
come under the Commission (as the Italian government
maintained) or the Council (the French position) or
be placed in the same position as the Committee for
Medium term Economic Policy (4). The Council could
reach no agreement either on the proposed fund for
interest rebates: Italy considered it to be inade¬
quate, France put forward preliminary conditions for
an agreement by requesting "transparency" of national
regional aids. Both proposals would later be
changed fundamentally, but in the meantime they worked
towards the broadening of EEC regional policy.
The Council agreed only that Member States and Comm¬
ission should consult each other permanently on
matters concerning the objectives, methods, procedure
and experiences of regional development; this con¬
sultation should lead to the coordination of object¬
ives, concerted action and even to appropriate
solutions to regional problems at EEC level (5)* It
would be surprising if this sort of non binding
consultations would lead to anything better than in
(1) idem, p. 2k.
(2) EP, resolution 12«5«1970, JO nr C65, 5»6.1970.
(3) ESC, avis 22.4.1970, JO nr 108, 26.8.1970.
(4) 4th general report 1970, p. 90.
(5) P. Romus, op. cit. p. 221.
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the past.
In these circumstances one can understand that regional
policy did not occupy a prominent place in the second
medium-term economic programme (l), which was a compl¬
iment to the first programme. The importance of reg¬
ional policy was mentioned again as well as the links
between other policies and regional policies. There were
no new proposals for the concrete elaboration of these
so often repeated ideas.
A new dimension was added to EEC regional policy after
the decision of the Summit Conference of The Hague
(i2.i2.i969) to realize an Economic and Monetary Union
by 198O. In the Werner Report (2) the urgency and
importance of regional policy was underlined once more.
The establishment of the common market had been possible
without any global regional policy, but the establish¬
ment of the EMU could be seriously endangered by existing
structural differences. This was also recognized by
the Council (3).
The following Commission study (4) introduced a new
argument: the relation between regional disequilibria
and inflation. The greater the regional disparities,
the greater the tendency to inflation; but it is not
only the underdeveloped regions, but also the congested
regions which are a source of inflation and tend to
strengthen exterior inflationist tendencies. The
realisation of the objectives of the EMU is made more
difficult.
However, in the elaboration of the third medium—term
economic programme, at a time when inflation was becom¬
ing a great problem indeed and unease about regional
disparities was increasing in many Member States, the
(1) £0 no. L 129, 30.5.1969.
(2) JO no. CI36, ll.ll.i97O
(3) JO no. C 28, 27.3.1971.
(k) Doc. XVl/137/71, 19.10.1971.
absence of a political will to do anything about it
prevented any significant progress. However, the
third medium«term economic programme (1971-75) (l)
requested national regional policy and planning to take
more account of the regional dimensions; better co¬
ordination of both and of infrastructure policies
in particular could prevent economic incoherence and
financial losses.
Though it is difficult to define precisely the inter¬
relation between regional thinking at national and
European level, it seems that increasing emphasis
on certain aspects (ecological, planning) of regional
problems in the Member States is followed by attention
for these aspects at European level. The main exception
concerns structures; where as in the Member States
the necessity of establishing some form of regions
was now recognised (2) the idea of the regional
delimitation of the EEC remains forgotten. It was
indeed politically impossible, but it had the negative
effect that regionalization was carried out in each
Member State without any reference to the EEC and
its possible repercussions on the structures and
powers of the regions. Of course, lip sendee is
paid everywhere to the idea of regionalization in a
European perspective, but there is not even a thought
of harmonization or coordination (3).
Real progress was made at the Council meeting of
6.7.72 where it was decided to use the FEOGA from
1972 onwards for activities concerning regional develop-
1) JO no. L b9, 1.3.1971.
2) See Part I, Chapter III.
(3) See S. Schepers, De Belgische gewestvorming
europees bekeken, in Kultuurleven 197^> nr 8, p. 863
et seq; S. Schepers, Loopt de Nederlandse gewest-
rvorming uit de Europees pas? In Tijdschrift voor
Openbaar Bestuur 1975 nr 15» P« 337 et seq; R.A.Iv.
Rhodes, The European dimension of the Kilbrandon
Report, in New Europe 1973/^ nr k.
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merit and to establish a regional development fund or
another system to allot EEC funds to regional develop¬
ment (l). This resolution, which was a further
elaboration of the Council resolution of 27.3*71»
invited the Commission to make proposals in accord-
the
ance with this/previous resolution, part 3» section
4. It looks as if the Council was trying to make
progress as slow as possible, because the Commission
had already made similar proposals in 1969. However,
as we have indicated earlier, the emphasis in the
FEOGA was swinging towards a more regional approach.
Not surprisingly, these basic proposals of 1969 were
reiterated in a communication from the Commission
to the Council of 19.6.72; it stressed the importance
of a regional development fund as the most suitable
instrument, and emphasised the need to make a more
coordinated use of the limited existing financial
resources. This Council resolution was received
favourably by the European Parlanent (2) and the
Economic and Social Committee (3)> but in spite of
this, no progress was made towards a final decision.
The Commission proposals were discussed again on
23.9.72, but a decision was deferred until after
the forthcoming Summit Meeting in Paris.
2. POLICIES
Whereas little progress was made in the elaboration
of a coherent and global regional policy because of
the reluctance of the Member States, the EEC seems
to have a better record as regards bbA policies.
This was probably a result of greater experience
as well as greats awareness of regional problems
on a European scale.
(l) JO nr C 38, 18.4.1972.
2) JO nr C 36, 12.4.1972.
3) JO nr C 21, 23.3.1972
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a) Regional aids continued to exist during this period.
Because of the continuing coal crisis, the High Author¬
ity authorized Member States to give aid to enter¬
prises to carry out social obligations and ration¬
al ization investments (l). These aids were auth¬
orized if the adaptation of these enterprises to
new conditions on the coal market could lead to
serious economic and social difficulties in the
region concerned (art. 5 of Decision 63-65). This
decision has been renewed several times, last in
1970 (2). Member States have also been authorised
to continue their aids until 1978 for coal mines
producing cokes (3).
These decisions showed that state aids, although
originally forbidden by the treaty, had become a
general rule for coal mines. Though many have reg¬
ional implications in the sense that they maintain
employment and social benefits in certain regions,
these aids are no real assistance to regional dev¬
elopment; they only delay the closing down of
certain enterprises. As such they can be useful
if they are part of a global plan for regional
reconversion.
For a long period, Member States used EEC art. 92
to hand out state aid in an almost indiscriminate
manner. In 1968, the Commission made a first attempt
to exercise soipe control: on the basis of EEC
apt. 93 S 2 it requested governments to notify it of all
projects before their final approval if they exceeded
500,000 UA. In July 1969 the Commission requested
Member States to provide more information to permit
(1) ECSC decision nr 3-65 of 17.2.1965, JO nr 31,
25.2.1965.
(2) ECSC decision nr 3-71 of 22.12.1970, JO nr 13»
5.1.1971.
(3) ECSC decision I9.i2.i969, JO nr 12. 6.1.1970.
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a better insight into the regional sharing out of these
aids. However, negotiations over these relatively modest
requests took quite a time, and it was in fact two years
before the first significant step towards the co¬
ordination of national regional aid was made in the
form of a Council resolution (l) and a Commission
communication to apply it as from 1.1.72.
This Council resolution applies only in central or
industrialized regions, thus excluding Berlin, Zone-
•nrandgebiete, the west of France and the Mezzog-
iorno. The maximum regional aid in these central
regions is fixed at 20c/c of the net investment cost.
It is also decided to make all aid publicly known,
which is essential in order to arrive at efficient
coordination and to adapt the amount of regional aid
to the gravity of the problems. The effects of
regional aid on different economic sectors must also
be appreciated. According to EEC art. 93 8 2, the
Commission can declare certain state aids to be in-
'compatible with the common market. Since 1958, the
Commission has examined several dossiers, but it appears
that a rather permissive attitude has been taken in
most cases.
In 1971j however, the Commission attempted to abolish
a provision in German law (Kohlegesetz of 15«5»6S)
which allowed enterprises moving into coal regions
to deduct 10°/c of the investment costs from their
income(2). The German government did not agreejthe
ease was brought before the Court of Justice, which
rejected the Commission's complaint (3).
What was perhaps a more important intervention of the
Commission concerns the Belgian expansion law of
(1) Council resolution of 20.10.1971, JO nr C
III, 4.2.1971.
(2) Commission decision of 17.2.1971, JO nr L
57, 10.3.1971.
(3) JO nr C 93 8.11.1973. But in fact the decision
also strengthened the Commission.
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30.12.70, which prolonged the 1959 19&6 laws,
without modifying the regional application areas,
though conditionsin each of them have changed con¬
siderably. This was the principal reason for the
Commission's intervention (l). The Belgian govern¬
ment then communicated to the Commission a draft
law defining new development zones; 4l out of 44
arrondissements of the state were considered as
such. In a Decision of 26.4.72 (2) the Commission
indicated the regions within which the government was
allowed to define development zones and invited the
Belgian government to make a new proposal within two
years. For internal political reasons, this has not
happened and thus development areas defined in 1959
and 1966 continued to be used;for more than four
years, areas not in need of it continued to receive
regional aid.
It is remarkable that the Commission has been so
careful in approach to this problem; as in
1961, when no regional delimitation was worked out
at the Conference on regional economies, the Commission
seems to have taken care not to become involved in the
uneasy relations between the two cultural communities
and the attempts of the government to regionalize
the state. However, it might well be easier for a
European authority to obtain what would certainly
be more effective results.
The French overnment, too, envisaged a system of
financial aid which was indiscriminate in its sel¬
ection of the regions to benefit from it. However,
after a Commission intervention (3)» the system
was readjusted.
1) JO nr C 32, 6.4.1971.
2) JO nr L 105, 4.5.1972
(3) JO nr C77, 15.7.1972 and JO nr C 33, 23.5.1973.
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National regional aid is bound to have reprecussions
on a European regional policy. Until 1972 there
was virtually no control or coordination and aid
was given to regions not really in need of it.
Underdeveloped regions suffer doubly from this
policy: they receive less financial aid and the
more advanced regions strengthen their economic
position further. An important aspect of the
Member States' reluctance to establish a more open
and honest system may have been the fact that state
aid had become a means for the government to "buy"
a region's favours. Every MP wants something
to be given to his district, whether it is in need
o r no t.
b) Still in the same category of regional aid, the
High Authority and later the Commission authorized
the continuation of special transport tariffs for
coal and steel. Special freight rates for coal and
steel enterprises in the Saar were authorized in 1969
in order to give the government time to finalize the
measures announced for the reorganization of the coal
and steel industries in the Saar and of its regional
economy as a whole (l). Special tariffs were also
permitted for consignment of coal and steel products
from Lorraine, Decazeville and the Centre Midi (2),
Cevennes, Auvergne and Dauphine (3)* There were
hardly any French regions where coal and steel
industries did not benefit from special rail tariffs.
This together with direct aid meant that these regions
received considerable assistance to maintain enter¬
prises which were economically not really viable. In
1970> the Commission proposed that the Council should
modify this situation and replace the aid system in
(l) Commission, 3° general report 1969 , p. 283.
2) JO L 192, 5.8.1969 and JO L 220, 1.9.1970.
3) JO 70/305 and JO 70/^03.
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the Member States for the coal mining industries (l).
Member States should take more account of regional
forecasts; the Commission would establish a direct
link between the authorization granted for financial
aid by the Member States and the elaboration of a
regional development programm (2).
It is clear here that the fusion of the executives has
brought some positive effects in matters of regional
policy too. Though the Commission is bound by the
provisions of the ECSC treaty, it seemed to take more
account of the regional implications of its policies
and to try to make full use of the regional possibilities
offered by the provisions concerning aid and transport
by urging Member States to elaborate comprehensive
programmes in which these measures could play a part.
This is the sort of thinking which comes more from
the EEC itself than from the ECSC Treaty (3).
On the basis of the Rome Treaty, the Council had
already decided in 1966 that the regional implications
of transport policy should be taken into account (4).
On the other hand, it seems that the Commission was
unwilling to make too extensive a use of special
tariffs, precisely because they cannot provide a
fundamental solution to regional economic problems.
Thus the reduced tariffs for fresh fruit and vegetables
from southern Italy had to be cut by 50/° on 1.1.70 and
cease completely as from 1.1.71 (5). Better infras¬
tructure is often a condition sine qua non for
regional development. Under a procedure laid down by
the Council on 28.2.66, the Commission has consul¬
tations with Member States on investment projects
1) Decision 3/65 of 17-2.1965* which expired on 31.12.1970.
2) Commission, 4th general report 1970 p. 95»
3J See Chapter II S 1, B.
k) Council decision of 28.2.1966.
(5) JO L 281 of 20.1.1967 and JO L 281 of 2O.ll.i968.
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regarding roads and inland waterways (l); the results
do not seem to be satisfactory, and can hardly be if
no European infrastructure plan is worked out.
Consultation alone cannot be enough in planning matters:
Member States will still continue to plan according
to national needs.
Transport is also an important public service in
modern societies. The Commission has recognized
that regional economic problems can arise by abolish¬
ing their public service obligations; in so far as
they are essential to guarantee adequate transport
services, they may be maintained (2). However, the
costs of public transport are particularly high in
congested areas, where in fact the whole state shares
the burden; it might be advisable to have these costs
borne by these congested and wealthy areas them¬
selves, which would certainly reduce further conges-
t ion.
c) Regarding agricultural policy, the Commission has
continued its policy along the same lines as in the
previous period. Regulation 17/6*4 allowed it to
make better use of FEOGA to improve agricultural
structure in backward regions. T£.e Commission seemed
to take the view that the efforts of public author¬
ities should vary according to the type of region and
should aim at the creation of new jobs (3).
These points were taken up again in the memorandum
on agricultural reform (*4) for example, which included
some points of direct interest for regional policy.
This so-called Mansholt plan opted for large agricul¬
tural enterprises, the cultivation of good land only,
market equilibrium in order to reduce subsidies and a
(1) Commission, 2nd general report 1968, p. 281.
(2) Council regulation nr 1191/69, 26.6.1969.
(3) Commission, 2nd general report 1968, p. 281.
(*4) European Parliament, doc. 19*4/68 22.1.1969.
285.
reduction of the number of farms from ten to five
million. The repercussions, if this plan u>
realized, will be particularly felt in underdeveloped
regions; the memo therefore envisaged an active policy
of economic reconversion in these regions. However,
the latter seem to have been absent in the first series
of proposals from the Commission to the Council on the
realization of these reforms (l). To remedy this
omission, the Commission proposed in 19&7 ten "Community
programmes" to be carried out in backward agricul¬
tural regions (2), but none of these was accepted by
the Council. These Community programmes were an
interesting European regional development experiment
which might have succeeded where national governments
had failed (which was probably the reason why they
blocked it). Valuable time was therefore lost before
the reconversion of agricultural regions was started;
the negative effects of agricultural reforms thus
happened before any counter balance (namely industrial¬
ization) was introduced. This situation was agg¬
ravated because national governments took very little
account of the European dimension of their regional
policies; as we have seen, they continued to plan and
execut e regional measures as they did before the
establishment of the EEC, despite the fact that the
EEC had changed economic conditions in general.
A new series of proposals in 1971 brought better
results (3). They envisaged the use of the guidance
section of FEOGA for projects which are part of a
regional development plan and which create employment
for people leaving agriculture. Non-agricultural
enterprises could receive a grant of 1^500 UA for
each new job created for farmers. The guidance section
of FEOGA would also provide financial assistance to
1)
3)
jo c 70, 12.6.1970.
jo nr 25^» 20.10.1967.
jo C 90, 11.9.1971 and jo C 21, 3.3.1972.
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encourage farmers over fifty five years of age to leave
agriculture (l).
These measures marked the beginning of a more regional¬
ized agricultural policy. In view of the fact that
all underdeveloped regions are highly dependent on
agriculture, this policy is likely to increase the
efficiency of EEC regional policy.
d) Whereas in the previous period the European
Investment Bank had to work out its administrative and
fiscal arrangements, from 1966 onwards there was a rapid
growth in its activities (2). The priorities set
previously remained the same: the development of
backward areas, the improvement of the European transport
infrastructure, the reorganization and modernization
of industrial structures and development of associated
states; most loans went to regional projects (3)« In
1968 the Bank started a system of overall loans to help
the development of small and medium sized enterprises.
This is of special interest for regional development:
sometimes a major industry was implanted in a backward
region which could not generate economic development
on its own; small and medium sized enterprises can
bring a more complete and harmonious economic structure
to the region. The Bank also increased its financing
for projects of joint interest to several Member States,
for example, industrial cooperation projects or infra¬
structure works; the latter are important to improve
transport facilities in frontier areas and these are
areas where transport facilities are often outdated,
incomplete and inadequate for modern economic life.
The enlargement of the EEC to include Britain, Ireland
and Denmark brought some adjustments in the functioning
of the Bank. The new Member States contributed to the
statutory reserve and the new capital of the bank
amounted to 2^070 million UA; 20c/c is paid up by the
(lj JO nr L 96 23.4.1972.
(2) European Investment Bank Bulletin 1969 nr 3> P« 10•
(3) Until 1972, ip to 2/3 of the total loans granted
went to regional development. See EIB Bulletin 1973
nr 6, p. 121.
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Member States, 1/5 in national currency and the balance
in treasury bonds. The Board of Governors now
comprises nine members and the Board of Directors
eighteen(and ten supplementary members).
However, the Bank\continued to receive criticism too.
It was thus suggested that the dossiers of applications
for credit from small enterprises should be assembled
and dealt with collectively by specialized financial
institutions on a regional basis (e.g. the "societes de
developpment regional" in France and Belgium)(l). This
would allow the European Investment Bank to plan its
operations on a more regional basis. It also suggested
cooperating with governments to establish provisional
regional budgets and programmes of action in order to
be able to act in advance (2). Such action, however,
can only be fully adequate if it takes place within the
framework of a general European regional plan, which in
its turn requires the existence of a harmonious regional
framework.
e) Regarding social policy, the principal EEC activity
with regional repercussions to be mentioned in the reform
of the social fund. Though it is agreed that the social
fund is a valuable instrument in principle, its func¬
tioning has often been criticised inside the European
Parliament and outside. A technical modification
(Council decision 47/63) was thus followed in 1965 by
a Commission proposal for a more fundamental reform;
the Commission suggested changing regulation nr 9
(on the basis of EEC art. 127) and a complementary
regulation (on the basis of EEC art. 235) • Both ideas
were received favourably in the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee, but the Council
refused to accept the latter part of the Commission
proposal before the end of the transition period
(3). In this vray, years were lost before the social
1) S. Barzanti, op. cit. p. 176.
2) Idem, p. 177.
(3) Only Council regulation nr 37 was adopted, JO
24.2.1967.
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fund was adapted to the economic and social realities
of the common market. Up to 1972, the general results
of the social fund nevertheless remained positive:
225,8 million UA were spent for the professional
re-eduation of about 800,000 unemployed workers and
9. *4 million UA for the resettlement of about 704,000
workers who had become unemployed. However, many
other unemployed workers did not benefit from it.
On IO.6.69 the Commission sent an Opinion to the Council
about the reform of the social fund (l). It argued
that a reform was necessary because of the difficulties
of maintaining employment in various regions: this led
to an unt>oJcmce.<jL economic development in the EEC
which was clearly not in line with the Treaty of
Rome. The Commission wanted to make the social fund
more suitable for the professional retraining and
geographic mobility of workers in regions where a new
economic take-off required the regrouping of economic
activities around one or more development centres. It
also wanted to give more attention to the integration
of handicapped people in economic life. In order to
obtain a balanced economic growth and optimal employ¬
ment conditions for the population, it would be nece¬
ssary for some regions to make a structural change,
and in such cases the social fund must be available
to assist workers. The European Parliament (2) and
the Social and Economic Committee (3) were rather
favourable to this in general, but still it was not
until 1971 that a fundamental reform was finally
agreed upon (4).
(1) jo c 131, 13.10.1969.
(2) JO ■ : C 2, 8.1.1970.
(3) JO C 26 of 4.3.1970.
(4) Council decision ofl.2.71, JO £2.28, 4.2.71.
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The aims of the social fund now had more regional
implications : _ , «.■_ -
bhe social fund would intervene if the employment
situation was affected in some regions of the EEC;
it would also aim to reduce structural underemployment
and unemployment in several regions of the EEC. The
formulation of these objectives permitted the Commission
to integrate the social fund more fully into a global
regional policy.
These objectives have been elaborated by several
regulations which envisage the intervention of the
social fund if persistent and serious employment
problems arise in regions with a backward economy or
where the main economic activity declines; these
operations must help the execution of regional programmes
to change fundamentally the causes of such social
problems (1).
Theue are two main advantages to the new social fund:
it can help in the first place to create employment
possibilities in regions which always have suffered
from emigration, even to the extent that in the medium
and long term, skilled workers can return to their
regions of origin and find suitable jobs; secondly,
it can allow a financial transfer to the less prosperous
regions of the EEC.
(l) Council regulation nr 2396/71? nr 2397/71 and
nr 2398/71 of 8.11.71, JO nr L 2^9 of 10.11.71.
Further note about the presentation of requests to
the social fund, JO nr C96 20.9.1972.
290.
CHAPTER XV: A NEW START?
INTRODUCTION
Under the Ortoli Commission (1973-1976), European
regional policy seemed to make a new start; whether
it was also an improvement needs to be examined. For
the first time, a Commissioner was given regional pol¬
icy as his principal responsibility, whereas his
predecessors always had to take on other tasks too.
This would certainly facilitate the elaboration of the
EEC regional policy and favour coherence in particular.
But it is not the main reason why we consider the period
from 1973 onwards as a third phase in the elaboration
of EEC regional policy. In fact, the start was made
two months earlier, at the summit conference on 19-21
October 1972 in Paris. In the final declaration of
the conference, special attention was given to regional
policy and the establishment of a regional development
fund was decided. The other event of importance is the
enlargement of the EEC with three new Member States
(Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain) which dates in
practice from 1.1.73* Great Britain and Ireland in
particular put a new strain on EEC regional policy
because both suffer from serious regional imbalances
and parts of Ireland are among the most backward areas
in the Community. The enlargement of the EEC, the
new prospects opened by the 1972 Paris summit and
the appointment of a special Commissiorcrare sufficient




The start of new EEC regional policy was made at the
summit conference in Paris on 19-21st October, 1972.
The moment was well chosen: the enlargement of the
EEC gave regional backwardness a different and wider
perspective than the traditional problem areas of the
Six (l). Now the extreme northern and western regions
of the Nine needed assistance too, whereas previously
most attention went to the South of Italy and the West
of France. Moreover, Ireland in particular expected
a great deal from its richer partners; in the case
of the United Kingdom, regional aid from the EEC was
used as a means of making people in Scotland, Wales
and other problem areas more sympathetic ta the idea
of European integration. The heads of Government
and State could not teJb them<j[^.
Once more, a high priority was given to the objective
of reducing the regional and structural dfcseauilibria
in the EEC which could affect the realization of the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Every statement
of that kind was in fact also a recognition that
previous policies had failed. It is remarkable that
the summit declaration related regional policy to the
realization of the EMU; the EEC Treaty (in its preamble
right. This is not necessarily a negative attitude:
it could prompt the EEC institutions to draw up a
planning concept of regional policy in the framework
of common economic and monetary policies elaborated for
the realization of the EMU. However, this was not
how the heads of government saw it; there was no
(l) EC Commission, Sixth General Report, 1972.
and art 2) own
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enlargement or even a hint of a trend in that direction
of the EEC concept of regional policy as practised
until 1972. Some Member States (France in particular)
had moved towards a different approach to regional
policy than they had had at the time of the signature
of the Treaty of Rome; regionalization was under way
in all Member States or had already been realized. But
it would affect their sovereign ty to allow the EEC to
elaborate overall planning of regional economic develop¬
ment; it might bring up again the subject to regional
delimitation in the EEC. However, the inherent contrad¬
iction in the establishment of a relationship between
regional policy and the EMU and the refusal to enlarge
the concept of such a policy never came to light because
the idea of an EMU was delayed indefinitely a few years
later.
The declaration contains two concrete points (besides
an invitation to the Commission to write yet another
report on regional problems, this time in the Nine).
The Member States agreed to coordinate their, regional
policies. They should have done so years ago but
better a late beginning than none; what this coordin¬
ation implied and how it was to be achieved remained
an open question in the Paris declaration. But the
establishment of a European regional development fund
received the most publicity; an institution which
will give away money to finance projects for regional
development is always a nice thing to bring home, at
least if one is not a head of government of one of the
"paymaster-states" (West Germany, the Benelux, Denmark).
A European regional development fund was not a new prop¬
osal: something similar had been suggested already in
1955 at the Messina conference and in the Spaak report
(1956), namely a European investment fund which would
finance infra-structure and economic development
projects in backward regions. But the idea was dropped
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because the German and Dutch governments thought that
it would be too" dirigistt; the European Investment Bank
(and the Social fund) came instead. The idea was taken
up a few times in the European Parliament, but it never
had a real chance until the enlargement of the EEC when
it was suggested as one of the great attractions of
joining.
However, the setting up of the ERDF met with opposition
from West Germany and, to a lesser extent, from the
Benelux states. The official reason was the large
amount of money which they would have to pay to the
ERDF; per capita, Belgium is the largest and West
Germany the second largest to the EEC
budget (l) and all four states (Benelux, Germany)
contribute more toother institutions of the EEC than
they receive from it. Disillusionment about the
anti»European feelings in the United Kingdom in
particular was probably the principal reason for the
sudden outburst of public resentment as yet another
supplement to these countries' financial burden. In
West Germany some politicians also feared that the fund
would become too interventionist in the economic life
of the Member States. This explains why a Council
resolution of 6.3.72, deciding to establish the ERDF,
or another financial system for spending the Community
resources for regional development, was not actually
implemented.
The problems concerning the establishment of anERDF also
indicates a certain decrease in the political standing
of the Council of Ministers. Its powers were legally
unchanged, but the institution of regular meetings
with the tleads of State (in fact only one, the French
president) ariGovernment has created a tendency to
leave difficult issues to be decided in principle at
(l) According to an Article in European-Union,
1976 November, p. 1. to Aujl*lAXAeAxbi- iav.
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the summit conference (l). Thus it was agreed at the
1972 summit in Paris to set up an RDF before 31.12.73.
The Commission put forward its proposals to the Council
on 31.7.73, and the Council invited the European
Parliament to present its advice about the proposed
decision to establish a Committee for regional policy,
about the proposed financial regulation and about the
proposed regulation to establish an ERDF (2). Another
proposal was added concerning the list of regions and
areas referred to in the proposed regulation establishing
an ERDF (3).
According to these proposals (k) the ERDF was to be a
Community supplement to the regional policies of the
Member States and not an alternative. Though the
latter was politically impossible during the elaboration
of these proposals, the Commission appeared again to
take a minimalist view of regional policy. A fund is
in itself not an alternative for the variety of measures
existing in the Member States and at EEC level, but
it could be used to introduce a more comprehensive
regional policy at EEC level to which national reg¬
ional policies would be submitted. Both the resolution
of the Council of Ministers of 6,J>. 72 and the 1972
Paris summit declaration had related theIRDF and regional
policy to the objective of establishing an EMU (5)«
Such a union implies a transfer of decision-making
power over internal economic matters, including reg¬
ional policy; the Member States must also transfer
(1) A. Shlaim, De rol van topoverleg in de EEG-
besluitvorming, in De Internationale Spectator 197^
p. 325 et seq.
(2) Commission doc. (73) 1171 def.,(73) 1170 def.
(73) 1218 def. JO C 86 of l6.lO.i973.
(3) Commission doc. (73) 1751 («J0 C 106, 6.12.1973)-
(4) About the final structure and functioning of
the ERDF, see S 2.
(5) Report to the Commission & the Council on the
realization by stages of an Economic and Monetary Union
in the EEC, EEC-Bulletin 1970, no. 11 (supplement}.
the author of this report, Trime Minister Werner of
Luxemburg, seems to have put much emphasis on this. See
R. McAllister, in J. Cornford (ed). op. cit. p. 190-
191 and his comments on the Werner Report.
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the monetary powers which they used to adjust their
currencies every time that their economy got out of
step because of deficient sectorial or regional
structures. But such asystem is only possible if
each national economy functions in such a way that
protective measures are largely unnecessary; regional
economic policy is a means of achieving that aim. But
(as we have seen in the first part) national regional
policies are not an effective means of reducing regional
imbalances; the conditions for an EMU are thus not
yet fulfilled. Faster European integration is only
possible if Member States and the EEC pay particular
attention to backward regions, but some Member States
do not have sufficient resources to be able to do so.
Thus, while waiting (l) for the EMU, which will perform
only EEC actions, the EEC must increase its supplementary
role by establishing this new instrument. Indeed, it is
hoped that the ERDF will direct more capital to
backward regions; to make this possible, it appeals for
financial solidarity between the Member States.
Not enough time has yet passed for a solid judgement
but it may well be that this view could be behind the
ERDF's lack of success, together with its relatively
limited financial resources. The ERDF risks becoming
a supplemfert to regional policies which have proved
in most cases to be unable to reduce the economic
gap between developed and backward regions. Regional
development planning, in those states where it is
practised, does not take account of the European
dimension either. The EEC could at least supple¬
ment this in the case of frontier regions, but it
does not have the powers to do it|xj. Member States
(l) It is certainly true that the link between
regional policy and the EMU has been over emphasized.
See J.D.B. Mitchell, op. cit. p. J. This has resulted
in the delay of further EEC regional innovation when
the objective of the EMU was delayed too.
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are not very efficient either in reducing the growth
of over developed regions, and the EEC can do nothing
because it would be against the spirit of the Rome
treaty which aims at economic expansion in general.
Was it really impossible to have the Member States
coordinate their regional policies with a European
plan for regional development, prepared by the Comm¬
ission and approved by the Council? The risk of
incidental and geographically dispersed interventions
by the ERDF, as criticised in the European Parliament
(l) would then be greatly reduced. A European plan
of this nature would be very useful because many back¬
ward regions are located on the internal frontiers
of the EEC or on the periphery; as a supra-national
institution, the Commission is better placed to single
out and assist such regions independently of national
political considerations.
An attempt could have been made to persuade the Member
States to agree to some general principles concerning
slowing down economic growth in over developed reg¬
ions and speeding it up in backward regions (i.e. those
regions whose average income per capita is higher or
lower than the EEC average); the argument could have
been used that this would make the ERDF, which some
governments wanted so much, really effective. Parlia¬
ment would certainly give its support. The opportunity
was lost because of the Commission's view of its own
role: the Ortoli Commission took the (gaullist) view
that the Commission is an auxiliary instrument of the
Council and not a supra-national political body, or
the motor of European integration. Its proposals
concerning the ERDF prove this, as do the debates in
the European Parliament where the Commissioner for
regional policy warned MPs several times to beware of
what he saw as unrealistic suggestions: clearly he
and his colleagues were unwilling to test the political
(l) European Parliament, doc. 178/73 (Delmotte-report),
10.10.1973.
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will of the Member States. One could not of course
advocate a repetition of initiatives such as the 1961
conference on regional economies, but the Commission's
role is to stimulate European integration and not just
to follow the governments of the Member States.
The Commission's technocratic and unpolitical approach
was demonstrated by another fact: it was proposed that
the ERDF should operate only in regions recognized
by the Commission; but the choice was to be made from
among areas selected by the Member States and whose
per capita GNP is below the EEC average. Regions
below this average which, for internal reasons, were
not selected as problem areas by their government
therefore cannot profit from the ERDF. Other criteria
will be used by the Commission: high dependence on
employment in agriculture or in declining industries,
high and continuing unemployment and a large negative
migration figure. About half the EEC's territory
with l/3 of the EEC's population is thus selected
for help by the ERDF. In the Benelux, some of the
regions selected are so small that they cannot even
be considered to be micro regions; this is a waste
of Community money because these areas are sometimes
adjacent to well developed areas and because economic
development can easily be stimulated by national means
in such small areas. The Parliament had seen this
danger too when it amended the Commission's proposal
with a provision that the ERDF can only intervene
if national support cannot be sufficient to reduce
economic imbalances (l); but the Council did not
want to give the Commission the means of passing
judgement on this. Each government wants to profit
from the ERDF, which means in fact that less money is
available for really underdeveloped regions such as
southern Italy or Ireland. Thus the Parliament's
amendment was not included in the final text adopted
(l) Delmotte Report, amendment to art 3 of proposed
regulation.
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by the Council The debates in the European Parliament
between MP's and the Commission made the Commission's
attitude clear: it wanted in the first place to find
an agreement with the Council of Ministers and therefore
it tried to avoid every point which could displease
the governments or the national bureaucracies. One
of the results is this ridiculous system of giving EC
regional aid to small areas in the Benelux and Vest
Germany which do not really need this money. Another
result is the absence of consultation with regional
authorities
The proposed committee for regional policy will study
national regional policies, economic progress in all
EEC regions, specific development programmes in regions
referred to in the regulation establishing the ERDF
and the financial means which the Member States and the
EEC intend to employ for regional actions. It also
examines the coordination between EEC and national
regidnal policies for the execution of specific
programmes and the measures to reduce economic growfh
in regions with heavy economic concentration. In
fact, the committee for regional policy can cover
everything concerning regional policy, except the
repercussions of regionalization. But since it is
composed of national civil servants, assisted by an
observer from the European Investment Bank and experts,
as and when required, one need not h> fear that any
proposal will be made which might upset the Member
States. Parliament, which in the past always pressed
for cooperation between local and regional authorities
and the Commission, repeats this request as an indirect
criticism of the composition of the committee (l).
Unlike the European Investment Bank, to which regional
authorities have direct access, requests for assistance
from the ERDF must be put forward by the Member States.
This is justified by bureaucratic reasons (2), the
(1) EEC Commission, doc. (76) 307 def. First Report
on the activities of the ERDF, p. 8.
(2) Delmotte Report.
(3>) Qcmaaa>ci(£ gP bbC t c • -*02-3,. 7z.v/l5
C*0 /
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small staff of the ERDF would not be able to select
from a great number of requests, thus a pre-selection
is made by the national administrations. The fact
that proposals have to fit into a national plan of
regional economic development is not a valid argument
against direct contacts between the Commission and
regional authorities.
The Commission gives a detailed decision for important
projects and a more general decision for other requests.
The Member States must also communicate their regional
development programmes so as to allow the Commission
to fit in its support. One should not have too high
expectations of the advice which the committee for
regional policy must transmit to the Commission. It
is unlikely that national civil servants will voice
fundamental criticism, if any, about regional policy
projects in a particular Member State; only independ¬
ent experts would be able and willing to do so.
Besides the two points mentioned already, the European
Parliament also expressed more general criticism of
the Commission's proposals concerning the ERDF. It
regrets the regional approach of the Commission, which
is too exclusively economic and does not take sufficient
account of the social and human aspects. It therefore
urges that the ERDF should also assist projects concern¬
ing professional training and education and social
matters, which some Member States might have difficulties
in financing (l). The European Parliament has asked
the Commission before to take a wider approach to
regional problems (2) but apparently without success.
In spite of the 1972 Paris summit declaration, the
Council could not come to an agreement on the budget
of the ERDF. The Commission had proposed 2.250
million UA for the 197^-76 period; this was too much
1) European Parliament, resolution of 5*7.73 S 7«
2) Kredietbank-weekberichten, 1975 nr 9» P* 6.
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for the German government, which had to pay the largest
part of it and which was under pressures from MP's of
all parties which were far from pleased with the re¬
negotiation manoevres of the British government; to
a lesser extent this was also true of the Benelux
governments who did not exercise their usual pressure
in favour of everything which would strengthen European
integration.
At the 1973 summit conference in Copenhagen, no
agreement could be reached, but this conference was
preoccupied with other issues (the oil crisis). At
the December 197*+ summit in Paris it was finally decided
that the ERDF would come into operation on 1.1.75?
during the first three years it would have an exper¬
imental character. But the financial means of the
ERDF are considerably lower than originally envisaged:
300 million UA in 1975 and 500 million TJA in 1976 and
1977• If one considers the population of the regions
selected to benefit from the fund, this is at the most
6 UA per capita; together, the Member States spend
about 18 UA per capita for scheduled backward areas to
finance their regional policy (l)» It was also
decided to use Community resources to finance the ERDF;
150 million UA will therefore be taken from the guid¬
ance section of the FEOGA. The Council regulation
setting up the ERDF was passed on 18.3«75> so that
after all the fund had to start with retro-active force
Meanwhile the Commission had completed another request
from the Heads of State and government made at the
1972 Paris summit. A study was carried out on regional
report provides a survey of the main aspects of regional
(2).
problems and policies in the enlarged EEC (3)« The
Council regulation nr 72^/75> JO L 73> 21.3«75»
Commission doc. (73)> 550 final, 3«5»73» See
also EC Commission 7th General Report, 1973-
1) idem.
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disequilibria in each Member State and of measures
to remedy this situation. But what is more important
is that the Commission openly admitted that economic
growth between i960 and 1970 had not brought harmonious
economic development as requested by the Treaty of
Rome. Apart from the human and environmental arguments,
which are conveniently forgotten when it comes to the
elaboration of EEC measures, the relationship between
regional policy and the EMU was repeated; the trend
of the Commission to link underdevelopment to congest¬
ion, which had already emerged in the previous period,
continued and seems to have been strengthened (though
there is only one concrete EEC measure in this field:
the limitation of investment assistance in the central
areas of the Community).
The report was far from innovative: EEC regional
policy was to be a supplement to national policies;
there should be more coordination of common policies
and financial instruments at EEC level, and of national
regional policies. Apart from the announcement that
measures would be proposed to reduce congestion, the
establishment of the ERDF and a committee for regional
policy, all the rest had been said before.
It must be noted, however, that under the Ortoli
Commission there was a change in the Commission's
approach to its regional development studies. Instead
of studies concerning a particular project of interest
to one Member State or another, regional studies were
now undertaken in a coordinated way; the Commission
for .
had set up a working group/that purpose (in 197°)• This
will be helpful in integrating EEC regional studies
more closely with the activities of the Committee for
regional policy and the ERDF.
Tn the context of this thesis, mention must be made also
of an interesting suggestion made in the European
Parliament, which recommended new local government
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authorities which could cooperate easily on both sides
of the Community's internal frontiers (l). Parliament's
concern is understandable: trans-frontier cooperation
is hampered by legal incompatibilities and political
difficulties (i.e. suspicion in national capital^. But
the idea of a European Joint Authority which would have
powers to organize such trans-frontier cooperation,
particularly regarding public services (but without
excluding planning activities), seems hard to sell.
However, the Commissioner for regional policy again
refused to tackle what is clearly a political problem
nor did he even suggest alternatives.
2. Regional policy measures
a) The EEC's principal achievement is the establishment
of the European Regional Development Fund, although it
has only been functioning since 1.1.75* The ERDF gives
assistance to public institutions carrying out infra¬
structures works which are necessary for the develop¬
ment of the industrial or the tertiary sector. Its
financial aid cannot exceed "}0c/c of the total expenses.
But this assistance can also be an interest subsidy
of y/c on a loan taken out from the European Investment
Bank. The ERDF can also give financial help to
investment projects in the industrial or tertiary
sector which create at least ten new employment facil¬
ities or which counthbute to maintaining employment in
one of the selected regions; these investment projects
must exceed 50,000 UA. Another condition is that to
receive assistance from the fund, these projects must
also be assisted by the national government according
to their existing regional aid measures. ERDF aid is
thus associated with national aid; it may not exceed
50c/c of the national aid, nor 20c/c of the investment costs.
(l) European Parliament, Gerlach report 18.11.76.
303.
Cooperation between the Bank and the Fund, which both
have regional responsibilities but different methods of
action, was thus made possible by the introduction at
European level of regional aid measures which were already
long in use in the Member States (interest subsidies).
However, the first decision lies with the European
Investment Bank (to grant a loan); thereafter the ERDF
can add supplementary' aid where necessary (to grant
the interest subsidy), but this depends on the govern¬
ment: if it does not present a project to the ERDF,
a regional authority which can deal directly with the
Bank, could run into difficulties. Indeed, the loan
may be takai out at the Bank in the hope of an interest
subsidy from the ERDF. The EIB acts autonomously and
does not have to take account of the priorities of
the ERDF which may be established by the committee for
regional policy, the Commission and the Council; the
presence of an observer from the Bank in the committee
does not solve this problem. Coordination with national
regional aid measures is envisaged explicity in regul¬
ation no. 72^/75 (art 5); "the Commission must thus
decide on matters regarding the conformity of proposed
regional programmes to EEC objectives.
In the first year, difficulties already emerged concern-
' ing the interpretation of "infrastructure investments
which are directly related to industrial and tertiary
development" (l). The wide differences between national
regional policies have meant that this phrase has been
interpreted differently in different states; projects
proposed for ERDF support therefore vary greatly. The
necessity of the coordination of national regional
policies and their subordination to EEC principles is
obvious. The Commission has emphasized that the
ERDF is complementary to national aid and that the
Member States may not reduce their expenditure on
(l) ERDF, first report, p. 8.
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regional policy because they now receive European
money too; they should rather increase it (l). All
Member States have agreed to this principle. However,
it is not certain that they follow it in practice.
Very soon, suspicion emerged that they put ERDF money
in the general budget, together with their income from
other sources. It thus became difficult to find out
whether it had gone to the regions and whether national
aid had not gone down. They also submitted the
annual information statements required under ERDF
regulations; these will help the Commission to compare
the practical application of national regional policies,
a necessary first step towards coordination.
Another matter to be solved concerns coordination between
the Fund and other Commission instruments and policies.
Special procedures have been worked out to provide for
coordination between the ERDF and the social fund, the
ECSC aid under art and 36 (reconversion and readap-
tation aid) and the guidance section of the FEOGA (2);
a region can receive assistance from more than one EEC
institution at the same time, but not from FEOGA and
ERDF together. The attribution of the responsibility
for EEC regional policy to one commissioner exclusively
has brought more internal coordination; one of the
often criticized darknesses of the EEC regional policy
has thus been reduced considerably since 1972 and
in particular since the fund started to function. The
Commission has set up an internal group to coordinate
all EEC financial instruments and the Council agreed
in principle on ^.b.76 that the mechanism of these
instruments should be coordinated, but this has not
yet been completed. However, it seems that good progress
is being made concerning the coordination of grants
from the ERDF with ESCS conversion funds, the FEOGA
guidance section and even the EIB (3)«
idem, p. 17-18
idem, p. 28-30.
EEC Commission, 10th general report p. 120.
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During the first year, Ireland and the selected regions
in Italy, Great Britain and France benefited most from
the ERDF, but the Commission rightly argues in favour
of a better concentration of the fund's resources on
regions with the greatest economic difficulties and on
the projects and sectors most likely to help to over¬
come them. Modifications of the ERDF regulation may
be expected, probably after presentation of the second
report (June 1977).
b) The EIB, whose basic capital was increased after
the enlargement of the EEC, increased its financing
in 1976 to 1.273 million UA, compared with 1.006 million
UA in 1975* Loans and guarantees given by the EIB
exceeded the thousand million UA level for the first
time; they rose to 1.086 million UA in 197&, compared
with 917 million UA in 1975. The distribution of EIB
aid among the Member States changed: Italy which was
the main beneficiary in the past, now comes second
after the United Kingdom. It is remarkable that three
projects in Vest Germany, the wealthiest Member State
of the EEC, received 110 million UA, whereas France
and Ireland received respectively 60 million UA and
57 million UA. Though regional disparities persist
in the Benelux, Denmark and Germany, they are smaller
than in other states; moreover, the economic and
financial situation in these states (except perhaps
Luxembourg and Denmark) should enable them to do without
European aid. But clearly this is politically very
difficult to achieve.
c) In matters of agricultural policy, the main point
to be mentioned in relation to regional policy concerns
the establishment of a list of priority agricultural
regions and areas referred to in the regulation on
finance of the guidance section of the FEOGA (l). In
(l) Commission doc. (73) 10.3.1973.
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these regions and areas, incentives will be given for
regional development to encourage the creation of jobs
when there is a large surplus in the agricultural
working population. It shows a continuing trend to
give more regional importance to the common agricultural
policy, though there is a continuing danger too of
confusing regional policy with industrialization (l).
At a time when people all over Europe are becomming
more environment conscious, it would be very regrettable
if the Commission's well-meant policy actually con¬
tributed to the destruction of the agricultural
environment.
During this period, the Commission also started to
elaborate special measures for regions with unfavour¬
able conditions for agriculture, such as mountain
and hill regions In view of what it said above,
this could become a valuable part of the EEC regional
policy in agricultural matters, preventing the depop¬
ulation of these areas or the kind of industrializ¬
ation that would destroy their environment.
d) At the request of the ECSC consultative committee,
the Commission has started the elaboration of reconver¬
sion programmes for the iron and steel industry, which
is in an extremely difficult position in many regions
(e.g. Wallonia, Lorrain) (3)« Many of these regions
have already been selected for the help of the ERDF;
thus the Commission intends to use all the financial
instruments for the implementation of these programmes
(ERDF, Social Fund, application of ECSC art. 56). This
will provide an interesting coordination which will
increase the cumulative effect of these aid measures.
Conclusions
To avoid the danger of violations of the common market
(1) J.D.B. Mitchell, op. cit. p. 2.
(2) Kredietbank-weekberichten, 1975 nr 9 P« 6.
(3) EC Commission, 10th general report 1976 p. l6l
(f) Jzjz, (V) CtAA- ^ 30^ .
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in its present stage and to be able to establish an
EMU one day, a faster reduction of regional disparities
is still necessary. With the present level of national
and EEC actions combined, it may not be before the year
2023 that regional disparities are reduced to such an
extent that an EMU can be established (l).
The ERDF, the only regional achievement of the EEC
of significance in this period, offers new possibilities
for the elaboration of a coherent and more global
regional policy. However, the stumbling block remains
the coordination with national regional policies. The
concept of an EEC regional policy remains an aid
concept, but more internal coordination and more co¬
ordination with Member States may gradually lead to a
more planned concept at EEC level.
(2.) EEC Directive 75-/268, JO L 128 of 19.5.1975.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
It has been difficult to make the 'red line' of this
thesis always apparent, because of the complicated nature
of the discussion (legal political and economic) and
because of the two levels of government involved (the
national and the european level). Therefore it seems
useful to bring together several conclusions which
emerge from the analysis in the preceding chapters.
It is often thought that coordination of national
regional policies is very difficult because of the widely
different character of these policies. 1/ Member States
are willing to coordinate regional policies at european
level, tWtthey are willing to develop a proper EC regional
policy, but the differences between the nine national
regional policies are almost unsurmountable#
-
■== Some doubts may now be expressed
about this view.
Depending on the seriousness of regional economic
imbalances, Member States have gradually elaborated
a regional policy. The introduction of regional policy
measures took place at different periods in each Member
State, but it does not seem relevant for this thesis
whether it happened at the beginning of this century
(for example in Italy) or only during the late fifties
(for example in Belgium and Luxemburg). From their
emergence in the form of assistance measures in the
beginning, all national regional policies are character¬
ized by an evolution towards regional economic develop¬
ment planning. Differences in plaining methods continue
to exist, but this is more a technical matter; it has
some political consequences too, but these can not
affect this general conclusion: although the functions
and methods of regional policies can differ, there is a
remarkable similarity between the regional measures
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applicable today in the Member States.
In relation to this point, mention must be made of the
reforms of local and regional government in the Member
States. One of the reasons for these reforms is the
evolution towards regional economic planning. There
seems to be a general belief in the Member States that
traditional local and regional structures are not
for the elaboration and execution of planning measures;
therefore reforms are planned or have been worked out
already.
But there are other reasons for these reforms too,
related to the desire for more democratic and efficient
government at these levels and for more decentraliz¬
ation. The increase of governmentaftasks had also
increased centralization; it seems difficult to imagine
it otherwise, because local and regional authorities
were often unable to cope with new tasks (such as
planning) in an efficient way. However, the reaction
is very real today and one can see everywhere a revival
of ideas of local and/or regional government. In some
countries, historic and cultural reasons are added to
these economic and political reasons, and demands for
regional autonomy even emerge. Also in this respect
there is similarity between the Member States although
to different degrees.
These reforms of existing structures are marked by
amalgamation of municipalities and by the emergence
of a two tier intermediate structure (micro-and macro —
regions). The micro-regional level seems destined
to be close to the municipal level and to perform tasks
ma.inly concerned with public service. The macro-regional
level seems destined to be closer to the national level
and to perform planning" tasks mainly in the economic
and social field. A two tier intermediate structure
does not yet exist in each Member State, but proposals
in that direction have been made; the evolution is
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still underway.
One may conclude thus that fundamental differences
between the Member States in matters of regional policy
and regionalization are not as large as sometimes
suggested. There is a common evolution towards more
regional economic planning and, not without relation
to it, a tendency towards regionalization.
As we have indicated before, this implies reform of
the intermediate structure of local/regional govern¬
ment (provinces, counties, departments) and the
introduction of another level, the macro—regions.
The regional policy of the EC is weakened by the absence
of a coherent set of measures in the Treaties. In fact
it is based on concepts of regional policy existing in
the Member States in the early fifties. This is proved
most clearly by the absence of any idea of regional
economic planning. However, it looks as if a new
evolution has started recently and that the EC is moving
towards a more comprehensive regional policy; the
establishment of the ERDF will probably stimulate this
evolution even more. Real planning of regional economic
development is still not possible at European level,
because the institutions have no powers to do so; if
they will have such powers one day, they will have
first to coordinate planning techniques. Also the
coordination of national regional policies has been
weak until now. In this matter there are less excuses
for the present state of affairs. Differences between
regional policy measures in the Member States are not
so large that coordination is impossible; it seems
thus that the political will has failed, owaaaA
b(Le, ic{jux£y oc&aJcuma, to add a
new chapter to the Treaties, based on the aims already
laid down in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, in
order to allow the EEC institutions to work out comp-
311.
rehensive planning of regional economic development.
This should include the independent use of the Regional
Development Fund, full integration of the regional
activities of the EIB into such a policy, coordination
of national (macro) regional economic policies, measures
and financial aid. In general, a considerable extension
of EEC powers would be needed in this field.
It would also offer an opportunity to make some provisions
concerning contacts between regional and Buropean author¬
ities. There must be coherence between the different
levels of government; therefore national authorities
will continue to occupy an important place in any
system of direct links between regional authorities
(of whatever sort) and the Commission. Contacts exist
already but there is a need to make them more official
and more open, t-o the benefit of all parties.
It might be a beginning to more complementary forms of
government in the EC.
However, it is not certain that a more harmonious
development could then be achieved because, if the EC
institutions move further towards a new regional
policy, they will probably meet the same problem
which the national governments have come up against;
the need for new political and administrative structures,
in particular at the level of intermediate government.
Local and regional authorities which can no longer
function efficiently in a national pattern, are also
not suited to deal with Buropean institutions.
The reforms of local and regional structures in the
Member States can thus influence the elaboration of
European regional policy. This conclusion may certainly
not overshadow other suggestions for a renewed european
regional policy, but it is an aspect which is often
overlooked. Without such reforms, coordination of
national regional policies, elaboration of a regional
economic development planning and consultation and
participation by regional authorities will continue
to be jeopardized. This of course does not mean that
EC institutions should seek a revolutionary policy which
would cause an upheavel in internal affairs. Vhat seems
to be required is that Member States, when in the process
of elaborating regionalization, take more account of
the European dimension of these reforms.
A final point concerns the connection between the first and the second
part of the thesis. The study of national regional policies is
needed to understand fully the possibilities and limitations of
European regional policy (in particular in relation to the problem
of coordination) and to understand the implications of regionalization
in the Member States. If the elaboration of regional policy afeks for
reform of existing local and regional structures, than the elaboration
of a European regional policy asks also for a more coherent structure
in the Community. In other words, national reform proposals should
take more account of European regional policy, and its structural
needs. One is tempted to say at the end of this work : the Conference
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